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ABSTRACT 
Primarily, this paper attempts to analyze Aristotle's notion of 
"principle" as it is uniquely applied throughout his works. 'Principle' 
is a basic notion; and it is, moreover, the basic notion in Aristotle's 
philosophy. The purpose here is to establish as precisely as possible 
the meaning of 'principle' and the role that it plays in Aristotelian 
thought. It is shown that the meaning of 'principle' involves a certain 
bipolar tension which strains between a logico-epistemic pole and an 
on tic pole. This tension grounds a philosophy which constantly vacil-
lates between a rationalistic idealism and an empirically oriented 
naturalism. 
The Greek term under consideration is tip x n although it should 
be noted that Aristotle does not a,Iways use the term in a technical sense; 
and, at times, when he refers to 'principle' in a technical sense, he may 
not always use ap x fi . 
In Chapter I, we claim that Aristotle's basic and primary assumption--
that there is a real world which is intelligible--necessarily involves a 
notion of principles that somehow "connects" the real world with intel-
ligible expressions of it. In other words, "principles" manifest a bipolar 
condition of being both mental (the intelligible expression) and real 
(objectively grounded in the world). 
i 
ii 
Descartes is seen as the first philosopher to challenge seriously 
the objective pole of principles. For Descartes, philosophical inquiry 
begins with "principles of knowledge" rather than with "principles of 
being." The Cartesian assault on Aristotle's "principles" may be unwar-
ranted if it is realized that his (Aristotle's) search after principles of 
being included the cognitional pole so that "being" is never really 
separated from one's clear and distinct understanding of it. 
Chapter II investigates the bipolarity of Aristotelian principles in 
the realm of perishable entities. Through his notion of "principles," 
Aristotle attempts to solve an enigma of "being" and "knowing." How can 
sensible entities be individual and yet definable, unique and yet intel-
ligible? How can a world of particulars be admitted when "knowledge is 
of the universal"? 11 Principles II provide both the concrete unity and the 
ground for universal understanding in Aristotle's attempt to solve the 
problem. It is the ontic pole of principles that is explanatory of the con-
creteness and unity of individuals, while it is the logico-epistemic pole 
which serves as the basis for univers ·ality and intelligibility. 
Four specific characteristics of principles as applied to perishable 
entities are then revealed. Principles are seen to be as: 1) referential or 
relational; 2} potential for universality; 3) irreducible contraries; and 
4) analogous. Concerning the first, principles are to be viewed not as 
"entities" or "things" but rather as certain ways whereby things are known. 
The second characteristic pursues in specific detail the problem of 
iii 
universal knowledge versus individual entities. From the point of view 
of a being's potentiality, one may realize a universal ground of being 
many things. From the point of view of a being's actuality, one grasps 
the individual entity in an immediate sensory awareness. The third 
characteristic remolds the pre-Socratic and Platonic notions of contrariety. 
~ 
The pre-Socratic notion of archai as contraries (according to Aristotle) 
cannot be true principles, since being material elements they are not 
basic and irreducible. Plato's contrary forms cannot be true principles 
since they are separate from what they purport to explain. Aristotle's bi-
polar "principles" can be irreducible and contrary and yet be simultaneously 
"in" things (e.g., act-potency). The fourth characteristic allows both 
sameness and difference to permeate the various levels of being so that 
any hierarchy of being is freed from an uncompromising fixity or rigidity. 
Analogous principles explain a hierarchy of horizontal levels of classes 
with a vertical continuity running through the class structures (i.e., the 
genera and species). 
In Chapter III, Aristotle's imperishable realm ( acpeap-ros ) 
is compared with his sublunar realm. The two realms are seen to be 
different and yet similar, and it is analogous principles that effect these 
differences and similarities. Aristotle's application of the same principles 
to both realms allows him to include both perishables and imperishables 
under the realm of "nature." This spanning of the whole range of nature 
by principles warrants a transcendental character of principles that is 
iv 
contrasted with Aristotle's search in the Physics and the Metaphysics for 
a Transcendent One. Again, a bipolarity is indicated which strains 
between a rationalistic tendency toward a Transcendent Being which might 
explain the whole of reality and a tendency toward more naturalistic 
explanations in terms of transcendental principles. 
The last Chapter traces the role of principles in the realm of 
• 
reason where archai are applied to Aristotle's theory of demonstration and 
his general notion of science. Two basic kinds of demonstration are seen 
as permeating Aristotle's theory of methodology. The first we label 
"axiomatic demonstration." This is demonstration in the strict sense of 
deducing certain and necessary conclusions from self-evident principles. 
These "worthy" and "noble" first principles (:&~·iwµata) 
are the source of intellectual delight and contain more intrinsic worth than 
the conclusions that are drawn from them. 
The second kind of demonstration is termed "hypothetical demon-
stration." This is demonstration in a looser sense in which principles are 
difficult to know and demonstration proceeds fn?m hypotheses and 
postulates. Conclusions arrived at by means of this type of deduction 
tend toward probability rather than certitude. 
Concerning the problem of how one acquires knowledge of the 
first principles, we again maintain that Aristotle vacillates between the 
poles of rationalism and realism. The former pole involves an analytic 
intuition in which the world of experience is shunned and a mere analysis 
v 
of terms and concepts reveals the primary axioms. The latter advocates 
an inductive intuition in which experience plays a necessary role in one's 
grasping of the principles. 
Finally, it is shown that there is more than one meaning to 
Aristotle's concept of "science" (l1r1crTnµn ). 
* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
THE PRIME ARISTOTELIAN ASSUMPTION 
The reason for our present discussion is that it is generally 
assumed that what is call e d wisdom is concerned with 
primary causes and principles .... Since we are investigating 
this kind of knowledge we must consider what these causes 
and principles are whose knowledge is wisdom.I 
Thus for Aristotle the highest possible kind of human knowledge is a 
knowledge of primary principles. Why does Aristotle maintain that human 
cognition reaches its zenith in grasping principles? Does knowledge 
terminate in principles or, as the term itself suggests, does knowledge 
begin with principles? Could one perhaps even venture to say that 
knowledge begins and ends with first principles? Since Aristotle relates 
principles to knowledge in speaking of the highest knowledge through 
primary principles, he implies that principles have a mental or logical 
expression. One may ask further, then, if _principles are merely logical 
expressions--mental constructs that give meaning to a "reality" that 
otherwise would be unintelligible; or do principles have a more ontological 
basis--having as it were a real foundational character? Or again can these 
antithetical questions be synthesized in an Hegelian kind of dialectic so 
that perhaps the very same principles of knowledge also serve as principles 
of being? Furthermore, Aristotle himself raises the question of principles 
lAristotle, Metaphysics I, 981 b 28-30; 982 a 5 (Harvard: Loeb 
Edition, 1933). 
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as axioms of demonstration. Can there even be a science of axioms? If 
"science" means "knowledge acquired through demonstration," and if 
demonstration proceeds from first principles or axioms, then would there 
not seem to be an infinite regress of demonstrating "first" principles by 
using other "first" principles which in tum would require another demon-
stration? It is perhaps a difficult task to investigate the "principles" of 
a philosophical system, since the very object of study precludes any 
explanation that would be couched in "more basic" terminology than that 
which is to be described. Yet it would seem that without some under-
standing of a philosopher's basic starting point, one can hardly grasp the 
significance of his philosophy. Considering both the difficulty of 
describing the character of "that which is prior" and the necessity of such 
a study, one's approach to the problem cannot be direct. The problem 
must be approached slowly and cautiously, encircled as it were, from all 
sides not unlike Marcel's approach to philosophical mysteries. 
From a linguistic point of view, it may not be clear what a particular 
philosopher means by 'principle. ' The discussion could begin and end at 
the level of language if the question "what is a principle? 11 was considered 
a nonsense question involving a "category mistake" which attempts to 
reify II principle II when in effect the term merely signifies a basic rule or 
norm or guide. Such meaning is best exemplified in an expression: "The 
chief principle of philosophy is to determine the precise meaning of words 
in a given statement." Even here the word "principle" connotes a begin-
ning of a philosophical position, or a source--a priority--so that the term 
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is not so nebulous as to exclude understanding. Principle in this sense 
indicates that : "a proper philosophical attitude begins with ... " or 
"a good philosopher starts with ... " and again, "the source of philosoph-
ical clarity is found in ... " All of this is clear enough, but how would 
the term be understood if it designates a collection of unproved mathe-
matical axioms that can be used to attain to an understanding of other 
mathematical truths? For example, principles of mathematics as: if a, 
b, c are natural numbers, and if a ==b and b=c, then a=c (Things equal to 
the same thing are equal to each other). Or, if a=b and c =d, all letters 
representing natural numbers, then a+c = b+ d (if equals are added to 
equals, the results are equal). In these examples of principles of mathe-
matics, the term 'principle' means more than a norm or guideline. It 
approaches the notion of axiom, rndi cating a basic unproven and unprovable 
truth from which other mathematical truths may be derived. And, of 
course, it is not uncommon to speak of principles of geometry--such as 
in Euclidean geometry: given any two distinct points, there is at least 
one line containing them, and at most ohe line containing them. Here in 
geometry, we are perhaps dealing with a less abstract subject matter than 
pure numbers because lines and planes and solids seem to correspond 
more with doors and walls and table tops than do numbers. 
This isomorphic character of "principles" and "things" becomes even 
more apparent in speaking about principles of physics. To say in Newtonian 
terms, for example, that every action has an equal and opposite reaction 
or that a body in motion tends to stay in motion unless an external force 
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intervenes, is to set the meaning of •principle• in an even more complex 
light. When we speak of "principles of moving bodies," are we using 
•principles' to denote merely conceptual schemes? If such is the case, 
if principles are merely conceptual schemes, then why are not "moving 
bodies" mere con c eptual schemes as well? What does it mean to speak 
of "principles of moving bodies"? We are loathe to attribute reality to 
principles, yet we are equally reluctant to as sign a mere cognitive 
existence to "bodies." We want to say that "principles" are a conceptual 
and/or linguistic expression and that "bodies" are real things and in the 
same breath to speak of "principles of bodies." Now unless "principles" 
have some foundational character, we could not speak of "principles of 
bodies." "Principles" is a reference term. 2 It needs the preposition 'of. ' 
In and of itself, it means nothing. By isolating the term in a definition 
we see the reference character. "Principle:" a beginning (implying a 
beginning of something to follow); "Principle:" a source (implying a source 
of something to come); "Principle:" a priority (implying a priority of an 
impending posteriority}. Thus if one wants to retain the purely conceptual 
character of principles, he does so at the price of existing things. For his 
principles must then be expressed as "principles of conceptual schemes." 
These conceptual schemes may, of course, be called "bodies, " but is 
this what the physicist means when he talks about bodies? Is he talking 
about conceptual schemes, or is his "talking" a conceptual scheme about 
2 
"But we ask what the principle is so that we may refer to something 
more intelligible." Meta. VII, 1040 b 20. Here Aristotle states that "unity" 
and "being" are more substantial than "principle" which relates to that 
which it explains. 
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bodies--real bodies? And if the latter is the case, is there really any 
difference between the phrases "talking about bodies" and "principles 
of bodies, " since his "talking" is a basic scheme or source of further 
utterances about things? If you want to admit that basic expressions 
are of real things, and if you want to call these basic expressions 
"principles," then principles have a foundational character. Principles 
have a nebulous ambivalence between a logical schema and an ontic ground. 
One need not admit the ontic ground of principles. Principles may indeed 
be divorced entirely from an on tic reference. But since "principle" is a 
reference term, it (a conceptual scheme) must be referred at least to 
another conceptual scheme. "Principles of bodies" in this case is a con-
ceptual scheme of a conceptual scheme. It is "thinking about thinking," 
or "talking about talking." The basic assumption of Aristotle avoids this 
"denial" of a "real" world. The merits and demerits of such an assumption 
shall be subsequently discussed, but it first must be understood that it 
is the assumption of Aristotle and that it basically involves a particular 
view of "principles." That there is one basic assumption is clouded by 
the fact that different linguistic expressions can be given to the same 
assumption. For example, it is sometimes stated that Aristotle assumes 
"there is a world." At other times one reads that Aristotle assumes "that 
the world is intelligible." Now these two statements are really identical 
because the assumption "there is a world" as soon as it is uttered, 
immediately engages "the world" in a cognitional frame of reference, 
thus immediately implying that "the world is intelligible." Furthermore, 
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if one is not ready to admit that he is "talking about talking," then any 
further assertions about "the world" must assume that reasons or principles 
that say something about the world, first (negatively}, are not mere con-
ceptual schemes, and second (positively}, are real reasons or principles 
of the world. Perhaps the significance of this view of principles as tied 
in with a real, intelligible world is , seen in better perspective when it is 
contrasted with its very denial. Then, perhaps, an analysis of the analogous 
character of "principles" in Aristotle's thinking will cut across his 
philosophical works and reveal a basic strength and, at the same time, 
a weakness--taking him at his word that a philosophical view is neither 
better nor worse than its first principles. 
THE CARTESIAN CHALLENGE - A BRIEF HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
Few historians of philosophy will dispute the claim that Descartes 
represents the beginning of a new philosophical era for he challenged not 
only an entrenched system of philosophy which supported a theological 
doctrine, but he also called into doubt the entire scope of human knowledge 
' 
and submitted the value of cognition to a rigorous scrutiny. For Descartes, 
philosophical knowledge represented an all-embracing knowledge; so that 
if he was to tumble the structure of human knowledge in order to build anew, 
then philosophical knowledge about all must be leveled. But what was 
"philosophy" to the young Descartes? What did "philosophy" mean to him? 
Primarily it was Aristotelianism as formulated by the Schools, 3 and the 
3Descartes himself distinguishes the philosophy of Aristotle from a 
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schoolmen had carefully constructed their system upon that which was the 
very basis of philosophical wisdom for Aristotle--Principles. Philosophy 
was basically that of Aristotle and Aristotelianism was basically a set of 
infallible, primary principles. Descartes, therefore, saw need to challenge 
the validity of these principles if he was to shake the entire structure. It 
is curious to note that Descartes himself never for a moment questioned 
the right given to first principles as the basis for philosophy. What 
Descartes questions is whether Aristotle's archai were the right ones. He 
(Descartes) accepts, or rather, assumes as a fact that philosophical 
wisdom is attained through first principles; and his language is not unlike 
that of Aristotle concerning wisdom in the text from Aristotle quoted above . 
. . . this word philosophy signifies the study of wisdom, and 
that by wisdom we not only understand prudence in affairs, 
but also a perfect knowledge of all things that man can know . 
. . . It is essential that it (wisdom) should be derived from 
first causes, so that in order to acquire it (which is properly 
termed philosophising}, we must begin with the investigation 
of these first causes, i.e. , of the principles. 4 
Descartes, then, never doubts that philosophical wisdom is based 
on the primary principles, nor does he deny , that metaphysics is the prime 
part of philosophy that deals with the prime principles: 
Then when one has acquired a certain skill in discovering 
the truth in these questions (mathematics) he should begin 
seriously to apply himself to the true philosophy, the first 
part of which is metaphysics which contains the principles 
"corruption of diverse opinions which he would not recognize as his were he 
to return to this world." Letter to Abbe Picot used as a preface to 
Principles of Philosophy (Dover Publications), trans. Haldane and Ross, 
1955, p. 207. 
4Ibid., pp. 203-204. 
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of knowledge .... Thus philosophy as a whole is like a 
tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, 
and whose branches which issue from this trunk, are all 
the other sciences. 5 
Yet for all this apparent agreement between Descartes' conception 
of philosophy, philosophical wisdom and the basic role of principles and 
that of the Aristotelian view, Descarte"B will not allow that Aristotle's 
principles be the basis of a true philosophy--if for no other reason than 
that centuries of futility have proved those principles false. 
So, when we have true principles in philosophy we cannot 
fail, by following them, occasionally to meet with other 
truths; and that there is no way in which we can better 
prove the falsity of those of Aristotle, than by pointing 
out that no progress has been attained by their means in 
all the centuries in which they have been followed. 6 
Upon closer examination, one can see the basis for the challenge 
that Descartes throws down concerning Aristotle's "principles." In the 
above-quoted text from Descartes, we saw that "true philosophy" has for 
its "first part" "metaphysics which contains the principles of knowledge." 
(Emphasis mine.) In his introduction to the Principles of Philosophy, 
Descartes makes it very clear that metaphysics pr first philosophy deals 
with principles of knowledge. 
I likewise published them (The Principles of Philosophy), and 
divided the book containing them into four parts, the first of 
which contains the principles of knowledge, which is what 
may be called the First Philosophy or Metaphysics. 7 
(Emphasis mine.) 
5Ibid, I p, 211. 
6Ibid, I p, 214, 
7Ibid. , p. 212. 
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It may be no overstatement to maintain that the key to the Cartesian 
reconstruction--a reconstruction which ushered in a new critical approach 
to knowledge--can be found in this identification of First Philosophy with 
the prime principles of knowledge. For Aristotle and the Aristotelian 
tradition, Metaphysics or First Philosophy was the "science" that 
discovered the principles of being- !..being qua being. 8 Thus Being is 
ass urned as intelligible by the Aristotelian s; and the intelligibility of 
being, that is to say the highest degree of knowledge about being is 
brought about by a mental grasping of being's first principles from which 
other things can be known. 
"The things that are most knowable are first principles and causes, 
for it is through these and from these that other things come to be known ... 9 
The character of Aristotelian principles, however, serves not only a truth 
value but an ontic value as well: "They (first principles) are the cause 
of the existence of other things, and so as each thing is in respect of 
existence, so it is in respect of truth." 10 In this assumption that Aristotle 
makes--that there is being and it is knowable.:..-the very existence of 
things finds its source (arche) in the same source in which the truth of 
things is found. The principles of knowledge are not merely principles 
of knowledge but are foundational principles as well. In emphasizing 
8Aristotle, Meta. N, 1003 a ff. 
9Meta. I, 982 b 1-2. 
lOMeta. II, 993 b 29-30. 
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the first part of the assumption (there is a world), one makes an onto-
logical commitment which attempts to place being beyond cognitional 
formulation. ("There is a science of Being qua Being.") Here Aristotle 
sets the theme for a basic philosophic tendency to distinguish a Being-
in-itself from a Being-known. The two views, however, are of the same 
Being since the principles of the one are also the principles of the other. 
The ontic tendency of the Being-in-itself view becomes involved in a 
major difficulty, one perhaps that cannot be fully resolved. Basic prin-
ciples which are causal and explanatory must take on some logical 
formulation. And as soon as one realizes that such principles have a 
logical expression, the ontic in-itself character of Being is questioned. 
To say that principles of knowledge support an ontology which has the 
same set .Qf_ principles looked at from different points of view, so that 
with a shift of perspective one can distinguish Being from Being's intel-
ligibility, may not solve the problem. For we might ask what that other 
point of view is in which ontological principles "exist." Is it a point 
of view apart from cognitional expression? ·In order to talk about "them, " 
one must involve "them" in cognition; and once involved in cognition, 
then on what grounds can "principles of knowledge" be distinguished 
from "principles of Being"? It would appear that any ontology would 
destroy itself as an ontology (i.e. , any attempt to express Being apart 
from its expression) the very moment that a conceptual formulation is given 
to it. On the other hand, there is the strongest inclination to deny that 
our cognitional acts have any ontological effect on things. We want to 
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say that our knowledge of things does not dictate existence to things. 
We want to say that things are somehow independent of my cognitional 
functions. We want to admit that there are things whether or not we 
know them. This is Aristotle's legacy--a realism that talks about a 
world shot full of principles whereby things are what they are. There 
is the notion that Being holds some sort of domination over knowledge 
insofar as the latter is in a state of passive subservience to the former. ' 
Yet Being and knowledge cannot be disconnected for Aristotle. The same 
principles that explain why things are also explain why things are or 
can be known. Truth is thus explained in terms of Being. 
"This (excluded middle principle) will be plain if we first define 
truth and falsehood. To say that what is, is not, or that what is not, 
is, is false; but to say that what is, is, and what is not, is not, is 
true. 11 l l 
But is it really that simple? Descartes did not think so--at least 
the historical disputes that centered around Aristotelianism manifested 
a complexity that was too entangled for,the mathematical mind of 
Descartes. Descartes sought a simplicity in matters of truth. He looked 
for the least number of principles that would explain the most. The 
Aristotelian notion that each science is basically different from another, 12 
and that principles of one science cannot be used to demonstrate truths 
in other sciences 13 was a scandal to philosophical inquiry and perhaps 
11Meta. IV, 1011 b 26-28. 
12Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 87 a 38-40; 87 b 1-5. 
13Aristotle makes an exception when the sciences are subalternates. 
Post. Ana. 76 a 10-12. 
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even the source of so many disputes over things philosophical. Descartes 
might reason that if principles have such an epistemic priority and an 
ontic priority, then why is there so much consternation over philosoph-
ical issues? Why could not a few basic first principles be discovered 
that could serve as the foundation for truth in all the disciplines? 
Perhaps the only way to establish such first principles would be to chal-
lenge the basic assumption of an intelligible world. Only in this way 
could one tell whether or not Aristotle• s first principles were genuine 
or sham. This is Descartes• legacy--to challenge the most basic 
assumption systematized by the masterful Aristotle. Descartes called 
into doubt the prime assumption of Aristotle--that there are things. If 
fuscartes was to avoid the confusion and complexity of philosophical 
issues, then he must avoid speaking of "Beings" as distinct from 
"knowledge of Beings. " There is a world only if a world can be acknowl-
edged, and so Descartes begins his reconstruction with the principles of 
knowledge. Thus the Cartesian Metaphysics or First Philosophy "contains 
the principles of knowledge." 
Generally speaking, no one prior to Descartes questioned the bipolar 
character of principles (i.e. , the on tic and epistemic). If one accepts 
the usual historical evaluation of Stoic and Epicurean thinking as being 
predominantly ethical, then any ontological-epistemological contributions 
can be dismissed as having no great influence on future philosophers in 
this area. Alexander of Aphrodisias evidently "freed" Aristotle from Neo-
Platonism, but he need not have worried about Plotinus' philosophy 
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concerning the basic assumption of a principle of Being distinct from 
and yet the cause of knowledge. The One of Plotinus has to be apart 
from thought since thinking implies object-thought, and hence there 
would be a manifold which would contradict the perfect unity of T O ~ v • 14 
"Principle is above all else. The whole is like a conclusion of 
a syllogism, only without premises--beyond demonstration ... 15 And 
again, "Being and Actuality are identified in a single principle which 
depends on itself and nothing else." 16 
Proclus, whom E. R. Dodds considers as the chief link between 
ancient pnd medieval thought, 17 accepts much of Aristotle's philosophy, 
not the least of which is a self-sustaining arche which gives being to all 
things and which is apart from and the cause of knowledge. 18 Now we are 
not necessarily claiming that Aristotle influenced Neo-Platonism by 
distinguishing the realm of Being from the realm of thought. 19 
14 Plotinus, Enneads V, III 6. 
15Ibid., V 8. 
l6Ibid., VI 8. 
17 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, trans. -commentary E. R. 
Dodds (Oxford, 1933), cf. Preface. 
18Ibid., Proposition 20, p. 22. 
19 Aristotle does separate, of course, sensible substance from 
eternal substance. In Book XIII of the Metaphysics, he contends that 
neither Platonic Ideas nor Pythagorean numbers as separated substances 
can explain (as principles) sensible, perishable objects. Aristotle is not 
opposed to the concept of separated substances--surely he himself has 
enough of them. Nor is he opposed to the notion that separated substances 
can be the causes or principles of sensible objects, for he also has such 
principles. What he does maintain in Book XIII is that 1) neither Ideas nor 
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Aristotle's insistence on the actual knowledge of particular things denies 
any separate realm of intelligibility. What Aristotle did--as we have 
indicated--was to endow principles with a dual (ontic-epistemic) 
character. Our point now is that no Neo-Platonist saw need for chal-
lenging this endowment and, in fact, each philosopher fit it very nicely 
into his own particular philosophy. 
In medieval philosophy there is something of a challenge offered 
to the Aristotelian assumption of a "real world" when the status of universals 
is disputed. Ncilminalism and conceptualism foreshadow the Cartesian 
revolt against the domination of Being over knowledge. In the end, 
however, it is "modern Realism" that triumphs over both nominalism 
and conceptualism so that universal ideas "exist" in mente formaliter, 
cum fundamento in re. Mental (formal) existence is second best to the 
foundational reality of things, and truth becomes the adeguatio intellectus 
et rei. This formula clearly expresses the distinction between logical 
truth (the truth of the conceptual judgment) and the ontological truth (the 
truth of things themselves); of course, log;ical truth is possible only 
because of the ontological truth of things. And, equally important, this 
notion of truth is possible because principles somehow bridge the gap 
between the real and the ideal. In the Thomistic commentaries, the basic 
Aristotelian assumption reaches its complete fruition. Aristotle is the 
philosopher. Garrigou-Lagrange adequately summarizes the role that 
principles play in a philosophy which assumes that the world is intelligible. 
Numbers can exist apart from sensible substances, and 2) they cannot 
explain sensible things (i.e., cannot be principles). 
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In the intelligible reality thus known, our intellect seizes 
at once its opposition to non-being, and an opposition 
expressed by the principle of contradiction: Being is not 
non-being. "By nature our intellect knows being and the 
immediate characteristics of being as being, out of which 
knowledge arises the understanding of first principles, 
of the principle, say, that affirmation and denial cannot 
coexist (opposition between being and non-being), and 
other similar principles." Here lies the point of de-
parture in Thomistic realism. 20 
Thus Being qua Being has a philosophical primacy, and all knowl-
edge must "conform" to being if that knowledge is to be true. This 
assumption of an intelligible world may not be so easily dismissed. It 
was already mentioned that some sort of mental submissiveness to 
"reality" is a tendency quite in accord with common sense, and Aristotle 
has indeed been credited with a common-sense approach to philosophy. 
However, there is a danger that may arise when the assumption of a real 
world is based on a set of fixed principles that will not allow the 
"assumption" to be modified or changed for the purpose of discovering 
some new aspect of reality. There certainly does not seem to be anything 
wrong with taking "being" as one's starting point. One needs some 
starting point--an arche--and it might as well be something rather than 
nothing. But once it is realized that such an "objective" beginning has 
an immediate "subjective" (conceptual) formulation, then the assumption 
must grow so that the conceptual expression, in some way, is the same as 
the "objective something. " It is precisely here that the bipolarity of 
first principles enters into the Aristotelian assumptions. It will be our 
20R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality (St. Louis: Herder Book Co., 
1950), p. 31. 
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task now to investigate specific Aristotelian texts to determine what 
may be considered the strength of a "first principles" philosophy and 
also what may be weaknesses due to the very same first principles. 
II. PRINCIPLES AND THE REALM OF "PERISHABLES" 
PART I - THE RELATION OF PRINCIPLES TO THE REALM OF "PERISHABLES" 
If we begin our investigation of principles with Aristotle's prob-
lematic approach to Being, l we notice that some of the aporiai deal 
with principles in relation to methodology, science and/or demonstration, 
Being and Knowledge. Of those problems that involve the Being-Knowledge 
relationship of principles, three in particular seem to involve a common 
answer: 2 1) aporia VI--Are the first principles ultimate genera? 
2) aporia XI--Are the first principles universal or like individual things? 
3) aporia XII--Do first principles exist potentially or actually? In 
developing each problem in detail in Metaphysics III (Beta), Aristotle 
expresses the puzzlement concerning the nature of principles. In the 
light of his prime assumption, he wants principles to be of things; but 
"things" are individual. But individuals are ~xplained in terms of genera 
and species and differentiae which are universals and hence conceptual. 
What, then, is the status of principles--real, in the sense of having an 
individual character, or ideal, in a universal sense? If real (individual), 
then how can principles explain anything? If ideal (universal), then how 
can they explain individuals? 
lMeta. III, 995 a ff. 
2The Roman numerals are the numerical values assigned to the 
aporiai in the Loeb edition, 995 b 26; 996 a 10; 996 a 12. 
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Aristotle poses the problem of the genera status of principles in two 
ways. Perhaps we can reformulate the problems by means of two 
dilemmas: 
If first principles are elements of individuals, then they are not 
genera. If first principles explain and define individuals, then they 
are genera. But the principles cannot both be genera and not be genera 
at the same time. 
Therefore, first principles cannot be elements of individuals 
and at the same time define individuals. 3 
Aristotle then shows a preference for assuming that first principles 
are genera and not elements of individuals. He speaks of elements in 
a pre-Socratic sense and tentatively rejects the term since elements can 
be broken down quantitatively and thus cannot be primary. Hence, there 
is the second dilemma which tries to assume that first principles are 
genera: 
If first principles are genera, then they are the highest genera 
(first principles must be predicated of all). If first principles are genera, 
' 
then they must be the lowest genera (that which is more pertinent to 
the individual best explains the individual). 
But they cannot be the highest genera (for then Unity and Being 
would have nothing to differentiate within a genus), nor can they be the 
3Aristotle does not use the dilemma form. His formulation of the 
problem can be found in Metaphysics III, 998 a 20-30. 
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lowest genera (for how can a principle exist apart from an individual--
which a principle must be able to do). 
Therefore, first principles cannot be genera. 4 
In Aristotle's complex discussion of the problems surrounding the 
character of principles, there seems to be little question of the perplexity 
• that confronts him. How can principles mediate between a real world of 
individuals and the conceptual understanding of that world? The com-
mitment to an intelligible world has its problems. This basic tension 
seems to permeate Aristotle's writings. Principles are invoked to explain 
individual things; as such explanations they (principles) have a con-
ceptual and somewhat universal character; as explanations of things, 
however, they should have some kind of II extra-mental II and hence indi -
victual status. 
Concerning the more specific problem of first principles and the 
genera, Aristotle attempts to resolve the difficulty first when he considers 
the relationship of substance (ousia) to universals. 5 Aristotle is 
reluctant to allow any universal term to be a substance since 1) substance 
is of an individual peculiar to a "this" and no other, whereas "the 
universal is common;" 2) substance, because it is a substance, cannot 
be predicated of a subject, while the universal is always predicated of 
a subject. 6 Aristotle concludes these passages with the warning that 
4Meta. III, 998 b 15-35; 999 a 1-15. 
5 Meta. VII, especially Chapters 10, 12, 13; cf. also Topics 128 a ff. 
6Meta. VII, 1038 b 1-35. 
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unless one wants to risk becoming involved in a "third man" argument, 
then "no universal attribute is substance." It seems fairly certain that 
Aristotle argues against the endowing of substance with universality in 
order to preserve the uniqueness of a real world of individual entities. 
But as soon as he denies a universal attribute of substance, he foresees 
the difficulty. If substance includes no universal attribute, it can contain 
no formula (logos); and if it contains no formula, there can be no 
definition. But if substance cannot be defined, then nothing can be 
defined, since it was shown that "substance is the only or chief subject 
of definition." 7 Aristotle then executes his classic philosophical dodge 
that in a way gives a clue to his impending "solution." He states that 
after all in one sense things may be defined and in another sense may not. 
He then promises to clear it all up later. 8 
Before pursuing further Aristotle's answer, it might be well to 
recover some ground and also to anticipate his answer in order to put 
the problem into better perspective. The question "Are the principles 
ultimate genera?" raised the problem of individual entities understood 
in universal terms. The difficulty revolves around and is couched in 
the terms of the traditional one-many enigma that Aristotle inherited 
from the pre-Socratics and Plato. Ousia--{substance) is the term 
Aristotle chooses to designate individual entity 9 and as we saw, he 
?Meta. VII, 1039 a 19. 
8The problem and its "solution" are treated again in Book VII 15 
and Book VIII 6. 
9 For a translation of ousia as "entity" and its justification, cf. 
J. Owens' The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics {Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1951). 
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is groping to explain the knowledge of such entities through universal 
explanations. Will the Platonic universal Ideas of Unity and Being 
provide such an explanation? Aristotle does not think so. Once he has 
committed himself to the notion of substance as a basic entity-category, 
then it serves no conceivable purpose to call in a separate "entity" of 
unification. Substance has all the unity it needs and is in fact the 
primary sense of being . 10 To attempt to "tie" substance together with 
some kind of participation in an Idea-Entity runs the risk of a third-man 
argument. Aristotle's starting point in an investigation of Being qua Being 
is with the real world of sensible entities (substances}; and in order to 
save the assumed intelligibility of the world of entities, 11 he introduces 
his unique concept of "principle. " Principles are to save the intelligi-
bility by providing universality, without, at the same time, destroying 
the uniqueness of individual entities. In fact, far from destroying indi-
vidual uniqueness, principles are to explain it--all the while, of course, 
they also explain universality. Aristotle will try to maintain that his 
"principles" preserve the individual entities as a basic unit in and of 
themselves because principles are not entities in and of themselves (at 
least principles of sensible substances are not). Hence there is no danger 
of a third-man regression. Secondly, principles are to afford the common 
bond of universality that makes individuals intelligible. Perhaps the 
most significant statement in the Aristotelian texts that highlights the 
lOMeta. VII, 1028 a 15; IX, 1045 b 25. 
llAristotle never denied the Platonic insistence that true knowledge 
in some way attained the universal status. 
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relational character of principles, along with their explanatory function 
is the one quoted above: "We ask what the principle is so that we may 
refer to something more intelligible ... 12 
In formulating in more detail the last aporia in Book III (i.e., 
whether principles are . universal), Aristotle summarizes the second part 
of the difficulty. "If bn the other hand they (first principles) are not 
universal, but like particulars, they will not be knowable, for the 
knowledge of everything is universal ... 13 
Aristotle will then try to show that individual substances are unities 
of principles--that actuality and potentiality, matter and form, as principles, 
constitute the basic unity of substance--and as dual principles manifest 
in substance and through substance the one-many tensions of change and 
stability, unknowable and knowable, and ultimately of non-being and 
being . 14 Even when Aristotle applies his principle-solution, the tensions 
and paradoxes remain, or perhaps one should say that they remain because 
of the Aristotelian solution. There ,will always have to be a shift in one's 
point of view--from principle as 'universal explanation to principle as 
ground of real individual entity. Individual things can be defined from one 
point of view and will be undefinable from another. Knowledge is universal 
in the sense of dealing with universal principles (a potential application 
12Meta. VII, 1040 b 20. 
13Meta. III, 1003 a 13. 
14rn the non-being-being category, non-being is the potential 
aspect of changing entities rather than an absolute nothing. Aristotle 
criticizes Plato for not conceiving non-being as a potential substrate in 
things. cf. Meta. XIV, 1089 b 15-30. 
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to all individuals); and, again, knowledge is not universal in the sense 
of actually knowing the individual. In dealing with sensible substances 
in the Metaphysics, Aristotle substitutes "principles" for Platonic Ideas 
and Pythagorean Numbers, with his "principles" serving as the inherent 
explanations of particulars. 
The Platonists are chided by Aristotle for trying to explain a 
multiplicity that stands apart from a primary unity. Aristotle asserts that 
they (the Platonists) should also have asked, "How is it that relations 
are many and not one?" and "He (Plato) should ask how is it that things 
in general are many? 11 15 Aristotle's own starting point--as his prime 
assumption implies--was with the intelligible world of "the many." This 
latter realm may rightly or wrongly need an ultimate One to complete the 
Aristotelian system, but he prefers to begin with the more common-sense 
approach. 
Now, perhaps, we are better prepared to return to Aristotle's 
attempt to have his multi-faceted principles explain how sensible entities 
(substances) can be unique and yet definable; particular and yet intel-
ligible. 
In the Metaphysicsl6 Aristotle distinguishes substance which is 
the concrete (synolon), sensible entity having the formula (logos) combined 
with matter from substance which is "formula in the proper sense." There 
is no need to assume that Aristotle is speaking of eternal substances in 
15 Meta. XIV, 1089 b 9 and 25. 
16Meta. VII, 15 1039 b 20ff. 
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the latter case. He is apparently referring to our conceptual grasping of 
what is definable in individuals for he mentions as an example "the essence 
of house" which, as such, is not generated; rather, it is the "essence of 
this house" that admits of generation and destruction. Aristotle concludes 
from this distinction that there is no definition nor demonstration of 
individualsl7 since these "perish" and do not manifest the stability and 
necessity required by definition and demonstration. The principle of 
individuals that prevents their being defined is the material or potential 
aspect. This is so, Aristotle maintains, because matter is "indeterminate," 
a principle of change, and hence the reason for a sensible entity's 
affinity for "otherness." 
"For this reason there is no definition or demonstration of partic-
ular sensible substances, because they contain matter whose nature is 
such that it can both exist and not exist. ul8 Earlier in Book VII he writes: 
"There is no formula involving the matter, for this is indeterminate. 11 19 
Shifting from the negative aspect of what a definition does not 
involve to a positive view, Aristotle wants t'o claim that the definition 
does involve the "indwelling form" which is substance in the primary sense.20 
"And when they (individuals) have passed from the sphere of 
actuality it is uncertain whether they exist or not, but they are always 
17Meta. VII, 1039 b 30. 
18Meta. VII, 1039 b 32. 
19Meta. VII, 103 7 a 28. 
20 Meta. VII, 103 7 a 29. cf. also De Anima 403 a 25 in which 
Aristotle speaks of the "in mattered forms" (logoi enyloi). 
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spoken and apprehended by the universal formula. But matter is in itself 
unknowable. 11 21 
It seems that Aristotle presumes the form to be the same in all 
individuals that are thus grouped in a class and defined according to 
the form, and in this form (eidos) is the ground for the necessary 
universality in definition. 22 
But, perhaps, this begs the whole question of the unity in an 
individual entity? And how does Aristotle himself avoid a kind of par-
ticipation theory? If he explains away the difficulty of giving universal 
definitions of indefinable singulars by positing two inherent principles, 
then what unites the principles into one individual being? Might it not 
seem that Aristotle himself is guilty of a tritos anthropos argument? He 
claims not. 
Evidently if we proceed in this way (i.e. , to explain unity 
through a Platonic participation in separate Ideas), it 
will be impossible to answer and solve the difficulty. But, 
if, as we maintain, man is part matter and part form--the 
matter being potentially, and the form actually man--, then 
the point which we are investigating will no longer seem to 
be a difficulty. 2 3 (Emphasis mine.) 
21Meta. VII, 1036 a 8-9. 
2 2the question of finding universality in the individual's eidos in 
Aristotle's writings is highly debatable. Parker and Veatch admit that it 
is only implied in Aristotle but spelled out more clearly in Avicenna, then 
developed more fully by Aquinas. Randall denies that Aristotle ever 
intended a scholastic notion of "abstraction." In addition to the pas-
sages cited above (footnotes 20 and 21), confer with Posterior Analytics 
71 a 26ff. in which it is implied that one can know the universal without 
having to grasp all the particulars that fall under it. Also confer with 
Aristotle's description of induction, Posterior Analytics II, 19. 
23Meta. VIII, 1045 a 22-26. 
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In the Aristotelian explanation, then principles are "parts" of 
the whole thing and not whole things themselves. But, again, an ob-
jection might persist: Do not "parts" need another unifying aspect in 
order to render the whole intelligible? Aristotle would answer "Yes" to 
this question if the II parts" were physical, i.e. , elements (stoichea); 
but such is not the case. For Aristotle, elements are "things in their 
own right" into which other things are divided, whereas principles are ir-
reducible aspects of the one individual thing. "Substance (i.e., eidos, 
formal principle in this passage) would seem to be the 'nature' which is 
not an element but a principle. An element is that which is present as 
matter in a thing and into which the thing is divided. 11 24 
In this view of principles, as irreducible aspects of the one 
individual entity, you cannot divide the principles from the thing nor can 
the principles actually be divided from each other. In fact, principles are 
simply different views of the same thing. Man, if he is a perishable 
entity, is a fulfilled capacity--an actualized possibility. The individual 
man is not a pure eidos, but a formal organization of II something" cap-
able of being formed and whose capacities constantly resist form (i.e., 
the individual is perishable). 25 
24Meta. VII, 1041 b 30-31. 
25Aristotle, like Plato, has a notion of matter as that which resists 
form. The basic difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian 
"solutions" is in the former' s "separation" of the Forms from that which 
resists it and the latter's "combination" of the two aspects in one 
individual caught up in an inherent tension. Aristotle seems to allow 
for a dynamic view of reality by locating the aspects of order and 
resistance in the same entity. 
- 27 -
In fact, if the proper distinctions are made, the principles, in a 
sense, can be identified. It can be said, for example, that the matter 
is the form--potentially, and that the form is the matter--a-etualized. 
The shift from one principle to the other is made only because the one 
individual manifests such dual aspects. There is an actual man who is 
potentially many things (at least he is open to a multiplicity of temporal 
moments--he is enduring). Thus both aspects of being--actual and 
possible--are at the same time inherent in sensible individual entities; 
and there is no need to look beyond individuals for another unifying 
principle or Idea or Cause. 
"What then is it--apart from the efficient cause--that causes 
what exists potentially to exist actually in things which admit of gen-
eration? There is no other cause of the potential sphere's being an 
actual sphere; this was the essence of each ... 26 
And again: 
People look for a unifying formula, and a difference between 
potentiality and actuality. But as . we have said, the 
proximate matter and the shape (inorphe) are one and the 
same; the one existing potentially, and the other actually. 
Therefore to ask the cause of their unity is like asking 
the cause of unity in general; for each individual thing 
is one, and the potential and the actual are in a sense 
one.27 
There is a sense, then, in which the actual and the potential are 
one; and it is through the unity of these principles that Aristotle hopes 
to solve the dilemma concerning the demands of universal knowledge in 
26Meta. VIII, 1045 a 30-34. 
27 Meta. VIII, 1045 b 20-23. 
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the face of individual entities. What one actually knows is that which 
actually is--the individual (i.e., actual cognition is of the individual 
entity). However, as it was seen, the actual individual--being a 
sensible and perishable entity--contains within it potentiality which is 
the ground for a knowledge of many things. As knowledge of individuals 
is to actuality, so knowledge of universals is to potentiality; and since 
actuality and potentiality are in a sense the same, so knowledge of 
individuals and knowledge of universals is in a sense the same. The 
expression "in a sense the same" implies that every individual act of 
cognition has as its object an individual in which is contained the ground 
for universality. 
The doctrine that all knowledge is of the universal and 
hence that principles of existing things must also be 
universal and not separate substances, presents the 
greatest difficulty of all that we have discussed; there 
is however, a sense in which this statement is true, 
although there is another sense in which it is not true. 
Knowledge, like the verb "to know" has two senses, of 
which one is potential and the other actual. The 
potential being--as matter--universal and indefinite, 
has a universal and indefinite object; ·but the actuality 
is definite and has a definite object because it is 
individual and deals with the individual ... it is 
clear that although in one sense knowledge is uni-
versal in another it is not. 28 
Finally, we are in a position to return to the problems of whether 
or not principles are genera, whether principles are particular or universal, 
whether principles are actual or potential. The latter two problems are 
answered more directly in the quotations cited above. Principles are both 
28Meta. XIV 108 7 a 12-25. 
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particular and universal, and principles are both potential and actual 
according to one's point of view. Concerning the problem of the genera, 
Aristotle never directly answers his question although, perhaps, some 
inferences can now be made. The first dilemma that was formulated above 
could not be resolved if principles were genera and at the same time 
principles of individuals. There seems to be no problem now since the 
principles of individuals contain the ground for universal (generic) 
expression. The second dilemma would not allow principles to be both 
the highest and lowest genera. But, now, principles are both the highest 
(universal) and the lowest (individual) at the same time and in the one 
same entity . 
Following Aristotle's classic expression, we can now say, perhaps, 
that principles in one sense are genera and in another sense are not. They 
are not genera inasmuch as they are principles of individual entities 
("real" principles). They may be considered genera insofar as they are 
involved in universal definitions of a mental character (conceptual 
principles). 
This reveals a further character of Aristotle's "principles." They 
are both "real" and "ideal." The principles of Being are also principles 
of knowledge. That principles should thus vacillate between being a 
ground of entities and a conceptual expression is exactly what the basic 
assumption of Aristotl e demands. Real, actual, individual entities are 
mind related. Being is intelligible. 
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Summary and Critique 
An investigation of the relation that Aristotelian p:rrinciples bear to 
being and knowledge was begun by examining certain aporiai in the 
Metaphysics. It was claimed that Aristotle's desire both to begin phil-
osophy with what common sense tells us is real (viz., the sensible world 
of individuals) and also to explain the "highest forms" of knowledge in 
terms of universality and necessity demanded a reality that was somehow 
unified through principles of a protean character. The matter and the form 
of individual entities are but the potential and the actual manifestations of 
the one changing entity. By beginning with the manifold of experience in 
order to explain the unity of knowledge, Aristotle departs from the Platonic 
approach whereby unique and separate Forms are somehow superimp o sed 
upon an enduring "world." In the light of this basic difference, it is not 
a little surprising when some philosophical scholars suggest that "Plato's 
pupil" is just as Platonic as Plato. George Boas, for example, states 
that Aristotle's "separated substances" prevent him from any claim of 
being an empiricist; and Boas further maintains that it is due to Hegel's 
dialectical influences that Aristotle has been considered the "antithesis" 
of Platonic philosophy. 
They (eternal and immutable substances) are as separate 
as any Idea of Plato's. Consequently, to classify Aristotle 
as an empiricist is extremely misleading, since we have 
his word for it that no knowledge is possible of what modern 
philosophers call experience. . . . But since the time of 
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Hegel it was thought necessary that Plato's pupil provide 
an antithesis to his master's philosophy. 29 
First of all, while it is true that Aristotle concludes with eternal 
substances that are as "separate as any Idea of Plato's, " it remains to 
be seen how this would exclude the possibility of an analogous kind of 
necessity-principle inherent i,n and explanatory of the sensible world of 
individuals. Not only did Aristotle claim this latter world to be real 
(actual) and intelligible, but this is precisely where he begins his inves-
tigation of being qua being. Boas urges us to read the text of Aristotle, 
yet almost the entire Books XIII and XN are a criticism of any attempt to 
allow separate Ideas and Numbers serve as explanations of physical, 
individual beings. Furthermore, as it was stated above, the very approach 
of Plato is challenged by Aristotle: "They (Platonists) should have asked 
how is it that relations are many and not one ... 30 Aristotle even attempts 
to show why Plato could not bridge the gap between the Ideals of Being 
and Unity on the one hand and a manifold on the other. He claims it was 
due to Plato's failure to recognize in t~e changing sensibles a non-being 
that is a potency-substrate. 31 
29George Boas, Some Assumptions of Aristotle, transactions of 
American Philosophical Society (Philadelphia, 1959), p. 79. F. Solmsen 
had made an earlier claim that Aristotle's entire theory of archai grew 
out of Plato's doctrine of hypothesis in Republic VI-VII and that basically 
there is little difference between the two. cf. Die Entwicklung der 
Aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik (Berlin, 1929). This view is disputed 
by Ross. 
30Meta. XIV, 1089 b 8. 
31Meta. XIV, 1089 b 16-30. 
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Secondly, Boas' charge that in Aristotle "no knowledge is pos-
sible of what modern philosophers call experience" merits comment. Boas 
seems to be basing this criticism on an earlier statement in which he 
(Boas) writes: "There is no knowledge of individuals, says Aristotle in 
the Metaphysics 1003 a 13 ... 32 The general passage in Aristotle that is 
referred to by Boas is the third Book of the Metaphysics--the aporiai; 
specifically, it is the last problem posed in which Aristotle says that if 
principles are universal, then how can there be knowledge of universals 
since all knowledge is of the universal? 33 (Emphasis mine.) Aristotle is 
not dogmatically stating that "all knowledge is of the universal." He is 
posing what he considers to be a legitimate problem when he realizes that 
knowledge tends to be structured for universal concepts while reality 
consists of particular beings. 34 It is this precise problem that Aristotle 
thought he solved by realizing, through unifying principles, a universal 
ground in sensible reality. 
Principles are and are not genera, depending on how they are 
realized. Conceptually, they admit of a universal formulation; concretely, 
they are never separate from physical entities. Also, even after Aristotle 
has allegedly solved the problem (especially in 1039 b 29), he never states 
that individuals cannot be known. To do so would be to deny his prime 
32Boas, op. cit., p. 45. 
33Meta. III, 1003 a 13. 
34Aristotle applauds Socrates for realizing that although definitions 
need universal concepts, he did not separate universality from particulars. 
cf. Meta. XIII, 1086bl-5. 
- 33 -
assumption. What he does say is that individuals as such cannot be 
defined or demonstrated. The terms 'definition' (orismos) and 'demon-
stration' (apodeixis), which are used together three times within eight 
lines, designate a specific mode of knowledge which is attained only 
after the individual has been in some way generalized. 35 
To be sure, this Aristotelian 1 knowledge of individual, physical 
entities need not make Aristotle an empiricist in the modern sense of the 
term. It is true, however, that Aristotle is usually referred to as a 
realist. 36 Empiricists can also be called realists, but certainly Aristotle's 
"empirical" approach to reality is more of a gross observation compared 
to the experimental analysis of the modern empiricist. If he ~istotle) 
is a realist, then he is an Aristotelian realist in the same way that Plato 
is a Platonic idealist and Hume is a Humean empiricist. In other words, 
it would certainly seem that an authentic philosopher is a philosopher 
sui generis. 
Aristotle is certainly more than simply "Plato's pupil." Plato's 
influence is surely felt. Perhaps what Aristptle designates as "Being qua 
Being" may also be a separate, immutable and eternal substance; 3 7 but 
35Meta. VII, 1039 b 29-37. 
36rt is interesting to note that William James calls Aristotle "The 
Forerunner of Pragnatism" in that his approach to philosophy is a problem-
solving one. Cf. William James, Pragmatism (New York: World Publishing 
Company, 1955), p. 45. 
37The hermeneutical question surrounding Being qua Being as the 
subject matter of the Metaphysics seems to raise an almost endless con-
troversy. Does Aristotle intend that first philosophy should study the 
universe as a whole, or is "Being" to be taken in a distributive sense in 
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even if this is so, Aristotle's own concern with principles of nature (the 
sensible world) distinguishes him from his Platonic heritage. 
Part II--The Character of Principles in the Realm of "Perishables" 
In Part I Aristotelian principles that related to Being and Knowledge 
in the realm of "perishables" were considered, and it is hoped that 
Aristotle is established (thus far at least) as an Aristotelian rather than 
as another Platonist. This claim for the uniqueness of Aristotle's 
philosophy rests mainly in his acknowledgment that the sensible world 
of changing entities carries within itself its own reason (principles) for 
being--and--being known. To be consistent with this view (which we 
expressed as the basic assumption of Aristotle--the notion of an intel-
ligible world), the "principles" must have certain characteristics or traits 
which set them off from previous explanations of the world. 38 
which any individual being is studied insofar as it is. (Ross formulates 
this problem in his commentary on the Metaphysics Vol. I, p. 251.) 
Perhaps the problem is even more complex than as Ross states it. Con-
sidering Being qua Being just in its distri ,butive connotation, one might 
ask whether Aristotle is considering individual things as conceptually 
unqualified in virtue of their existential status. Such a consideration 
would perhaps involve an ontological commitment which could be expres-
sed by the ens commune formula. On the other hand, Being qua Being 
(still in a distributive sense) could mean that "part" of an individual 
being--any being--that is independent of matter and change, separate 
substance that is most like the Divine. This consideration of Being qua 
Being classifies its object--separate substance--and does not have the 
pervasive, ontological significance. This latter interpretation of Being 
as primarily separate and Divine substance is held by Owens (fn. 9). 
381n order to understand Aristotle's notion of "principle," we must 
consider his philosophical doctrines in their historical setting. His 
"principles" are explanations arrived at after a consideration and rejection 
of pre-Socratic "elements," Pythagorean "numbers," and Platonic "forms" 
as basic explanations of why the world is the way it is. His own basic 
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"Principles," thus far considered as principles of perishable entities, have 
the following characteristics: 1) referential; 2) universally real only in a 
potential sense; 3) irreducible in a given line of thought; 4) analogous, 
inasmuch as "sameness" and "difference" are rooted in the principles 
themselves. 
* 
The Referential Aspect of Principle 
First of all, in labeling Aristotle's principles as "referential, " 
we must add certain qualifications. Only "perishable" entities have so 
far been considered in the "Science of Being qua Being. " He himself 
reminds us several times in the Metaphysics that, strictly speaking, 
natural philosophy is the discipline that properly studies perishable 
(changing) beings. However, he feels that a prior consideration of 
changing entities is requisite in order to arrive at a proper understanding 
"answers" are called "principles," the character of which we shall now 
examine. It may well be impossible to consider Aristotle's philosophy in 
any other context except the historical frame of reference in which he set 
down his thoughts. Attempts are still made, however, to extract his 
philosophy from the development of thought and give it a kind of semper 
et ubigue character. Even in areas of the physical sciences in the face 
of modern physics, one finds attempts to deploy Aristotelian "physics" 
as valid "explanations" which hold true of nature regardless of any new 
scientific discovery. (cf. V. E. Smith, The General Science of Nature 
(Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1959) Many times this is done in 
the name of "perennial philosophy" whereby it is implied that a philosoph-
ical system validly escapes the historical condition and offers the 
perennial answer in spite of new problems. My feeling is that if 
"perennial philosophy" means anything it indicates the reverse of this 
view, viz., that reality has more or less presented similar problems to 
philosophers of any age, but once an attempt is made to state or solve 
the problems--once a particular philosopher sets his thoughts down--his 
philosophy is immediately colored by the peculiar circumstances of the 
age. There is value in this "perennial" approach insofar as past phil-
osophies serve as an aid in formulating new approaches. "Perennial 
philosophy," in my opinion, should mean nothing more than this. 
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of Being qua Being. It was mentioned above that this latter expression 
may mean for Aristotle that Being's "primary instance" (ousia) is separate 
and eternal. On the other hand, Being qua Being may mean that our 
understanding of things involves a common bond of individual realities 
with no special reference to any one being. Whatever it may mean, a 
great portion of Aristotle's Metaphysics concerns itself with the familiar 
world of changing things. It is not until Book XII that eternal and immutable 
ousia is unmasked as the raison d'etre of all, and it still remains to be 
seen whether such ousia is a "principle" with an entitative thing-in-itself 
character or not. In the realm of perishables, however, his principles are 
purely referential. Principles are explanations of -- . "We ask what the 
principle is so that we may refer to something more intelligible. "39 From 
an epistemological point of view, principles may be considered as 
rational schemes of understanding (through principles we come to know 
individual things). On the more ontological side, principles are but modes 
of being--or aspects or whatever term may best convey the notion that 
' 
while 'real' may never be properly predicated of principles, yet individuals 
really manifest certain modes or characteristics (through principles we 
come to know individual things). It is the individual entity which is real; 
and for Aristotle, the individual's reality is grounded in a principle of 
actuality which is simply one's understanding of what~ thing is as op-
posed to what a thing may become. The actuality-potentiality principles 
are not "things" themselves. This is not to say, however, that 
39Meta. VII 1040 b 20. 
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"principles" are purely conceptual. The unique puzzle surrounding the 
whole notion of Aristotle's principles seems to lie in their partaking of 
both the conceptual and the real state of affairs. It seems unlikely that 
Aristotle himself saw the difficulties involved in trying to determine the 
status of his archai. The archai are not physical; they are not purely 
logical; they are not completely independent of thought; they are not solely 
dependent upon thought. What, then, are "they"? Some might say 
"metaphysical," but that is not Aristotle's answer. In fact, to attach 
that label to Aristotle's principles brings only more problems, especially 
the "occult cause" charge leveled against medieval interpretations in 
which Aristotle's principles-as-ground (i.e., fundamental understanding) 
become principles-as-cause. For example, some scholastic philosophers 
talked about the "substance" as being the "cause" of the accidents; or 
"potentiality" as being the "cause" of change; and "actuality" as being 
the "cause" of existence. Such "causes" might well be occult. What 
Aristotle most likely intends by his archai theory is a compromise which 
grew out of his criticisms of pre-Socratic cosmology and Platonic 
epistemology. The archai of the former were material and, therefore, 
according to Aristotle, not the basic structure since a further division 
would always be possible. 40 Plato's archai (Forms) carried the necessary 
40Aristotle' s general criticism of the pre-Socratic archai (espec-
ially Meta. I, 3) revolves around their making a magnitude a basic 
principle. For Aristotle "material magnitude" and "principle" are 
incompatible terms. Nor would he allow the Pythagoreans to have 
"numbers" as inherent archai of bodies: "that bodies should be composed 
of numbers, and that these numbers should be mathematical is impossible. 
For a) it is not true to speak of indivisible magnitudes; b) assuming that 
- 38 -
credentials for true understanding but were separate from the very 
explicanda. Principles as referential are an attempt to compromise 
these two views: he admits with pre-Socratic thought that archai are 
inherent in physical things, but denies that the basic archai are physical 
inherents. He admits with the Platonists that archai render things intel-
ligible, but denies that they exist apart from intelligible things. Principles, 
therefore, are neither in things nor apart from things; principles are _Qf 
things, i.e. , principles are relational or referential. It is a noun-
obsessed language that would make "principles II into things, reifying 
principles into "its" and "theys. 11 In addition, when "principles of" 
(as ground) become "inherent causes of," then the occult cause charge is 
warranted. Hence bodies fall, not because of any attraction between 
masses which is mathematically measurable; but, rather, they fall be-
cause of a potency to fall. It may well be that certain passages in 
Aristotle lend themselves to such an interpretation, 41 and in those cases 
Aristotle's "principles" may be just as "occult" as those of some of the 
medieval interpreters. Aristotle seems to ha 've suffered from the same 
linguistic difficulties that plagued Plato who vainly sought to "locate" 
ideal entities the very nature of which excluded any location. At any rate, 
the bulk of Aristotle's linguistic testimony concerning "principles" serves 
this view is true, still units have no magnitude; and how can a magnitude 
be composed of indivisible parts?" Meta. XIII, 1083 b 12-14. 
4lcf. Physics VIII, 255 b 31-35. Aristotle distinguishes "natural 
motion" from "accidental motion" and, in the former case, nature itself 
is the "cause" of motion. 
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this valuable end: it links man with the world and it is "principles" in 
their referential character that primarily achieves this end. This is why, 
perhaps, William James will feel no embarrassment in calling Aristotle 
one of the precursors of Pragmatism and yet state as a basic attitude of 
Pragmatism that it must "look away from principles. 1142 The Aristotle that 
James knew was a realist in the only way that the historical Aristotle 
could have been a realist. At all costs, the intelligibility of the world 
had to be saved even if the expression of this world's intelligibility 
(through principles) gave rise to the possibility of occult entities. In 
many ways, Peirce and Aristotle share in the same kind of realism. Peirce 
seems to make the same basic Aristotelian assumption and also talks about 
"characters" of reality "entirely independent" of our opinion--all of this 
with no fear of an "occult entity" charge. Witness the following quotation 
from Peirce with my emphasis added: 
Such is the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, 
restated in more familiar language, is this: there are 
.real things, whose characters are entirely independent 
of our opinions about them; those rea~ities affect our 
senses according to regular laws, and, though our sen-
sations are as different as our relations to the object& 
yet by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we 
can ascertain by reasoning how things really are. 43 
42James, op. cit., pp. 45 and 47. 
43c. S. Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, Collected Papers of 
C. S. Peirce, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1934), Vol. V, p. 229. 
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The Character of "Principles" in Relation to the 
Universality of Knowledge 
There are many instances in the writings of Aristotle in which he 
declares that "knowledge is of the universal. ,,44 This assertion presents 
an especially puzzling problem in the light of any claim to make Aristotle 
a realist in touch with a world of "particulars" through "principles." 
The problem centers around the precise meaning of the statement 
"knowledge is of the universal." Surely in assuming this character of 
knowledge, Aristotle would not want to claim that knowledge involves a 
confrontation with "universal entities" existing apart from particular 
things. On the contrary, as he himself states, this "separation of the 
universal is the cause of the difficulties which we find in the Ideal Theory . .,45 
"Separation of the Universal," then, becomes the main bone of contention 
throughout Aristotle's criticism of Platonism in Books XIII (Mu) and XN (Nu). 
The problem is precisely this: how is Aristotle going to save knowledge 
without losing the real world? While he certainly seems willing to 
exorcise separate Universals from his own philosophy, he is not so wil-
ling to release Universals from the value of knowledge, "for without the 
universal we cannot acquire knowledge. ,,45 
The philosophy of his predecessors weighs heavily on Aristotle's 
own philosophy. Highest knowledge was all-encompassing knowledge--
44Meta. III, 1003 a 15; XIII, 1086 b 5 and 33; De Anima 417 b 23; 
Posterior Analytics 8 7 b 38. 
45Meta. XIII, 1086 b 7. 
46 Meta. XIII, 1086 b 6. 
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universal knowledge, knowledge that could be applied to the whole--the 
total structure. The Ionian pioneers in philosophical speculation may 
not have expressed this epistemological difficulty, but the problem is 
implied in their attempt to formulate a universal world view. The 
Pythagoreans saw fit to explain over-all harmony in the universal truths 
of mathematical and numerical values. Parmenides sharply distinguished 
the "Way of Truth" from the "Way of Opinion," in which the former "Way" 
reveals the intellectual universality of being in its permanent and 
complete structure. Thus universality is more clearly aligned with 
"highest knowledge." Even the Heraclitean notion of Panta Chorei con-
tains a left-handed expression of the all-encompassing view. Here, too, 
Heraclitus grounds his universal change theory intellectually rather than 
perceptually with his "Word" or "Logos." 
Not only is highest knowledge linked up ontologically with 
universality, but also epistemologically two distinct modes of knowing 
are defined--intellectual cognition and sensory perception. Plato, of 
course, completes this two-fold task by distinguishing episteme from 
doxa in which distinction the former attains to universals whereas the 
latter deals with changing particulars. 
Aristotle inherited these views of cognition; and while he 
explicitly and unequivocally rejects any separation of universality from 
individuals, he does not explain his own view of universal knowledge in 
a clear and consistent manner. It may be that an analysis of the nature 
of principles as ground of knowledge could render some plausible inter-
pretations. 
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We have already cited five specific passages in which Aristotle 
clearly states that "knowledge is of the universal" (cf. Fn. 44 above). 
But since the universal is not allowed to be separated from the particular, 
Aristotle is compelled to say how it is that we know particulars in a 
"universal" way. Furthermore, if the sharp distinction between the 
"senses and intellect" is to be retained, then the question arises: 
how can we know particulars at all since these latter are objects of 
senses and not of intellect? Does the mind (nous), after all, grasp 
universal principles that are just as separate as Plato's Ideas? Aristotle 
himself gives every indication of being very much aware of these prob-
lems, especially after he has criticized Platonic theory, and begins to 
outline his own: "The doctrine that all knowledge is of the universal, 
and hence that the principles of existing things must also be universal 
and not separate substances, presents the greatest difficulty of all that 
we have discussed ... 47 It is interesting to note that in the admission 
of the problem Aristotle reaffirms the referential character of "principles" 
as the intelligible aspect of beings. The answer that he offers to the 
question concerning cognition of things must involve "principles." He 
says in effect that if knowledge is universal, then principles must be 
universal in some way. How are principles universal? This is the 
"greatest difficulty of all." That the "universal principles" must not be 
separate from things is no great problem now, since the Platonic 
47Meta. XIII, 1087 a 11-14. 
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separation has been rejected. Proceeding in an attempt to answer the 
difficulty, Aristotle first dares to qualify his earlier assumption that 
"all knowledge is of the universal." 
'There is, however, a sense in which this statement is true, 
although there is another in which it is not true ... 48 
The basis for this problematic distinction is found in the act-
potency principles of perishable particulars and the knowledge of those 
particulars acquired through principles. Because of the act-potency 
aspects of individuals, knowledge has two senses: a particular-definite 
sense and a universal-indefinite sense. Actual knowledge is knowledge 
of a definite individual thing; knowledge of a universal character is 
potential knowledge, i.e. , a knowledge of what might possibly be the 
case in an indefinite number of things. This latter sense of knowledge 
is based on the formless, "material" side of particular entities which 
opens them up to any number of possibilities. 49 
For Aristotle, therefore, universality is not separate from par-
ticulars. Universality is "in" particulars, not as entity but as principle--
48Meta. XIII, 1087 a 15. 
49Perhaps the notion of "potentiality" in Aristotle's philosophy 
has not been given sufficient attention by contemporary thinkers. Possibly 
the dynamism that might be found in Aristotle and its possibilities of a 
world view of change have been overlooked because of medieval inter-
pretations in which "Pure Act" reigns supreme and "potency" is a static 
concept used merely to designate the "lower" limit of reality (Pure Potency} 
as distinct from the "highest" limit of reality (Pure Act). It is ironic, 
perhaps, that in a closed system even the concept of God as Pure Act has 
become static. That Act should become static is due to no mean intel-
lectual achievement! At any rate, it seems that Aristotle's potential 
principle might serve as a basis for more dynamic views of a world 
opened up to an infinite number of possibilities. 
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principle of potentiality. And it is this potential aspect of particulars 
that explains the universal sense of knowledge. 
Knowledge, like the verb "to know, " has two senses, 
of which one is potential and the other actual. The 
potentiality being--as matter--universal and in-
definite, has a universal and indefinite object; .but 
the actuality is definite and has a definite object, 
because it is particular and deals with the particular 
... it is clear that a~though in one sense knowledge 
is universal, in another it is not. 5 0 
Now just exactly what Aristotle means here may not be perfectly 
clear, but at least this much seems certain: there is no actual (singular 
act of) knowledge of universals because universals as such do not 
actually exist. Any individual act of cognition has as its referent object 
an individual, particular entity. The universal aspect of knowledge 
somehow enters into the area of mental expressions through the individual 
object's potentiality principle. Perhaps the universality enters into the 
cognitional act insofar as other similar cognitional acts are possible 
when a knower confronts other individuals whose potentialities are 
similarly actualized. Aristotle himself does claim that "the potential 
and the actual are in a sense one, 1151 insofar as principles are not 
entities themselves but are aspects of entities. It seems consistent, 
then, to locate the root of all generalizations about entities in a principle 
of possibility since only individual Beings actually exist. This view of 
the universality of knowledge presented here by Aristotle runs counter to 
50Meta. XIII, 1087 a 16-25. 
51Meta. VIII, 1045 b 21. 
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the Platonic universality of the Forms. Also, it does not seem consistent 
with the scholastic theory of abstraction of forms from matter. In fact, 
this notion of Aristotle seems more in harmony with the aim of modern 
science to form loosely structured general theories rather than assign an 
absolute value to mental constructs. By analyzing individual cases, one 
can form general notions of what may possibly be the case concerning 
other individuals or what may be other possibilities for this individual. 
In either case, universality always remains in the realm of possibility 
and never in the realm of actuality. 5 2 
Before allowing ourselves to make such an interpretation, however, 
we must first see if this passage of Aristotle in which universal knowledge 
is grounded in the potency principle is consistent with Aristotle himself, 
i.e. , with the general context of the Aristotelian corpus. In that one 
passage above which clearly links potentiality with universality, 
Aristotle is attempting to explain away separate universals and still 
retain universality as part of knowledge. There are, in addition, at 
least two passages set in a totally different context which still seem to 
imply a similar notion of potentiality. 53 
5 2The later Peirce (1902) preparing the ground for his notion of 
II synechism II tempers a pragmatism of individual acts with the mental 
ability to generalize. cf. Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 
ed. James Baldwin (New York: Macmillan, 1902), Vol. 2, p. 322. 
5 3Ross mentions these passages as 11a genuine part of Aristotle's 
theory, though perhaps inconsistent with another part. 11 Ross, Aristotle's 
Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), Vol. 11, p. 466. 
- 46 -
First, in the De Anima54 Aristotle applies his notions of being as 
potential and as actual as aids for understanding human instruction or 
learning (epistemon). There are three ways, he states, in which a man 
is said to be "learned": 1) insofar as he belongs to a class of learned 
people who have knowledge; 2) insofar as he is well instructed in a 
specific area (e.g., grammar}; 3) insofar as he manifests his learning 
in the act of knowing something. Aristotle claims that the first two 
meanings of "learned" involve a potential mode of being; the first is the 
general class of learned men (Aristotle likens this classification to the 
matter rather than to the form--i. e. , indefinite and universal rather than 
definite and particular). The second meaning involves a potentiality 
inasmuch as the man is capable of divulging some knowledge provided 
there are no external impediments. The third meaning involves actuality. 
The man is actually manifesting his learning by knowing "this particular 
A." In these examples Aristotle again seems to be grounding universal 
knowledge in the principle of potentiality while connecting particular 
knowledge with what actually is ~he case. 
In the Metaphysics, 55 while discussing specifically the 
actuality-potentiality principles, Aristotle indicates how these prin-
ciples are "in a sense the same." Both indicate the "presence of the 
thing" though not exactly in the same way. Potentiality indicates a 
thing's presence by what can be conceived apart from the thing. One 
can paradoxically say that potentiality indicates something' s presence 
54ne Anima, 417 a 22-30. 
55Meta. IX, 1048 a 31-40; 1048 b 1-6. 
- 47 -
by what is absent. For example, the presence of wood is known in a more 
meaningful way by the statue which can be carved from it, but is not yet 
actually carved; or the whole line is viewed in terms of half of the line 
which does not actually exist, but which can be extracted from the whole. 
Aristotle's third example is that of a man who is called "scholar" even 
though he is not actually studying. The term ~scholar' properly applies 
since he is capable of studying. In terms of potentiality, the scholar is 
present through an absence. This again indicates the unity of act and 
potency which was mentioned earlier; and, more important for our present 
purpose, it manifests the universal character attached to the potentiality 
principle. In proceeding to explain "actuality" as the presence of a 
thing on the "opposite side" of that same thing's potential presence, 
Aristotle 1) refuses to give a general definition of actuality and instead 
examines particular cases inductively; and 2) refuses to consider those 
particular cases apart from their general background of potentiality. The 
first refusal clearly aligns the actual with the particular; the second 
highlights the importance of a universal , (and potential) background for a 
better understanding of what actually is the case. 56 Aristotle writes: 
56rn developing his hermeneutic phenomenology, Heidegger objects 
to the Husserlian brand of phenomenology which aims at describing. The 
phenomenological approach for Heidegger must be interpretative (Her-
meneuein), i.e. , not only describing but anticipating all modes of 
possibilities. Husserl envisions a science of actually described facts. 
Heidegger states that "higher than actuality stands possibility. " 
cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and 
E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962}, p. 63. Needless to 
say, according to our interpretation, Heidegger is very Aristotelian on 
this point. 
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That which is present in the opposite sense to this (to 
potential presence) is present actually. What we mean can 
be plainly seen in the particular cases inductively; we 
need not seek a definition for every term, but must com-
prehend the analogy: as that which is actually building 
is to that which is capable of building, so is that which 
is awake to that which is asleep; and that which is seeing 
to that which has eyes shut, but is capable of sight; and 
that which is differentiated out of matter to the matter, 
and the finished article to the raw material. Let actuality 
be defined by one member of this analogy and the potential 
by the other. 5 7 
Having added two more texts to support the original text that 
identified "universality" with "potentiality," we can now, perhaps, con-
sider those texts which explicitly claim that "knowledge is of the 
universal." It would seem that this cannot mean that actual knowledge 
is of the universal and still be consistent with the three passages cited 
above. In those three instances, actual knowledge can be of the particu-
lars and of nothing else. Aristotle does, however, ~ to speak of 
actual knowledge of the universal which would run counter to the texts 
thus far examined. This apparent inconsistency seems to arise whenever 
he distinguishes sense perception (aisthesis) from knowledge (episteme). 58 
When this distinction is made, Aristotle implies that there might be 
two kinds of actual knowledge: the sensory cognition of particulars and 
5 7Meta. IX, 1048 a 35; bl-16. 
58 1t was noted above that in addition to inheriting this problem of 
how knowledge can be universal in the face of apparent individuals, 
Aristotle also inherited a "senses vs. mind" distinction. Plato, while 
radically distinguishing doxa from episteme, can more easily avoid incon-
sistency by radically distinguishing (separating) individuals from Ideas. 
In light of the historical setting it would be surprising not to find any 
inconsistencies in a "realistic" attempt that assumes an intelligible 
world. 
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the intellectual knowledge of universals. This, of course, presents the 
problem as to whether or not we actually know individuals or universals 
or both. If "actual knowledge" more properly applies to individuals, then 
this talk of "knowledge of universals" is meaningless. If, on the other 
hand, "actual knowledge" more properly refers to universals, then 
Aristotle's critique of Platonism is meaningless. If both individuals and 
universals somehow are to find a place in the cognitional scheme of 
things, then Aristotle still must show how he is to avoid a separate realm 
of universals. 59 
The questions that must be asked in order to throw some light on 
this Aristotelian dilemma are these: what is the precise meaning of 
Aristotle's use of the expression "knowledge is of the universal"; and, 
secondly, to what extent does Aristotle exclude sensations from the realm 
of knowledge? 
In the Metaphysics he writes: "If nothing exists apart from 
individual things, nothing will be intelligible; everything will be sensible, 
and there will be no knowledge of anything--up.tess it be maintained that 
sense perception is knowledge." 60 
Again in the De Anima, Aristotle would seem to exclude sensations 
from any claim to knowledge: "Actual sensation is of particulars, where-
as knowledge is of universals. u 61 
59Boas claims that Aristotle is hopelessly involved in a contra-
diction of trying to hold to a "knowledge of universals" and, at the same 
time, distinguish true judgments from false judgments concerning individ-
uals. cf. Boas, op. cit., pp. 45-46. 
60 1 Me.ta • III, 9 9 9 b - 3 . 
6lne Anima, 417 b 22. 
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And in the Posterior Analytics: "Since demonstrations are universal, 
and universals cannot be perceived by the senses, obviously knowledge 
cannot be acquired by sense perception ... 62 
These passages in which Aristotle seems to claim that no knowl-
edge is possible through sensory awareness appear to be inconsistent 
with his previous attempt to establish , a ground for actual knowledge in 
the concrete individual. 
In the first passage (from the Metaphysics), Aristotle offers a 
notion of separated substance as an hypothesis. He suggests that 
sensible objects partake of intelligibility only insofar as there are 
separate intelligible entities. It is, perhaps, the most Platonic passage 
in Aristotle's works; but it is significant that he formulates it hypothetically. 
In writing this passage, he is preparing to shift from a study of "perishable" 
entities to a study of "imperishable" entities. The transition seems dif-
ficult for him in light of the "heaven and earth" distinction passed on by 
his predecessors. Later he tries to overcome some of the differences 
between these "two realms" by applying the sa!Ile principles to both realms 
which can, therefore, come under the common rubric "nature." This attempt 
of Aristotle shall be considered in a subsequent chapter. 
The second passage (De Anima) does not seem to present the dif-
ficulty that first appears. Aristotle is discussing the general character of 
sensation in which he tries to explain how sentient beings move from 
having possible sensations to having actual sensations. He insists that 
62post.Ana. 87 b 32. 
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the efficacious cause of actualizing sensory powers must be found in 
individuals external to the thing having the sensation. Strictly speaking, 
one does not "think" individuals, rather one must see, hear, taste, touch 
or smell them; but this does not mean that sensations cannot be included 
in a broader meaning of "cognition." Looking at the more complete text, 
we read: 
Actual sensation corresponds to the exercise of knowledge; 
with this difference, that the objects of sight and hearing 
(and likewise of other senses) which produce the actuality 
of sensation are external. This is because actual sensation 
is of particulars, whereas knowledge is of universals. 
These in a sense exist in the soul itself. So it lies in man• s 
power to use his mind whenever he chooses, but it is not in 
his power to experience sensation; for the presence of the 
sensible object is necessary. 63 (Emphasis mine.) 
In short, there is not sufficient warrant here for accusing Aristotle 
of failing to "know" individuals. Sensations are really {actually) prompted 
by real individuals. Furthermore, there may be a way to detach these 
objects of sensation from their real status and think about them in a general 
(universal) way. We can do this general thinking any time we please, but 
we can have direct sensory experiences , only when confronted with actual, 
individual, external things. 64 Nor is all of this inconsistent with a realm 
of actual individuals whose actuality is set in a background of possibilities 
(mental or otherwise). One may point out that Aristotle never sufficiently 
explains the disparity between actual confrontation of particular things and 
63ne Anima, 417 b 18-28. 
64Perhaps here there is even the hint of Hume's distinction 
between the forceful and immediate data of experience (Impressions) 
and the less vivid thoughts about these experiences (Ideas). 
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man's ability to generalize. The point would be well taken--he does not. 
One might also choose to take issue with Aristotle's descriptive "psychology," 
but anyone who claims some share in a philosophical realism must acknowl-
edge some pioneering in the face of great odds. 
Neither does the third passage (Posterior Analytics) present that 
great an inconsistency between "knowledge of universals" versus "actual 
knowledge of individuals." In the context of this quotation, Aristotle is 
referring to a specific type of knowledge, viz., demonstration (apodeixis). 
He maintains that sense perception cannot obtain the reasoned fact. His 
example is that of a triangle having angles equal to two right angles. Even 
if one could perceive that this was the case, still the proof or demonstration 
of this fact would go beyond the scope of sensory perception. Furthermore, 
he tells us, what is demonstrated holds for all cases, i.e., it is universal. 
Sense perception, on the other hand, puts us in contact only with partic-
ulars. One can see a particular triangle, but one cannot see that its angles 
are equal to two right angles. This must be known through demonstration; 
and since these demonstrated facts are 1,1riiversal, then "knowledge is of the 
universal." This enigmatic expression in this context simply refers to the 
universal axioms arrived at by demonstrative knowledge and does not neces-
sarily rule out any knowledge of particulars. Aristotle wants to maintain 
the distinction between senses and intellect and still retain a world of 
changing particulars. The constant use of that expression"knowledge is of 
the universal" tends to promote a Rationalism and/ or Idealism and, thus, 
obscures Aristotle's original commitment to a changing world. But in 
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analyzing the more complete texts, as we tried to do, we find that knowl-
edge is also of the changing particular. 
It may also be clear now that there are two kinds of "universals" 
implied in the Aristotelian texts that may "save" him from what at first seems 
a hopeless inconsistency. First of all, there is the universality rooted in 
the potentiality of individual things ,. Such individual things are actually 
known; but, as Aristotle says, knowledge has two senses, potential and 
actual. The actual sense of knowledge determines the individual as an 
individual, i.e. , as a particular this. But in the realm of perishables, 
individuals exist in a background of possibilities. Each particular this 
carries with it a universal potentiality. For example, a block of wood can 
be carved into many possible figures. While it is true that what is actually 
known is this individual, it is also true that this individual's potential 
aspect contributes greatly to our actual knowledge of this. In fact, as it 
was mentioned above, Aristotle would not consider actuality apart from 
potentiality. Let us call this first type of "universality, " which is found 
in the potential ground of individuals, an ontic universality since its 
value lies in anchoring human knowledge to a real world of changing 
particulars. In this sense, the expression "knowledge is of the universal" 
refers to the potentiality of individuals. 
The second type of universality we will call "logical" universality. 
This refers to the universal propositions and conclusions of demonstration. 
There is no doubt that for Aristotle one has actual knowledge of these 
universals; e.g., that "the angles of a triangle equal two right angles" is 
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a universal actually known through a demonstrative process. Sensory per-
ceptions are of no use with these logical universals since individual cases 
do not enter into the demonstration. In this sense, "knowledge is of the 
universal" refers to the actual propositions of demonstration. 
It may be now asked what is the relationship, if any, between the 
potential universality of individuals stnd the actual universality of propo-
sitions? Unfortunately, Aristotle himself never tells us how individuals 
can become universalized in logical propositions. 65 Nor does he say how 
universal propositions can be used to demonstrate truths about individual 
facts. He seems to assume that his type of deductive demonstration can 
be applied to the realm of individuals, and this assumption shall be dealt 
with subsequently. 66 
At any rate, Aristotle's "principles" save him from the necessity 
of having to forsake either the universality connected with knowledge or 
the senses-mind distinction. In the bargain, Aristotle is consistent with 
his basic assumption of keeping "in touch" with a real, intelligible world 
of particulars. Whether or not any particular fact can be demonstrated 
(proven logically) in his system remains to be seen. 
65 Perhaps the closest he comes to such an explanation is his metaphor 
of stopping a rout in battle (Post. Ana. 100 a and b) This shall be dealt with 
again. Also, the traditional scholastic view claims to follow Aristotle in 
abstracting the form from individuating matter and, thus, universalizing the 
form in the mental concept or idea. It can be debated, however, whether 
Aristotle's "forms" admit of such universalizing since he seems to ground an 
individual's universality in the material (potency) principle. 
66one of the chief criticisms leveled against Aristotle's logic by 
modern logicians is the former' s failure to allow for all possible individual 
cases. cf. Ernst Cassirer, Substance and Function(Chicago: Dover Pub-
lishing Co., 1953), p. 4. 
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Principles as Irreducible Contraries 
In the last section it was indicated that a legacy of knowledge as 
universal was willed to Aristotle who then tried to reconcile that legacy 
with a realm of perishable particulars. Within that same realm, Aristotle's 
inheritance also included a notion of contraries (enantia) which played an 
important explanatory role in pre-Socratic cosmology and Platonic Trans-
cendentalism. The Wet and Dry, Hot and Cold, Love and Strife; the 
Limited and Unlimited, the Great and Small, Odd and Even--all of these, 
and more, represented attempts to "fix" a cosmos between terminals of op-
position. Aristotle accepts this view that things in motion involve a basic 
antithetical polarity (at least in the realm of perishables, though in the 
eternal heavens "principles" cannot be contraries, as we shall see), but 
he subtly modifies this notion by adding his own intellectual refinement 
embodied in the meaning of his "principles." The view that we are given 
of his multifarious principles in this context is one of irreducible contra-
riety. 
' The type of Aristotelian irreducibility attached to the principles is 
two-fold: there is an irreducibility of number and of kind. 6 7 Concerning 
the former type, Aristotle will not allow that principles be reduced to an 
infinite, never-ending sequence. 68 Reducing principles to such a state 
destroys the basic assumption of an intelligible world. Of course, Aristotle's 
6 7 Meta. II, 9 9 4 a 1- 2. 
68Meta. III, 996 a 1-2 poses this question. 
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world of perishables is intelligible through the four-fold causal view; and 
it is along these lines that he rejects an infinite number of principles. 
Without pretending to offer any kind of "proof," he simply states that an 
infinite series is unthinkable concerning 1) material generation, 2) the 
source of motion, 3) the termination of motion and 4) the "what it is" 
that moves. Finally, he connects the discussion with knowledge claiming 
that: "On this view (an infinite series of principles) it ·is impossible to 
know anything until one comes to terms which cannot be analysed (atoma).,, 59 
In this context, Aristotle is speaking mainly of definition and demon-
stration to support his claim. He says in effect that if everything is 
definable, then nothing is definable. Taking "definition" in its literal 
sense of "de-limiting," one's "definition" of something would constantly 
wait upon a further definition, and so on ad infinitum, thus destroying the 
very meaning of what we assume to know here and now. And the same holds 
for demonstration. If everything can be demonstrated, nothing could be 
demonstrated since there would be an infinite dependence upon more prior 
proofs. 70 The only type of infinity Aristptle allows for is potential infinity, 
as in the possibility of conceiving a line in respect to its unending divisi-
bility. Even "the concept of infinity is not (actually) infinite. "71 
69Meta. II, 994 b 20-22. 
70Principles in their connection with demonstration will be con-
sidered more thoroughly in a later chapter. 
71 Meta. II, 994 b 29. 
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In addition, principles cannot be infinite in kind for Aristotle; i.e. , 
not only are they irreducible to a numerical sequence, they are also ir-
reducible to each other here and now. This latter concept of principles 
added a new dimension to the notion of contraries found in pre-Socratic 
and Platonic thought. Aristotle questions the nature of pre-Socratic con-
traries. 72 If they are to be the true antithetical poles of change (and 
Aristotle assumes that they are), then in the first place, such principles 
cannot be derived from each other. Basically, Aristotle is arguing against 
the generation of one contrary "out of" another. "The Hot" cannot come 
from "The Cold"; "The Wet" cannot come from "The Dry." He does not 
accept the assumed axiom that "opposites generate opposites,,, 73 since 
it destroys the true antithetical character of principles. He would not 
accept, therefore, Plato's "proof" for the immortality of the soul in which 
"life" is generated from "death ... 74 Secondly, such principles cannot be 
derived from anything else if they are to be primary. They must be underived, 
presupposing nothing prior; otherwise they will be intermediate principles 
and not the true antithesis enclosing and explaining a given object. 
Aristotle recognizes the groundwork done by his predecessors in 
conceiving antithetical couples but adds his own refinements. 
72Physics I, 5 in toto. 
73John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (New York: Meridian Press, 
1957), p. 8. 
74Phaedo, 70 a-e. 
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Cl.early, then, all assume certain numbers of antithetical 
couples as principles; and not without reason for "prin-
ciples," being themselves primary, must not be derived 
either from each other or from anything else, and all 
other things must arise out of them. The terms of a 
primary antithesis fulfill the condition; for, because 
they are primary, they cannot be derived from anything 
else, and because they are antithetical, they cannot 
rise out of each other. 75 
Aristotle considers • his principles to be truly primary because they 
are truly irreducible; and being irreducible (contraries) they are truly 
principles, i.e., not entities themselves which would admit of further 
divisions. He never considered his predecessors' principles to be adequate 
as principles--they were not truly primary nor contrary, therefore, not 
truly principles. "Their assumptions and first principles are wrong, and it 
is difficult to propound a correct theory from faulty principles.,, 75 
Aristotle's principles as true contraries could do something that pre-
Socratic and Platonic contrariety could not do, viz., both principles could 
be present together as unifying and yet contrary principles of changing 
things. For example, the contraries Form and Privation are present together 
in things, likewise Act and Potency, · This is quite impossible for the pre-
Socratics whose "first principles" were a material stuff allowing for no 
contrary stuff which could serve as a substrate; therefore, opposites must 
be generated from opposites making the contraries existentially incompatible. 
Plato's contraries did not simultaneously coexist since a separate and inde-
pendent status was assigned to each. The problem of participation arises 
75physics I, 188 a 27-31. 
76Meta. XIII, 1086 a 15. 
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in Plato's philosophy when changing objects must first "participate" in one 
Form and then participate "in the contrary Forms," but never together; only 
Aristotelian "principles" and not "things themselves" could function as co-
existent terminals which could allow changing beings to have within 
themselves a certain intelligibility. 
As Aristotle sees it, the contraries as such do not change; rather 
"change is from so:r;nething into something." 77 
The contrary principles need a third principle acting as a substrate 
upon which the antithetical principles operate. 78 This third principle 
operating between the contrary principles is, of course, the material sub-
strate of Form and Privation. 79 Aristotle also makes this appeal in the 
more dynamic language of his act-potency principles. The ultimate set of 
contrary principles is Being and non-Being, and a proper understanding of 
the changing, perishable entities recognizes an intermediate principle of 
becoming. "' Becoming' is always intermediate between being and non-
being. 11 80 According to Aristotle, the failure to recognize this middle 
ground principle between contraries proves to b~ the fatal flaw of his 
predecessors. Plato especially, who took Being and non-Being as basic 
contraries, wrongly associated "non-Being" with "falsity ... 81 Plato was 
77Meta. IV, 1012 b 29. 
78physics I, 189 b 1-4. Aristotle identifies this third principle as 
the material cause in the philosophy of the pre-Socratics. 
79Meta. XII, 1069 b 30-34. 
80Meta. II, 994 a 28. 
81Meta. XIV, 1089 a 20. Cf. Plato, Sophist, 237 a; 241 b. 
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then left with a notion of "being" as Substance alone or as mere forms and, 
understandably, had difficulty deriving a "many." Furthermore, Aristotle 
continues, Plato could never explain a multiplicity of "affections" (pathe} 
and relations (£!:.2.§_ ti} since he "formulized" these categories (accidents} 
as separately existing. "For it may be said that since they (accidental 
contraries} are not separable, it is because the substrate becomes or is 
many things that qualities and quantities are many. 11 82 
Aristotle's notion of principles as irreducible contraries simultan-
eously present "in" things and mediated: by a substrate principle offered an 
explanation of changing particulars which need not look beyond those 
particular entities. In Aristotle's theory of principles, then, he can adopt 
the notion of contraries quite readily by "adding" the notion of irreduci-
bility. "Contraries are not compounded with one another and are therefore 
first principles ... 83 Intermediates 'straddle" the contraries and "must be 
composed of contraries, 11 84 i.e., the intermediate stages of a changing 
object belong to the same genus as the contraries. For example, red as 
an intermediate between the contraries black , a·nd white belongs to the 
same genus of color and, thus, is 'composed" of the contraries. 85 
Aristotle seems aware, however, that this example of an "accidental 
82Meta. XIV, 1089 b 24-26. 
83Meta. X, 1057 b 23. 
84Meta. X, 1057 b 32. 
85cf. Meta. x, 105 7 a 24. 
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attribute" must be subsumed under "higher" (more general) contraries, viz., 
Form and Privation, Act and Potency. Without this distinction, Aristotle 
would be guilty of a gross inconsistency in his criticism of Platonic con-
traries. He writes in the Metaphysics XIV (Nu) that "none of the contraries 
is strictly a first principle; first principle is something different. "86 This 
indeed seems hard to reconcile with some of the above passages. Are 
"principles" contraries or not? 
Aristotle would have · 'it both ways; his notion of contraries, as basic 
irreducible aspects of things, is one of "principle." "Everything is re-
ducible to being and non-being. "87 But he will not allow Plato to give 
entitative status to contraries. In this latter Platonic sense, contraries 
are not principles; because as contraries they are attributes of things, and 
whatever is an attribute cannot be a first principle since it is predicated of 
something more prior. In short, Plato tried to raise attributes (called con-
traries) to the level of ousiai which for Aristotle are the primary instances 
of being and have no contrary. 88 Insofar as the contrary attributes of Plato 
are not separate substances, then the cont.raries are not principles. 89 
86Meta. XIV, 1087 b 4-5. 
87Meta. IV, 1004 b 28. 
88Anton calls Aristotle's examples of contraries that are attributes--
such as white, black, hot, cold--instances of specific contraries which 
involve "accidental changes." These specific contraries merely suggest 
the "metaphysical contraries which are pervasive, general, all inclusive 
and deal with substantial change. These metaphysical contraries are true 
instances of first principles. " John P. Anton, Aristotle's Theory of 
Contrariety (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 195 9), p. 12. 
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In other words, by hypostatizing the contraries, Plato removed them 
from their role as explanatory of perishable entities having a dynamic inner 
tension of contrariety. In reifying contraries, Plato makes them irreducible 
entities each unique, absolute and immutable in its own eidetic way. Any 
understanding of the "realm of perishables" becomes difficult indeed in 
these terms. If no contrary (Form) can be wholly present in that which is 
in motion or process, then how can we say that we know that which is in 
process? The whole problem of participation is raised in which the hypos-
tatized paradigms have to "step in" and "slip out" of changing entities in 
a staccato like sequence, but never can contraries exist simultaneously 
"in" perishables. Aristotle thinks that these are the difficulties that are 
engendered when the contraries are made into substances. For Aristotle, 
substance is the "primary instance of being. ,,90 That is to say, sub-
stance is the prime ontic ground; as such, "there is no contrary to 
substance. ,,91 In fact, "it is of substance that the philosopher must 
grasp the first principles. ,,9 2 Thus for Aristotle, the contraries are the 
irreducible reasons why there are perishable ousiai. There are no static 
ousiai in this realm. What a thing actually is is understood in terms of 
one contrary (actuality} which is sometimes expressed as a to ti en einai; 
but this manifestation of something is always set in the background of 
90Meta. IV, 1003 b 17; also 1028 a 31. 
91Meta. XIV, 1087 b 3. 
92Meta. IV, 1003 b 18. 
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another contrary principle--Potentiality. Ousia is present through an 
absence. Things are and are not simultaneously--without violating the 
principle of contradiction--Being and not-Being (becoming) find harmony 
within the realm of things that are (changing). 
Aristotle can say, therefore, that the contraries are principles when 
it is realized that as principles the contraries are of a substance and not 
a substance itself. The referential character of principles is carried 
through. Plato's contraries are not principles since they are hypostatized 
into entities themselves. 9 3 
Aristotle, perhaps, "solves" one problem by giving some kind of 
understanding to things-in-process; but he seems to create another problem 
which he wills to philosophical posterity. The problem is this: Is ousia 
a principle? From what was stated above, it certainly cannot be a contrary. 
Perhaps we can say with Aristotle that contraries (Act-Potency, Form-
Privations) are principles, but is the converse true? Are all principles 
contraries? Substance has no contrary. Aristotle makes this point clearly 
enough in rejecting Plato's contrary substances. Hence, in endowing ousia 
with some sort of ontological primacy (perhaps "entity" best translates 
ousia in this sense), the notion of "principle" would not seem to apply in 
a proper sense. "Neither 'being an element' nor 'principle' can be the 
substance; but we ask what the principle is so that we may refer to something 
93Not only does the referential character of principles help under-
stand Aristotle's criticism of Plato but also the universality in a potential 
sense helps as well. Plato's universals were actual entities while 
Aristotle "locates" universality as an (potential) attribute of individuals. 
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more intelligible . .,94 On the other hand, if Aristotle wants to establish 
ousia as the primary instance of being, might we not call ousia some kind 
of ontological principle? In this sense, substance seems to be some kind 
of ground for Being ill@_Being which is supposed to be the point of issue in 
the Metaphysics. Anton suggests that "substance is the ontological 
principle and contrariety is a necessary principle for its intelligibility . .,95 
This interpretation, however, completely ignores the relation of 
Aristotle's realm of perishables with that of the imperishables. It is true 
that in dealing with contraries one need not be concerned with beings that 
do not change and, hence, need no understanding through contrariety. But 
Aristotle himself seems to relate the two orders through the notion of 
"substance" and "principle": 
Perhaps in this way (making a fresh approach to the problem 
"what is substance") we shall also obtain some light upon 
that kind of substance which exists in separation from ' 
sensible substances. Since, then, substance is a kind of 
principle and cause, we had better pursue our inquiry from 
this point. 9 6 
Which, then, is the proper "ontological principle," sensible sub-
stance or separate substance? Once the realms are related, Aristotle's 
theory of principles becomes entangled in further complications. It would 
seem that "sensible substance" cannot be a principle since substance is 
"the thing"--the changing thing--which "principles" (as contraries) explain. 
In what sense, then, would Anton call the perishable ousiai "ontological" 
94Meta. VII, 1040 b 19-21. 
95Anton, op. cit., p. 720 
96Meta. VII, 1041 a 7-10. 
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principles? On the other hand, if Aristotle says that imperishable sub-
stance is a "kind of principle," does he mean that these kind of principles 
are things rather than explanations of things? Or, perhaps, does he mean 
both? Could it be that separate ousiai are things which explain sensible 
things? And if this is the case, might not the ultimate meaning of 
Aristotle's arche be just as separate and immutable an entity as any of 
Plato's Ideas? 
There might be another alternative. Perhaps Aristotle never commits 
himself to a clear-cut meaning of arche that seems to be implied in the 
above problems. He constantly tempers his language with expressions such 
as "a kind of principle"; "in one sense it is, in another sense it is not." 
In more formal language, principles seem to have an analogous character 
which shall soon be considered. 
On the one hand, principles as analogous tend to erase any rigid 
lines drawn between the two realms; and, yet, because they are analogous, 
certain lines have to be drawn. Aristotle would have qualitative differences 
' 
existing between types of entities both in the formal differences of classes 
of things on earth and in the eternal entities of the celestial spheres. The 
formally structured world is--while qualitatively different (not until Galileo 
will "forms" be quantitatively conceived)--strung together in an analogous 
hierarchy. Perhaps Being qua Being is the analogous bond, perhaps actu-
ality is the existential link. At least it seems certain that principles as 
analogously conceived relate what-there-is to man's understanding. And 
since they are analogously conceived, Aristotle needs no literary myth form. 
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Analogy can ground all qualitative differences in a common denominator--
archai. Whether or not his principles can be viewed as hypotheses for the 
beginning of scientific knowledge as Anton suggests97 remains to be seen. 
Viewing Aristotle's theory of principles in terms of the philosophy that 
preceded him, it is seen that his principles as irreducible contraries 
represent an understanding of changing entities. If such types of entities 
are to be understood, the terminals of change must be grounded "in" things. 
Yet the contraries cannot be identified with the things since, then, there 
could be no basis for understanding changing entities; and the realm of 
perishables would lose its intelligible character in the face of a Heraclitean 
like flux. The ground is realized in the notion of contraries as principles 
of things whose referential character preserves the ontic contact with "the 
real" and whose irreducible character prevents the contraries from being 
"compounded" with the entity that is changing. For Aristotle, then, op-
po sites do not generate opposites; in fact, the irreducible, contrary 
principles contribute nothing to the process of change;98 their contribution 
lies in rendering change in some way intelligible. In surveying previous 
philosophies, Aristotle saw no such intelligibility, neither in the material 
archai inherent in things nor in the separated Forms of Plato. Being ir-
reducible, the archai of Aristotle are not material inherents; being referential, 
they are not separate entities. 
97Anton, op. cit., p. 9. 
98They are not "causes" in a stricter sense of Aristotle's efficient 
cause which becomes involved in the process of change. The contraries 
do contribute, of course, to one's understanding of change. 
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Thus far we have considered the irreducible aspect of Aristotle's 
principles by comparing his notion of contrariety with the philosophers that 
preceded him. Now, however, we might ask how well Aristotle's principles 
as irreducible contraries stand the philosophical test today. Can, for 
example, the basic contrariety of Act-Potency be applied as a dynamic process 
• 
philosophy today? Is there a hint of novelty, invention, discovery and 
evolution in these principles? Or are these principles simply names for 
predetermined events that can never really alter their patterns, whereby 
only what is an acorn can become an oak, or only what is heavy can move 
from "up" to "down"? 
Needless to say, commentators throughout the ages have opted for 
one or the other interpretation and have found--no doubt--ample texts to 
support their claims. Running the risk of constantly seeking middle ground 
until there may be no ground at all, we might still try to aim for some place 
in the middle. In the first place, I have already indicated that Aristotle's 
principle of potentiality provides sufficient warrant for a dynamic process 
interpretation. To convert Aristotle completely into a process philosopher, 
however, one would have to ignore certain pas sages which relate "process" 
to immutable principles. Anton asserts that not only do Aristotle's contrary 
principles "provide a criterion for the intelligibility of process, " but by 
relating his other basic concepts to the notion of contrariety, "it is possible 
to state with new forcefulness and freshness the equal significance of all 
principles of knowledge as 'beginnings' of scientific inquiry and to treat 
satisfactorily this rather neglected principle . .,99 
99Anton, op. cit., p. 9. 
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The question remains, however, whether Aristotle intends "prin-
ciples" to be "beginnings" in the way that Anton suggests. Anton 
supposes them to be some sort of scientific hypotheses in the modern 
sense in which the beginning of a scientific investigation involves the 
postulation of a theory (hypothesis) and proceeds to factual verification or 
falsification. In this scientific approach today, theoretical knowledge is 
set in contrast to factual knowledge so that if the facts do not support the 
theory, the latter is abandoned as impractical or false, or both. Whereas 
if the facts support the theory, then the theory is no longer a mere hypoth-
esis; and in this sense, the knowledge is removed from the theoretical 
realm. Aristotle, on the other hand, contrasts theoretical knowledge with 
practical knowledge in such a way that the two are not opposed at all. 
Theoria contains the general principles assumed in the doing or making of 
something. The man of theoria has a grasp of ultimate principles that tell 
why a thing is what it is or can do what it does. "Accordingly, although 
all other sciences are more necessary than this (science of first principles) 
none is more excellent. .. 100 It is highly unlikely that Aristotle viewed 
"principles" as the flexible, changeable type of "beginnings" formulated 
in the hypothetical theories of science today. For Aristotle, "first prin-
ciples" are not the beginnings of knowledge, but rather the termination 
and culmination of highest knowledge. Also, the question of "science" and 
"scientific inquiry" is begged in Anton's claim that Aristotle's "principles" 
may serve as "beginnings of scientific inquiry." 
lOOMeta. I, 983 a 10. 
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On the other hand, I do not know if I would be as severe a critic 
as John Dewey who writes: 
Potentiality never means, as in modern life, the pos-
sibility of novelty, of invention, of radical deviation, but 
only that principle in virtue of which the acorn becomes the 
oak. Technically, it is the capacity for movement between 
opposites .... Potentiality instead of implying the emer-
gence of anything novel means merely the facility with 
which a particular thing repeats the recurrent processes of 
its kind, and thus becomes a specific case of the eternal 
forms in and through which all things are constituted.101 
Now it is true that Dewey's pragmatism, in which practical conse-
quences are given prior consideration, can render Aristotle's principles 
rather meaningless. On the other hand, this may not be the only inter-
pretation. First of all, Aristotle from time to time gives hints of a purely 
potential view of the material substrate.10 2 Could it not be possible to 
translate this view of "primary matter," as it was sometimes called, into 
modern, dynamic expressions such as "Any physical thing can be changed 
into any other physical thing under the proper agency (efficient cause)." 
If the expression "pure potency" means anything, does it not leave things 
of the physical world open to any number of.possibilities? Furthermore, 
Mortimer Adler interprets .; the Aristotelian matter-form principles in terms 
of the manufacturing endeavors of the human species. Only man, Adler 
states, can manufacture since it involves the conceptual separation of 
"forms" which are then imposed upon many possible units of matter .103 
101 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Mentor Books, 1950), p. 65. 
l02Meta. VIII, 1045 a 23-35. 
103Mortimer Adler, What Man Has Made of Man (New York: Unger 
Press, 1957), p. 54. 
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And, of course, science has not fared badly with the Aristotelian terminology 
when it claimed that: "Matter is neither created nor destroyed, it is only 
changed in form. " 
Concerning the more specific principle of Potentiality which Dewey 
criticized above, we read in the Metaphysics IX: 
Now, if as we have ' said, that what is possible is that 
which does not involve an impossibility, obviously it 
cannot be true to say that "x" is possible, but will 
not be; this view entirely loses sight of the instances 
of impossibility, 104 
Viewed historically, Aristotle is clearly aiming his sights at too 
rigid a view of being and non-being, especially as held by Parmenides and 
Plato. Through his notion of potentiality, Aristotle distinguishes absolute 
non-existence (nothingness) from relative non-being (potency), 105 The 
former distinction deals with impossibilities, the latter with real pos sibil-
ities. He is the first thinker to give significant insight to "possibilities." 
It is true that he formulated a principle of non-contradiction which deals 
with being and not being; but this principle is not as rigid as it may first 
appear, since before it can be state .cf whether something is or is not, it 
must be ascertained to what extent something can be. A contradiction 
principle can only be applied when "impossibility" is assured, and this is 
not so easily determined. It is also true that in the above passage Aristotle 
is making just as strong a case for impossibility (the measurement of a 
diagonal) as he is for possibility, and this is a notion (impossibility) that 
104Meta. IX, 104 7 b 1-5. 
l05cf. Physics I, 191 b 25-30; also Meta. VII, 1032 a 20-21. 
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modern science will treat with extreme caution. The modern scientific 
attitude is reluctant to declare in a definitive way that "something" may be 
impossible. On the one hand, Aristotle's formulation of his contradiction 
principle at first seems too severe and rigid involving as it does the notion 
of "impossibility." On the other hand, today's scientific approach con-
siders it presumptuous to declare "impossibilities." The two views seem 
to have no common ground, and this is the gist of Dewey's argument against 
Aristotle: that Aristotle's "possibilities" are actualized only within 
determined categories and that it is "impossible" for things to cross over 
into different categories and admit of anything new or novel. However, the 
two views may not be so far removed from each other as they first appear 
to be. It has already been mentioned that Aristotle's introduction of the 
potency concept to the philosophical scene broke down the rigid dichotomy 
of being and non-being (nothing). The potential aspect of being became 
a tertium quid between "being" and "nothing"; hence, before his contradiction 
principle can be applied, all possibilities must be considered. In addition, 
his notion of "matter" as pure potency tends to erase the rigid lines drawn 
between the various classes of things and, thus, makes it possible for 
novel developments. 
By the same token, today's scientific avoidance of the term 'impos-
sible' may not be as rigid as it may seem. In refusing to admit "impossibilities," 
perhaps, science is simply guaranteeing an objective and open-end approach 
to the investigation of reality . . To insure a constant approach of being-led-
by-the-facts, and to avoid the close-minded view of an obscurantist, science 
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in a very general and theoretical way wants to declare that "nothing is 
impossible." This expression is more of an attitude than a logical utterance. 
It manifests an attitude of being open-minded and a desire to be led by the 
facts. When practical consequences are at issue, however, and when 
specific frames of references are established in order to realize those 
practical ends, "impossibility" is introduced into the scientific method. 
For example, within the framework of Euclidean geometry, we can say that 
"it is impossible for parallel lines to meet." Furthermore, we assume the 
Euclidean straight-line theory because of its practical consequences; e.g., 
although the surface of the earth is curved, the relative smallness of the 
area upon which we build homes, etc. allows us to act as if the area 
involved straight line measurements. Granting, then, that the modern 
scientist assumes the possibility-impossibility distinction when practical 
consequences are at issue and specific categories are needed, Dewey's 
pragmatism would seem to , owe more to Aristotle's potentiality principle 
and contradiction principle than first appears. 
It may be fruitless to criticize the fourth century B. C. Aristotle 
for not being a twentieth century thinker! From an historical point of view, 
Aristotle's role had to be limited; but his value is there. Through principles 
in general we are in touch with a real world. Through a principle of 
Potentiality that real world has real possibilities that are not yet realized. 
This does not necessarily mean that Aristotle is advocating some sort of 
"realm of possible entities" which would become meaningless under the 
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logical scrutiny of some contemporary thinkers .106 There seems to be no 
Aristotelian text that would support any such realm of "possible entities." 
For Aristotle, "possibilities" already have some stake in reality as some 
sort of universal ground for what already is the case. This notion frees 
"what there is" from any static type of reality and provides an open end 
to philosophical specula ,tion. Concerning this enigma of "possibilities," 
perhaps, we can paradoxically say that Aristotle's "possibles" are every-
where and nowhere. Everywhere insofar as everything in the realm of 
perishables has its potential aspect; nowhere insofar as potentiality-as-
principle strictly speaking does not exist. 
The Analogous Character of Principles 
The irreducible character of principles as contraries was considered 
from two points of view: first, insofar as Aristotle developed his archai 
theory in light of the philosophy of his predecessors; and, secondly, insofar 
as his principles may or may not be relevant to modern thinking. Within 
this same frame of reference, another aspect of his principles-as-contraries 
shall be considered: the samenes 's and difference contrariety, which 
Aristotle expresses in terms of "analogy" or "proportion." 
By refusing to allow that principles be corporeal inherents of things, 
on the one hand, and by denying that principles be separate from things, 
Aristotle was able to "locate II poles of opposition as explanatory of what 
changes. Principles as irreducible and referential allowed sameness and 
106According to Quine, language about "possible entities II reveals 
that such entities can neither be identical with each other nor distinct 
from each other; and in effect, such language is meaningless. Cf. 
Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1961}, p. 4. 
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difference to play simultaneous roles in the understanding of a changing 
thing's nature. An entity's formal and material principles manifest at one 
and the same time an intelligible constancy with a permanent 'possibility 
for new and different forms. An individual's actual and potential principles 
seem to indicate in a more general way the paradoxical same-but-different 
• 
notion of individuals that are "on-the-move." The question now is whether 
those same principles can apply to different cases. How well can these 
irreducible principles be applied throughout the scope of "what there is"? 
Are the principles of perishable things the same as or different from the 
principles of imperishable things? If the principles are the same, then on 
what grounds are "perishables" distinguished from "imperishables"? 107 
Furthermore, when the "realm of perishables" is investigated, there are 
many different sciences and arts. In the theoretical disciplines, one 
distinguishes 1) the study of natural entities (physics); 2) mathematics; 
and 3) the study of "being qua being." In the practical areas, the study 
of human conduct (ethics) is distinguished from the knowledgeable skills 
involved in making things (techne). ' If all of these disciplines are dis-
tinguishable, then are their respective "principles " discrete and totally 
different? Or is there any common ground in principles that can unite the 
sciences in some way? Aristotle begins his "first philosophy" by discus-
sing the wise man who knows the most basic reasons for all things. One 
who possesses a knowledge of the first principles possesses the things 
that are most knowable: 
107Meta. III, 1000 a 5-10. 
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For it is through these and from these that other things 
come to be known, and it is not these principles that 
are known through the particulars which fall under 
them. And that science is supreme, and superior to the 
subsidiary which knows for what end each action is to 
be done; i.e. , the good in each particular case and in 
general the highest good in the whole of nature .108 
Aristotle evidently envisions an all encompassing science which in 
some way reveals "principles" and "causes" of all things and of all other 
disciplines without, however, destroying the autonomy of the particular 
sciences .109 First philosophy is to study being qua being by studying the 
principles of being. But "the term 'being' is used in various senses ... 110 
"Being" is said in many different ways. Aristotle denies, however, that 
"being" is a "purely equivocal term." It is not purely equivocal ( o6x 
c / 
oµwvuµws ) in the way that ,;~ov is predicated of a man and of a 
portrait.111 In this latter case, only the name is common. The term "being," 
on the other hand, always bears a real "reference to ( 1rpos (I e: \) 
one central idea and one definite characteristic ... 112 The different modes 
and meanings of things must be distinguished. It would be a "hopeless 
' 
task" to proceed philosophically without accepting and examining the 
108Meta. I, 982 a 33-35; 982 b 1-8. 
109This highly ambitious endeavor of Aristotle has undoubtedly left 
its mark on anyone claiming the name of "philosopher." Indeed, his notion 
of the philosophical wisdom-seeker has waned not a little; and the rational-
istic interpretation of his first principles as fixed and absolute causes has 
had little influence outside of rationalism itself; but few claiming the name 
"philosopher" have not adopted his view of attempting to structure the "parts" 
into a meaningful whole without destroying the meaning of the parts. 
llOMeta. IV, 1003 a 33. 
lllcategories, l a 3. 
112Meta. IV, 1003 a 34. 
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"various senses in which things are said to exist. .. u3 But "being" and 
"being's principles" are always used in proportion to or analogous with 
some similar and, hence, unifying meaning. 
"For there is analogy between all the categories of being--as 
'straight' is in length, so is 'level' in breadth, perhaps 'odd' in number, 
and 'white' in color. •:114 "Being," therefore, enjoys a paradoxical sameness 
in its differences; and since ousia is the primary instance of being, "it is 
of ousia that the philosopher must grasp the first principles and causes ... us 
If ousia is taken in the sense of "individual entity" somehow placed in the 
general and abstract background of "being," then the ultimate analogy must 
rest in the principles of individuals. 
When speaking of the "various meanings" of terms, Aristotle distin-
guishes the purely equivocal use (homonym in a strict sense) from the 
analogous use of terms having "various meanings." Principles have the 
analogous character which serves to unite understanding with "the real" in 
their referential approach to "what there is." 
113Meta. I, 992 b 20. 'Aristotle consistently examines the "many ways 
in which things are said" ( 1roU.axws >.e:y6µe:va ). In the Topics 
129 b 30 and 130 a 4, "Things said in various ways" could destroy the 
strength of a demonstration if the proper clarifications are not made. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics 1096 a 24, it is acknowledged that "the word 'good' is 
used in many senses as the word 'being' is." In the Metaphysics XIII, 1087 
a 16, "Knowledge has several senses." And in the Metaphysics V 1013 b 5, 
"Causes are spoken of with various meanings." In fact, the entire Book V 
(Delta) of the Metaphysics is proof of Aristotle's concern for the "many 
meanings" of terms. Our task here is to indicate that the various meanings 
of principles are not "purely equivocal, " but analogous. 
114Meta. XIV, 1093 b 18-21. 
115 Meta. IV, 1003 b 18. 
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Before beginning his discussion of eternal and immutable substances 
in the Metaphysics, Aristotle gives a somewhat lengthy treatment of the 
analogous character of principles. He states that "in one sense the causes 
and principles are different for different things; but in another, if one 
speaks generally and analogically, they are the same for all. .. 115 It seems 
as though Aristotle is anticipating the great step he must take into the realm 
of imperishable entities, and he perhaps wants some sort of bridge con-
necting this latter realm with all that he has worked out concerning the 
perishable entities. Earlier in the formulating of the Aporiai, he had asked 
whether or not the principles of perishable things are the same or different 
from the principles of imperishable things . 117 If the principles are the same, 
then how can "perishables" be distinguished from "imperishables" at all? 
If the explanatory principles are different, then how can one pretend to 
explain anything about both realms by appealing to a common term--
"principles"? 
Returning to the realm of perishable beings, Aristotle will not allow 
that principles bear a univocal samenes ,s · with respect to each of the cate-
gories. If such were the case, then in effect there would be no categories 
for all would be the same; e.g., "Relations and substance would have the 
same constituents ... 118 The result would be a homogeneous "Being" not 
unlike the Parmenidean notion. 
ll6Meta. XII, 1070 a 31-32. 
117Meta. III, 1000 a 5-8. 
ll8Meta. XII, 1070 a 35. 
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Furthermore, similarity cannot be explained in terms of the same 
basic elements (Empedocles) for one cannot take the same elements and 
combine them into the same being. The basic elements are not the same 
as the compound entity . 119 But rather than abandon the plurality of basic 
elements of Empedocles, Aristotle in typical fashion integrates the elements 
into his own system of archai. "The truth is that, in one sense all things 
have the same elements and in another they have not. .. 120 Precisely it is 
the analogical character of principles that effects the integration in this 
particular case. The elements are generally the same when viewed in the 
light of the principles--form, privation and material substrate. That is, 
all of the perishable bodies "have" these same principles, but the prin-
ciples are realized differently in different particular bodies. For example, 
a particular body (substrate) may be hot (form) rather than cold (privation). 
While it bears its own unique and different characteristics, it bears a 
general similarity to other things. 
Things then, have the same elements and principles, al-
though specifically different things have specifically 
different elements; we cannot, , however, say that all 
things have the same elements in this sense but only 
by analogy; i.e., one might say that there are three 
principles, form, privation and matter, 121 
It is the analogical principles that allow the elements to be elements 
of all things, while at the same time there are elements of different things. 
119 Aristotle states that neither B nor A can be the same as BA (Meta. 
XII, 1070 b 7). In more modern terms, we might say that hydrogen and 
oxygen as separate elements are different from the composed molecule of 
water. 
120Meta. XII, 1070 b IL 
121Meta. XII, 1070 b 17-19. 
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There is a more general view of the analogical character of prin-
ciples, viz., actuality and potentiality . 122 These last two principles 
broaden the scope of other principles and thus serve as all encompassing 
explanations. For example, the more specific principles of Form (as 
considered separable), the Form-Matter composite and the Privation all 
can be considered as actualities. 1 The material substratum, on the other 
hand, is viewed as potentiality since it is in virtue of the substrate that 
things can become either the form or its contrary privation .123 Considered 
in this way, actuality and potentiality are the same principles of sensible 
things which are nevertheless present in a different manner in different 
things. In addition to the different ways in which act-potency are "in" 
things, there is yet another way in which they can be viewed as analogically 
permeating the perishable world, viz., in light of the cause-effect sequence 
in which one thing acts upon another. In such cases, one may first view 
something as "effect" in which the thing has the potentiality for being 
acted upon; from the point of view of "cause, 11 something is seen as having 
the power to bring about an actuality in thqt ·which does not possess it. 
This second meaning of "potentiality II gives a kind of double-edged char-
acter to dynamis. Things are not only able to be acted upon, but they also 
have the power to act upon other things and cause various changes. The 
Latin potentia seems to express the idea of potentiality as a dynamic and 
122Meta. XII, 1071 a 4-5. "There is another sense in which by 
analogy the principles are the same, viz., actuality and potentiality. " 
123Meta. XII, 1071 a 7-10. 
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less passive aspect of things. This interpretation 124 of potentiality frees 
the principle from sheer passivity whereby perishables are merely acted 
upon by something higher. On the contrary, there is dynamic action and 
interaction among the perishables with no necessary hierarchical dependency. 
There may be analogical continuity between the two realms, but it will be 
shown that this is quite different from a rigid hierarchical structure in which 
the higher dictates any ontic status to the lower. We see no such structure 
in Aristotle's realm of perishable entities. It will be remembered that while 
the two principles are irreducible, they are so identified as "parts" of whole 
things that, unless one principle is set in the background of the other, they 
become meaningless. Furthermore, analogy is a paradoxical way of re-
ducing the irreducible in which different things become the same . This is 
why, perhaps, Aristotle will feel no embarrassment in speaking of "the 
potentiality for acting" and the "actual possibilities" of something. Like-
wise, classical physicists speak of the "poised water above the dam" as 
"potential energy" (energeia). For that matter, "energy" itself is defined--
for want of better words--as the "ability _ to do work." As long as analogous 
principles are inherent reasons of things, there can be no rigid stratifi-
cation of Forms nor any oversimplified division between "real" and "unreal." 
Things may be more or less complete or more or less developed, depending 
upon the analogous application of their actual-potential structure. Further-
more, the combining and separating of elements to form different entities 
124Ross takes dynamis in this more active sense. Op. cit., 
Vol. II, p. 362. 
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is now possible when the analogous potency-act principles permeate the 
elements. The pre-Socratic pluralists had rescued the cosmos from a 
monolithic structure by trying to explain movement in terms of the combin-
ation and separation of basic elements. It remained to be seen, however, 
how elements could combine to form anything that was really any different 
from the elements. For Aristotle the elements themselves are reducible 
both potentially and actually to a sameness while preserving their dif-
ference, 125 In his classic ambivalence, he writes: "In one sense the 
potentiality for acting and being acted upon is one ... and in another 
sense it is not. .. 126 And again: "Things are not all said to exist actually 
in the same sense but only by analogy ... 12 7 Thus Aristotle rather neatly 
assimilates the Ideas of Sameness and Difference in Platonic thought into 
his explanations of perishables without 1) having recourse to separate 
forms; and 2) without resorting to the mythical language of Plato's world-
soul .128 Concerning the latter, Aristotle had repudiated the myth-device 
early in the Metaphysics where he criticizes Hesiod for making first 
principles into gods or generating archai from gods. Aristotle confesses 
that he cannot comprehend the meaning of the myths and, therefore, refuses 
125Ross suggests that in Aristotle's doctrine "no actual instance of 
any of the four elements is pure." Ross bases this claim on Aristotle's 
hint that privation may never be completely eliminated in the face of the 
contrary form of the individual. ~it., p. 369. 
126Meta. IX 1046 a 20-21. 
127Meta. IX1048 b 7. 
128cf. Timaeus, 30 b. 
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to "consider seriously the subtleties of mythologists. 11129 Concerning the 
Platonic Forms of Sameness and Difference, Aristotle offers the view that 
the harmony and/or proportion of things need not be explained in terms of 
something extrinsic to the perishables. Plato had indeed realized that 
unless knowledge involves some kind of organized unity (Sameness), then 
a plurality of different things appears meaningless. Now, Aristotle 
further contends if one's explanations are to be in any way meaningful, 
the organized unity must be, in some way, an acknowledgment of the 
plurality itself. This is true when considering any plurality of parts con-
stituting individuals as well as any plurality of entities grouped into classes. 
In either case, principles involve both the sameness and difference which 
allow 1) different elements to be somehow the same in all individuals; 
and 2) different individuals to be the same in a genus. Indeed it may well 
be that the analogical principles can reduce generic differences to one by 
analogy. For under the rubric of analogy, principles seem broader than 
genera. In discussing the "various meanings" of "one" in the Metaphysics, 
Aristotle states that some things can be "oqe ·11 numerically, formally, 
generically and analogically. This latter type of "oneness" always includes 
the generic "oneness" although the converse need not be true. "Such things 
that are one analogically are not all one generically ... 130 The analogical 
principles cut across generic classifications. "For there is analogy 
129Meta. III, 1000 a 10-18. 
130Meta. V, 1017 a 1-3. cf. also Topics 108 a 7-12. 
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between all the categories of being, .. 131 whereby things that differ even 
generically can be the same by analogy. Sameness and difference as 
analogically contained within irreducible principles are thus able to reduce 
all differences under a common bond while at the same time guaranteeing 
the differences of a plurality of things. 
This analogical character of the principles which runs through all 
I 
of Aristotle's philosophy in many ways sets him off in bold relief from the 
Platonic and Neo-Platonic view of reality as hierarchically structured--a 
view which dominated much of the ancient and medieval outlook. 
Now, precisely what is the source of Aristotle's notion of analogy? 
In what way does it explain both sameness and difference? How do the 
analogous principles allow for a hierarchy of things different from the 
structured reality of Platonic thought? And, finally, in what way--if any--
does Aristotle's structure approximate the more modern and contemporary 
views of reality as evolutionary or in process? 
Concerning the source of the analogy theory in Aristotle, it seems 
no different for Aristotle, as well as for any9ne else, that the past contains 
the roots of the present. While Aristotle's view of analogy may be properly 
his own view, the theory itself has a history. To trace that history would 
be a task not relevant to our present explication of Aristotelian principles. 
Suffice it to say that the main drift of analogical thinking in pre-Socratic 
thought seems to flow around the idea of mathematical proportions and the 
131Meta. XIV, 1093 b 19. 
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concept of harmony. Plato continues this thinking, especially in the 
Timaeus, where the elements are proportioned mathematically so that 
"fire is to air as air is to water as water is to earth. 11132 Not only is 
quantitative, arithmetical proportion assigned to the elements, but there 
is also the more qualitative geometric patterns whereby fire is a pyramid, 
earth a cube, air an octahedron and water an icosahedron .133 Furthermore, 
Plato has his world-soul myth inject sameness and difference into the pro-
portionately conceived elements. Aristotle assimilates this notion of 
sameness-and-difference-in-proper-proportion by leaving off the mythical 
language and by enlarging the mathematical type of analogy so that it can 
apply in a much broader way. But the basic concept seems to have grown 
out of a mathematical view, or at least analogy lends itself very nicely 
to mathematical expression. In the Poetics when Aristotle is classifying 
"nouns" and indicating how one may be substituted for another, as in 
metaphor, he explains analogy as possible "whenever there are four terms 
so related that the second is to the first as the fourth is to the third ... 134 
Mathematical proportions offer clear exampl!=s of analogies, but Aristotle 
in no way wants to restrict analogy to numbers which would reduce things 
to numerical values. In speaking of "justice" in the Ethics, he writes: 
132Timaeus, 32 b. 
133rn a way these patterns approximate the spatial patterns of 
carbon compounds in organic chemistry. 
134poetics, 145 7 b 16-17. Aristotle seems to be using the more 
general notion of analogy to explain how metaphors are possible so that 
all metaphors are a kind of analogy, but not all analogies are metaphorical. 
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Justice is therefore a kind of analogy for analogy is 
not a property of numerical quantity only, but of any 
quantity, proportion being equality of ratios and in-
volving four terms, 135 
In addition to freeing "analogy" from pure mathematics and 
geometry, there is also significance in the expression "equality of ratios" 
(isotes logon). Analogy, which may now be applied to any number of 
things, is seen as a relation of a relation. If sameness and difference are 
to be applied simultaneously throughout the realm of perishable things, then 
there can be no direct comparison of sameness to sameness. That would be 
no comparison at all but rather a univocal identity (Parmenides). Neither 
can there be a direct comparison of difference with difference for neither 
is this a comparison (which needs some similarity), but rather a juxta-
position of two equivocals (Heraclitus). For example, in a direct 
"comparison" of "sameness," the expression "Plato is the same as 
Socrates" would identify Plato and Socrates as one being. On the other 
hand, a direct "comparison" of difference, "Plato is different from Socrates, " 
would differentiate the terms beyond comprehension (assuming that the 
meaning of one of the terms is known). Only in an analogy--an indirect 
comparison or a relation of a relation--can both sameness and difference 
be preserved. Therefore, the expression "Plato is both the same as and 
different from Socrates" is explained by the proportion of entities and their 
principles. Such as, Plato is to his principles (basically act-potency) as 
Socrates is to his principles. Thus with the four-term, indirect comparison, 
135Nic. Eth., 1131 a 30-34. 
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no two individuals have actualities that are completely the same or 
completely different, nor are their potentialities quite the same or dif-
ferent. Things are both same and different. Following Aristotle's classic 
expression, we may say that in one sense they are the same; in another 
sense they are different. 
Does the analogical character of principles explain a hierarchy of 
beings? Is there a "great chain of Being" in Aristotle's thought? Is it a 
Platonic hierarchy which ultimately rests in separate entities? Can 
Aristotle's hierarchy (if there is one) be in any way compatible with the 
"process philosophy" of contemporary thinking?l36 The Platonic notion 
of a hierarchical structure that was passed on to Aristotle had both epistemic 
and ontic characteristics that are distinguishable but not necessarily 
separable: first, one's knowledge of such a hierarchy begins with the ens 
realissimum. There is no better way to begin than with highest knowledge 
of the highest being--Plato's idea of the Good, or later "The One" of 
Plotinus, or Spinoza's Deus sive Natura. To say that "The One" is the 
logical starting point does not nec~ssarily mean that initial awareness 
must be of the most perfect "One." Rather it means that in the order of 
cognitional value, there is no greater certitude available than the certitude 
obtained in knowing "The One." Because "The One" is most real, it is most 
knowable; and it is the notion of "reality" which exhibits the ontic side of 
the hierarchy. In a Platonic and Neo-Platonic hierarchy, individual "things" 
136Many classifications of "types" of hierarchies have been offered. 
Boas suggests hierarchies of power, logic, value and reality. Op. cit., 
pp. 85-92. Our own main concern involves all of these but with emphasis 
on the on tic type of hierarchy-- Reality--with its concomitant logical 
formulation. 
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which are viewed apart from "The One" (e.g. , physical sensibilia) are not 
real on-their-own, so to speak. The type of reality which they enjoy 
depends upon the next highest reality which in turn looks above itself 
for its very reason for being; until, finally, everything' s reason for being 
rests on the ens realissimum which explains why things are and are known. 
"In like manner, 1the Good may be said to be not only the author of 
knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence and yet the 
Good far exceeds essence in dignity and power. 11137 It seems as though 
the Good by some kind of natural necessity brings forth entities lesser than 
itself. Since the world comes from the Good, it is the best of all possible 
worlds; and, in order to be the best of all possible worlds, there can be no 
gaps, everything is filled in. No "stuff" is left over; no possibilities go 
unfulfilled.138 
Plotinus is very emphatic in describing "The One" as a necessary 
producer of others which spurt out of the overflow of "The One's" perfection 
because it cannot "remain shut up in itself ... 139 
137plato, Republic VI, 509 b. 
138cf. Timaeus, 29 e. N.B. Leibniz's law of continuity completes 
this hierarchical view. There are no gaps or leaps in the order of actual 
beings from the most perfect to the least perfect. Just as in mathematics 
there is proportion (direct or indirect) that mutually adds to or takes away 
from, and as in physics, what increases speed decreases rest and con-
versely, so, too, with real substances whenever there is a loss of 
perfection, there is a simultaneous gain. There are no gaps in the scale 
of being. Cf. G. Leibniz, On the Principle of Continuity, Selections, ed. 
P. Wiener (New York: Scribner Press, 1951), pp. 184-188; also, Letters to 
De Volder, p. 157-158. 
139Enneads V, 4 l. 
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Thus conceived, the "great chain of Being" is forged with each link 
representing a level of reality ranging from the most real to the least real. 
Also, it is a linear chain and not a self-perpetuating circular one. It is 
one directional, i.e. , reality flows in one direction only--from the top down. 
Undoubtedly, the meaning of "real" and "unreal" is the point of issue 
in attempting to compare Aristotle's structure of reality-through-principles 
with the Platonic and Neo-Platonic hierarchy. The latter schools of thought 
seemed quick to associate "unreal" with "change" and "real" with "permanence." 
Aristotle, while still maintaining these distinctions in many ways, modifies 
this either-or view quite drastically. His principles of potentiality, sub-
stratum, privation allow the term 'unreal' to be predicated in such a way as 
to connote "not fulfilled" or "incomplete." Once "actuality" and "form" 
are realized, however, then there is no question of "real" or "unreal" in 
the rigid sense of "being or not-being," i.e., any one thing is no more 
"real" or "unreal" than any other thing. Individuals are real. They may 
have similarities that allow grouping and specification, but the individual 
entities "such as Socrates and Coriscus , are the real existences" and not 
the groupings and/or the species .140 Aristotle's prime mover which seems 
so necessary as the source of motion appears to be entirely removed from 
the existential scene in which "natural things" are viewed as having an 
on-their-own status, e.g., minerals, plants, animals and men. These 
entities constitute the realm of nature according to Aristotle. However, 
140ne Partibus Animalium, 644 a 23. 
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"existence" also includes the subnatural artifacts and the supernatural 
heavenly bodies. While these existents are arranged hierarchically, the 
question here is whether or not Aristotle's hierarchy is based on existential 
dependence upon an ens realissimum.141 
Aristotle assumes the existential aspect of the changing plurality 
and explains their "not-being" in terms of potentiality . 142 He is not con-
strained, therefore, to assign epistemic or ontic priority to "The One." 
We might recall that "actual knowledge is of the individual II and that 
"universals as such do not exist. 11 Aristotle would rather begin with "the 
many," as he does in the Physics and the Metaphysics, and see where one 
might be led. "They (the Platonists) should have investigated this question: 
How is it that relations are many, and not one? ••. He (Plato) should ask 
how it is that things generally are many. 11143 And, of course, Aristotle's 
detailed work in the classification of biological specimens does not con-
cern itself with any kind of ens perfectissimum. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle does have some kind of hierarchical 
structure or scala naturae as Ross calls it.144 Lovejoy suggests three 
141Arthur O. Lovejoy, who treats of this "great chain" notion quite 
thoroughly, claims that "Aristotle's God generates nothing •.• the unmoved 
mover is no world ground, his nature and existence do not explain why the 
other things exist, why there are just so many of them, why their modes and 
degrees of their declension from the divine perfection are so various." Cf. 
The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 55. 
142Meta. XIV, 1089 b 16-25. 
143Meta. XIV, 1089 b 11 and 23. 
144w. D. Ross, Aristotle (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1964), p. 114. 
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scalae: 1) a vague ontological hierarchy; 2) a zoological hierarchy; and 
3) a psychological one .145 Concerning 2) and 3), there seems little doubt 
of a structural reality relating the lower to the higher. In his biological 
classifications, eleven types of sanguinous creatures are distinguished, 
the lowest being the zoophytes which are spontaneously generated, and the 
highest being man. 146 Man's psychic constitution admits of its own hier-
archy of powers. After giving his characteristic introduction, "the word 
'living' is used in many senses, .. 14 7 Aristotle distinguishes the vegetative, 
animal and rational forms of life. Aristotle recognizes the problem: in 
terms of what the soul can do (powers of the soul), not all living things are 
the same . 148 Yet there ought to be a way in which one definition might 
serve; for just as "rectilinear figure" serves to explain generally the quad-
rilateral and pentagon, etc. , so "soul" can be fit into one definition even 
though it is realized differently in different things. Furthermore, just as 
the triangle is implied in a quadrilateral, so also the nutritive soul (vege-
tative functions) is presupposed by animal life, which in turn is implied in 
rational life. "We must then inquire in each case, what is the soul of each 
individual, for instance of the plant, the man, and the beast. But we must 
also consider why they are thus arranged in a series. 11 149 This hierarchical 
1451 · 't 59 oveJoy, op. c1 . , p. . 
146De Generatione Animalium, 732 a 25; 733 b 16. 
14 7ne Anima, 413 a 22. 
148oe Anima, 414 a 29-35. 
149De Anima, 414 b 35; 415 a 1-2. 
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series in which the highest function of the lower form of life coincides with 
the lowest function of the higher form of life, nevertheless, is given some 
kind of definitive unity since: 
It is clear that there must be a single definition of soul, 
just as there is of rectilinear figure; for as in the latter 
case there is no figure besides the triangle and those 
that follow it (i.e. , quadrilateral, pentagon, etc.), so 
there is no soul besides those we have mentioned.150 
First of all, what can be made of the hierarchical structure of 
Aristotle's classification of animals? There seems to be no ground to in-
terpret the classification as a rigid and inflexible structure of a "once and 
forever" character given to the particular animals of a class. Aristotle 
seems reluctant to postulate any grandiose scheme which would exclude 
modification or revision. However, he does observe that within a frame 
of reference certain animals have determined attributes that allow them to 
be classified, and the classification does take on a "linear series" char-
acter. But even here, the notion of "analogy" is basic. Aristotle notices 
that animals that are "more or less identical," e.g., various birds can be 
put in one class and this class compares analogously with other classes. 
For example, the feathers of a bird may be analogous to the scales of a fish. 
Groups that only differ in degree (birds with short feathers--
long feathers), and in the more or less of an identical 
element that they possess, are aggregated under a single 
class; groups whose attributes are not identical but anal 
ogous are separated ... such analogies can scarcely, 
however, serve universally as indications for the formation 
of groups, for almost all animals present analogies in 
their corresponding parts .151 
150ne Anima, 414 b 20...:22. 
15lne Partibus Animalium, 644 a 16-22. 
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Understanding and communication seem to require certain logical 
classifications, but Aristotle's view of the real-as-basically-analogous 
will never allow the classifications to distort a certain "overlapping" of 
the classes. "Things pass so gradually from the inanimate to the animate 
that their continuity renders the boundary between them indistinguishable. rrl5 2 
In the Metaphysics he notes: "Things are said to be continuous 
whenever there is one and the same limit of both wherein they overlap and 
which they possess in common. 11153 
And again: "All things are arranged in order in a certain manner, 
but not in the same manner--birds and beasts and plants. They are not 
disposed in such a way that there is nothing which relates one to another ... 154 
Aristotle's logical classifications should not distort his ontological analogies. 
His classification of animals is no more "rigid" and "fixed" mutatis mutandis 
than the classifications (Phyla, Classes, Orders, etc.) of the modern 
biologist.15 5 
An analysis of the "psychological hierarchy" reveals the role of the 
analogous actuality-potentiality principles , in a clearer light. First of all, 
15 2Historia Animalium, 588 b 12. 
153Meta. XI, 1069 a 5. 
154Meta. XII, 1075 a 17. 
155concerning classification in Aristotle, Woodbridge writes: "The 
categories are what the investigation culminates in. They are ends reached 
and not beginnings which constrain the inquiry. " F. J. E. Woodbridge, 
Aristotle's Vision of Nature, ed. J. H. Randall (New York: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 1965), p. 35. On this point Whitehead had remarked: "It is notable 
that no biological science has been able to express itself apart from phras-
eology which is meaningless unless it refers to ideals proper to the 
organism in question. This aspect of the universe impressed itself on the 
great biologist and philosopher, Aristotle." Cf. Process and Reality ( New 
York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 128. 
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any consideration of "the soul" apart from the principles of actuality and 
potentiality is unthinkable, as a reading of the De Anima discloses. The 
soul is defined in terms of actuality, and actuality must involve a recip-
rocal potentiality. 
"The soul may be defined, therefore, as the first actuality of a 
natural body potentially possessing life. 1115 6 
He then explains his definition in more detail: "For the actuality 
of each thing is naturally inherent in its potentiality, that is, in its own 
proper matter. From all this it is clear that the soul is a kind of actuality 
or notion of that which has the capacity of having a soul. nl5 7 
Furthermore, Aristotle is quick to remind us of the analogous 
character of actuality and potentiality. He carefully establishes "soul" as 
a kind of substance (ousia) insofar as it is the "form" (eidos) of a natural 
body with the potentiality for life. Next, he establishes the "substance" 
as a kind of actuality (entelechia). 158 "But actuality has two senses, 
analogous to the possession of knowledge and the exercise of it. .. 159 It 
is the former, i.e., "having life" or "being alive" that best describes the 
156De Anima, 412 a 26. 
15 7 De Anima, 414 a 25-29. 
15 Brt is interesting to note that Aristotle uses entelechia instead of 
energeia to denote the kind of actuality that is the soul. The classic 
etymology of entelechia as "to have (echein) an end (telon)" and, hence, 
"realization" is rejected by C. H. Kahn. Kahn thinks that entelechia is an 
abstract noun derived from the adjective enteles meaning "perfected" or 
"completed." (Cf. Aristotle's Vision of Nature by Woodbridge, editorial 
assistant C. H. Kahn, op. cit., p. 36 n.) At any rate, the use of entelechia 
seems consistent with the analogical aspect as Aristotle wants to indicate 
the analogous way in which living things are "actual." 
159De Anima, 412 a 21. 
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soul as entelechia. Thus it (soul) presupposes no other principle; it is 
"first actuality." For Aristotle, there was no question of the basic unity 
of the living individual--the "insouled" bodily being. "One need no more 
ask whether body and soul are one than whether the wax and the impression 
it received are one ... l60 Actuality and potentiality are but "principles" of 
beings. As such, they are the general expressions of being into which 
individual entities are given some primary significance. However, within 
this general framework "We must inquire in each case, what is the soul 
(act of being alive) of each individual. 11161 Aristotle never allows his 
rational, general formulations to obscure the explication of real individuals. 
Soul as the entelechia--the being alive--is different in different things, 
i.e., living things differ from one another. Yet they are living things that 
differ, there is an element of similarity or sameness. The principle of life 
is analogous. Sameness and difference are realized together. The series 
of living things shades together; life-activities of plants (growth, nourish-
ment, reproduction) are presupposed by the animal, not as plant life but 
as animal life. The animal grows, nourishes itself and reproduces its species 
analogous to the plant functions. The animal, of course, does more: it is 
aware of its surroundings, not merely as tropic awareness but some sort of 
conscious awareness analogous to the plant's "awareness." The human 
being, in turn, pre supposes all of these vegetative and animal processes 
analogous to his peculiar mode of being alive. Aristotle's analogous scale 
160ne Anima, 412 b 5-6. 
16lne Anima, 414 b 35. 
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of life would fare favorably with certain contemporary thinkers. For example, 
Aristotle's analogous "tree of life" may serve in some way as a foreshadow 
of Teilhard de Chardin' s evolutionary notion of "complexification" which 
involves the gradual development of organic life from bare matter toward 
mind. "We must infer the presence of potential mind in all material systems, 
by backward extrapolation from the human phase to the biological, and from 
the biological to the inorganic. 11 162 Also, Whitehead speaks of the "Way of 
Rhythm" which "pervades all life, and indeed all physical existence. This 
common principle of Rhythm is one of the reasons for believing the root 
principles of life are, in some lowly form, exemplified in all types of phy-
sical existence. 11 163 Whitehead attempts to combine logical classifications 
with real process and development in describing "the primitive function of 
Reason in animal life, " and he bases the description on "the analogy of a 
living body with its own self-contained organization, to the self-contained 
physical organization of the material universe. 11 164 
All of this is not to make Aristotle a "process philosopher" merely 
to be in step with more recent thinking. Rather, the point is that there is 
much in the structure of the cosmic being of process philosophy today that 
can be traced to the type of hierarchies in Aristotle. Because of the basic 
analogical nature of his principles (reasons for being), Aristotle's hierarchical 
view of reality is not merely composed of horizontal levels or strata of 
162Teilhard De Chardin, Phenomenon of Man (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1959), p. 16. 
163A. N. Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1958), p. 21. 
164 Ibid .,. , p. 24. 
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classes in which one class is sharply divided and separated from the class 
above and below it. On the contrary, analogy allows for a kind of vertical 
continuity which cuts across the horizontal levels of being linking analo-
gously the hierarchy of classes. In addition, it would seem that the basic 
"sameness" and "difference" of the principles operate on both planes. 
Horizontally there is "sameness" which makes classification possible in 
the first place, but there is also the variants or differences of individuals 
within the class . 165 Vertically there is the "difference" of the classifications 
as they ascend from the lower to the higher, but there is also the all 
pervading likeness which makes the scale of ascent a continuous one. We 
can now, perhaps, return to an above quotation including, however, more 
of the text which should now have greater significance: 
Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to 
animal life in such a way that it is impossible to 
determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which 
side thereof an intermediate form should be. Thus, next 
after lifeless things in the upward scale comes the plant, 
and of plants one will differ from another as to its 
amount of apparent vitality; and, in a word, the whole 
genus of plants, while it is devo~d of life as compared 
with animal, is endowed with life as compared with 
other corporeal entities. Indeed, as we just remarked, 
there is observed in plants a continuous scale of 
ascent towards the animals .166 (Emphasis min~) 
It would be inaccurate to speak of a "hierarchy of beings" or a 
"great chain of Being" in Aristotle's thought unless one distinguished and 
165Aristotle implies that individual differences make it impossible 
to give an ultimate classification of animal forms by a logical process of 
dichotomy. Cf. De Partibus Animalium, 642 b 5; 644 a 10. 
166Historia Animalium, 588 b 5-11. Cf. also De Partibus 
Animalium, 681 a. 
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then combined this hierarchy of horizontal levels and the vertical continuity. 
These two planes can again be distinguished in terms of a "more logical" 
and "more ontic" point of view. The horizontal structuring according to 
"sameness" involves the grouping of individual things into classes so that 
the logical structure is emphasized, whereas "difference" on this plane is 
found among the actual individuals (an ontic point of view). The vertical 
continuity, on the other hand, emphasizes the "sameness' of individuals 
(ontic) while recognizing the "difference" of classes (logical). 
Horizontal 
Vertical 
Analogy 
Sameness 
Class 
(logical) 
Individuals 
(ontic) 
Difference 
Individuals 
(ontic) 
Class 
(logical) 
It would also be inaccurate to assume that the diagrammatic expression 
of Aristotle's analogous realm of perishables defines that realm in a fixed 
and permanent way. If such were the case, of course, it would not be an 
analogous realm of perishables. The difficulty arises in any attempt to 
explain and, in a sense, "fix" the continuous scale of beings in Aristotle's 
philosophy in which the very central notion-- "analogy"--defies "fixing." 
The vertical continuity that cuts across hierarchical levels of the 
perishables should not imply the kind of two-dimensional "perfect figure" 
as completely filled, which the schema may suggest. This is not a realm in 
which "everything has its proper place." Aristotle's structure of nature 
has gaps in it; there are unfulfilled possibilities (in things}, spontaneous 
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events, chance occurrences. There is no "principle of plenitude" in this 
structure. "The potential need not necessarily become actual. 1116 7 
"That which exists potentially may not exist. .. 168 
The language here need not suggest "a world of unactualized possibles" 
which has little meaning in strict logical terminology .169 It was already 
noted that Aristotle refused to con.sider the act-potency principles apart 
from concrete conditions in which the principles are mutually corelated. 
"Potentiality," by itself, is not an explanatory principle. As is his custom, 
Aristotle wants to specify objects in the light of general principles. The 
general expression "to be potential" assumes an actual state of affairs-- "to 
be potentially this 11 --e. g., an actual unhealthy man who is potentially 
healthy, etc. Potentiality can only be uttered in terms of what is actual, 
and what is actual is specified and conditioned.170 For Aristotle, therefore, 
1) it is inconceivable to "separate" actuality from potentiality in one's view 
of perishable entities; and 2) as principles of concrete individuals, they 
are always specified by some immediate circumstances and conditions. With 
these notions in mind, then, Aristotle' 's "possibilities that go unactualized" 
always refer paradoxically to real possibilities. That is to say, possibilities 
of real things and not a logical or ideal realm of unactualized possibilities 
allow Aristotle to avoid any separate and distinct realms, the one an actual 
realm and the other a potential. Also, Aristotle's thought seems to run counter 
167Meta. III, 1003 a 2. 
168Meta. XII, 1071 b 19. 
169cf. Quine, op. cit., p. 4. 
170Meta. IX, 1048 a 25-35; 1048 b 1-10. 
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to the rationalistic notion of "the best possible world." For Aristotle, 
nature makes mistakes. We know this from the analogous realm of the human 
arts. People make mistakes--writers in composing, physicians in diagnos-
ing--" so that analogous failures in nature may evidently be anticipated as 
possible ... 171 In one sense, "nature does nothing in vain" insofar as ends 
are striven for and the necessary functions are provided to continue the 
species. There is purpose or finality in nature, but there is no guarantee 
that the particular end aimed at by a particular being must be attained. 
"Nature does nothing in vain, and does not omit what is necessary, except 
in deformed or imperfect animals ... 172 These "failures of nature" are "failures 
of purpose," occurrences in which ends aimed at are not achieved. "Thus 
if in art there are cases in which the correct procedure serves a purpose and 
attempts that fail are aimed at a purpose but miss it, we may take it to be 
the same in nature, and monstrosities will be like failures of purpose in 
nature. ,,173 There are two technical terms which Aristotle uses to indicate 
their "missing of the mark." On the human level (i.e., involving deliberate 
choice, hence excluding beasts and ,children), it is called tyche-- "luck" or 
"fortune"; on the level of "nature" that does not act deliberately towards 
goals, it is automaton-- "chance" or "spontaneity." Such occurrences will 
not allow Aristotle's notion of what-there-is in reality to be given a strict 
and rigid rationalistic interpretation of a hierarchical arrangement that either 
17lphysics II, 199 a 34-35; 199 b 1. 
172ne Anima, 432 b 21-22. 
173Physics II, 199 b 2-5. 
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admits of no hidden exceptions or explains them away. For Aristotle, chance 
events cannot be reasoned away precisely because they are outside the scope 
of rational causes. We know things best when we know the causes and 
principles, but "chance" is not a cause. Chance events involve the ab-
sence of a cause, viz. , final cause; chance events are a teleological. Events 
happen by chance, indeed, but 1chance is not a cause. According to Aristotle, 
the reason why chance events cannot be calculated in advance is due to the 
nondirectional character of chance happening$ 0 Basically, nature is direc-
tional; most things aim at and achieve certain ends in a regular and orderly 
. 
process so that we can expect and anticipate what ends will be attained in 
the future. But because chance involves the absence of finality, there can 
be no apparent reckoning of chance events. "This is why we are justified 
in saying that tyche cannot be calculated; for we can calculate only from 
necessary or normal sequences, and luck acts outside such ... 17 4 
Yet Aristotle, in typical fashion, suspects that it is an oversimpli-
fication to oppose "chance" to "final cause." He goes on to say that in one 
sense--an absolute and unqualified sens,e--it is true that "tyche is not the 
cause of anything ... 175 In another sense--the qualified sense in which 
chance is a by-product of ordered events-- "chance is an incidental (§ym.-
bebekos) cause ... 175 And again, in one sense chance events cannot be 
anticipated and calculated (since, as we saw, chance events are outside of 
174physics II, 197 a 19. 
, 175Physics IL 197 a 15. 
176 Physics II, 199 b 23. 
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causal sequences); but in another sense, chance events can be anticipated 
and expected (by analogous situations of failure in the arts). Considering 
all of these "senses" of 'chance,' there is, perhaps, both a twofold 
strength and a twofold weakness in Aristotle's concept of chance, depending 
upon which "sense" is stressed. 
First of all, the strength of common sense seems to be with Aristotle. 
The terms 'luck, ' 'fortune, ' 'chance, ' 'accident, ' as they are understood 
today, coincide with his notion of the unforeseen and unintended. Secondly, 
Aristotle seems to give a sound basis for distinguishing the normal from the 
abnormal in nature in terms of the general notion of nature as goal directed 
through causality. What is more, finality as principle and not as entity is 
part and parcel of the real world of changing things and not separate from 
it.177 However, from another point of view, Aristotle's shortcomings might 
be exposed. In the first place, since chance is indeterminate and non-
causal for Aristotle, it cannot become involved in "scientific knowledge. 11178 
However, in the modern concept of statistics one can calculate the proba-
bility of the "indeterminate" anc;:l thus give to it a certain amount of 
determination. Also, it is conceivable that Aristotle's view of chance events 
could lead to a fatalistic surrender to inexplicable chance phenomena which, 
because of their deviation from the normal final causes, remain outside of 
177Whitehead claims that modern science cannot proceed without 
assuming a principle of finality. Op. cit., p. 13. 
l78Post. Ana., 87 b 19. 
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the sphere of explanation and must be simply accepted. I do not think that 
this last interpretation is completely consistent with the Aristotelian spirit 
of constantly searching for causal factors which--in this case--would tend 
to reduce "chance" happenings as we acquired more knowledge. 
At any rate, the basic analogous character of chance occurrences 
which are inseparably linked with the principles (act-potency, efficiency-
finality), together with the previously stated notions of unfulfilled 
capacities, all serve to indicate that the hierarchical edifices in Aristotle's 
philosophy are loosely constructed. There is a basic analogical character 
rooted in principles that runs through the logically conceived structures; 
and unless the analogous principles are recognized, the hierarchies of 
"beings" become fixed and immobile, in which case the structure would not 
be Aristotelian. 
III. PRINCIPLES AND THE REALM OF "IMPERISHABLES" 
We have seen Aristotle's attempt to render a realm of perishable 
\ 
entities as meaningful come to rest in explanatory principles. Matter, 
Form, Privation, Actuality and Potentiality are conceptual expressions 
grounded in a concrete world of beings analogically structured in a basic 
setting of "sameness" and "difference." Through the explanatory technique 
of the archai (especially the principle of potentiality), Aristotle hopes to 
avoid both the rigid dichotomy of a Parmenidean "Being versus Nothingness," 
and an inexplicable and random "flux" world that might be attributed to 
Heraclitean doctrine. In rejecting a unilateral approach, Aristotle finds 
merit in the pluralistic attempts of Anaxagoras and Empedocles but ulti-
mately revamps their archai into his own unique system whereby nous not 
only imparts motion to what there is but sustains that motion; and the ele-
ments of Fire, Earth, Air and Water are further explained in terms of more 
basic principles. Aristotle accepts the Pythagorean number theory insofar 
as numbers are not separate from individuals but are grounded in concrete 
reality. He ultimately rejects numbers as archai, however, because of their 
quantitative and, hence, non-irreducible character. Aristotle criticizes the 
use of number as an arche inasmuch as quantity admits of division and, hence, 
cannot be prior or first in terms of being and being known . 1 Had he continued 
lMeta. XIII, 1083 b 8ff. 
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the work of Pythagorean theory, perhaps, the evolution of the word "science" 
as the quantitative analysis of physical reality would have been hastened. 
As it happened, Aristotle's own particular world vision saw reality as 
neither wholly univocal (what is given in numerical values) nor as equivocal. 
Aristotle's world is analogous and, hence, basically qualitatively structured. 
While Platonic Forms seem to offer a more qualitative explanation of the 
world, they are dismissed as being too "separate" to explain anything. In 
such a way, Aristotle surveys the short history of Western Philosophy and 
molds the thoughts of his predecessors into his own unique system of the 
real which is rendered intelligible in terms of his archai. Aristotle makes it 
very clear that "principles" are the key to a philosophy. "Principles" are 
what his predecessors sought, and they are what he sought. 2 For "principles" 
are the "reasons why" things are the way they are, and nothing can be more 
important to a lover of wisdom than discovering the basic reasons why. 
In taking his lead from the philosophical past, Aristotle begins with 
the reality of common experience. It was and is a world of sunshine and 
rain, winter and summer, mountains and seas, earth and sky. To live this 
real life of events was one adventure; to attempt to explain it was, perhaps, 
another. And in the explanations offered by these first lovers of wisdom, 
there appears to be (at least to Aristotle) a certain discrepancy in the relating 
of the explanations to the things explained. First of all, there is the problem 
of what is to be explained. There seems to be no over-all category into 
which everything will fit. We hope for a science of "being qua being, " but 
2Meta. I, 983 b 1-5; Meta. IV, 1003 a 29-30. 
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"being is used in various senses." Is the "being-of-the-sun" the same as 
the "being-of-the-tree"? The latter manifests a coming-into and passing-
out-of "being"--it is perishable ( cpeaptos ) whereas the former is 
steadfast, manifesting a constancy--it is imperishable ( &cpeaptos ). 
This distinction of what there is to be explained casts a shadow over what 
explanations are to be used in reference to what there is. Aristotle first 
states the problem succinctly: 
We must consider and apply ourselves to the question 
whether the principles of perishable and of imperishable 
things are the same or different; and whether all are 
imperishable, or those of perishable things are 
perishable. 3 
Aristotle develops the problem at length 4 and expresses his amaze-
ment that no previous thinker had seen the problem of trying to explain 
different kinds of beings by means of the same principles. Even Empedocles, 
whose pluralism should have led him to the problem, is a disappointment. 5 
The problem is this: If principles are the same, then what is the basis for 
distinguishing perishable from nonperishable entities? On the other hand, 
if principles are different, then in wh 9.r way are they different? If the prin-
ciples are different, it must be assumed that perishable entities are 
explained by perishable principles and imperishable entities by imperishable 
principles; but if principles are perishable, can we really speak intelligibly 
of perishable entities? If this leaves only the other alternative of just 
3Meta. III, 996 a 2-5. 
4Meta. III, 1000 a and b. 
5 Meta. III, 1000 a 25ff. 
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imperishable principles, then we are caught in the first problem of explaining 
why something is perishable. 
On the one hand, Aristotle wants to hold on to the objective pre-
dominance of "things that come and go." His common sense realistic 
approach wants to embrace the "perishable realm." Yet the explanatory, 
subjective side of "principles" seems to demand an immutable, universal, 
imperishable character. He dismisses quite readily the possibility of 
"perishable" principles but refuses to deny the reality of perishable entities, 
in fact all of his discussions begin here. Aristotle would have, then, a 
philosophy whose prime concern is with the developing of imperishable 
principles of perishable entities. 
To be sure, Aristotle has a realm of imperishable entities--the 
celestial bodies. In considering this realm of Aristotle's philosophy, we 
shall explore: 1) what the differences are between the perishable and im-
perishable realms; 2) whether or not there are any similarities between the 
two realms; and 3) (cutting across both these questions is the problem 
central to this paper) what role Arist~tle' s theory of principles plays in 
linking and/or separating the perishables from the imperishables. 
Also in discussing the imperishable realm, we shall lead up to but 
exclude the Prime Mover (or Pure Act or Nous) from the realm of the natural. 
In his well-known passage in which the three kinds of ousia are named--
!) sensible and eternal; 2) sensible and perishable; 3) nonsensible and 
immutable6--Aristotle concludes: "The first two kinds of substance come 
6Meta. XII, 1069 a 30-35. 
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within the scope of physics, since they involve motion; the last belongs 
to some other science, if there is no principle common to all three. " 7 
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO REALMS 
The differences of the two realms would seem to exclude any common 
principles and, therefore, any common science. The realm of what-comes-
into and passes-out-of being, first of all--by the very fact of its generation 
and corruption--admits of a formal change, i.e., a substantial change. 8 
Whatever is perishable has some kind of beginning and end; the imperishable 
entities, on the other hand, are eternal, having neither beginning nor end. 
Furthermore, the perishables increase and decrease in size (quantitative 
change), 9 whereas what is imperishable is immutable, neither increasing 
nor decreasing. Again, the perishables suffer affections of various sorts 
(qualitative change), while the imperishable realm is qualitatively static •10 
Perhaps the most radical difference between these two realms is 
witnessed in the spatial changes of local motion 11 (kinesis rather than 
metabole). The motion of the sublunar perishables is rectilinear; and, as 
such, there is the imperfect tendency to run off into infinity, i.e. , to be 
boundless and indeterminate. Thus, fire, being absolutely light always 
7Meta. XII, 1069 a 35; 1069 b 2. N.B. There is no science of the 
Prime Mover. It does not admit of explanation through principles. It is 
the principle beyond explanation, the thinking of thinking. 
8physics II, 192 b 20. 
9physics II, 192 b 14. 
lOphysics II, 192 b 17; Meta. XII, 1069 b !Off. 
11 Physics VIII, 260 b 15. 
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tends to rise (and never return); and earth being absolutely heavy always 
tends to fall; while air and water are relative intermediates tending to rise 
and fall respectively . 12 The mixture of these pure elements on the face of the 
earth is fused into a realm of perishable entities which do not recur as 
individuals. Individual men, individual beasts, individual trees, individ-
ual drops of rain--all come into being and pass out of being as individuals. 
The "quintessence," on the other hand, manifests a local motion that is 
indicative of its eternal and immutable individuality--cyclical motion. This 
cyclic recurrence of the heavenly bodies, for Aristotle, is "empirical proof" 
of the "divine-like" character of ouranos.13 Circular motion is "prior" to 
rectilinear motion in that a circle is "perfect," i.e., it is self-contained, 
it has neither beginning nor end outside of itself. It can be said of circular 
motion that either 1) its beginning and end are contained within itself; or 
2) it has no beginning nor end, strictly speaking. In any event, a circle 
differs from a line in that the former is self-contained while the latter tends 
toward infinity and can never be complete. 14 
The heavenly bodies, having a m~tion of a circle rather than of a 
line, are neither heavy nor light, neither generated nor corrupted, neither 
increase nor decrease in size. Rather, each heavenly body "runs always" 
and forever. They are aetherial ( & e: t e e: 1. v ) .15 
12ne Coelo, 311 a 16ff. 
13De Coelo, 269 a 19ff. 
14physics VIII, 265 a 21. 
15ne Coelo, 270 b 23. Cf. Plato's Cratylus, 410 b. 
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These aetherial bodies, because of their perfect cyclical motion, 
recur numerically. It is the same sun that returns in its heavenly place in 
the night-day sequence. Likewise, it is the same planet that circles the 
upper sphere. The perishables operating on a linear plane between an 
upper limit (sphere of the moon) and a center (earth)l6 can only hope for a 
recurrence of species (eidos) rather than an individual, numerical recur-
rence. Men, animals, trees, etc. do not "return upon themselves" for their 
course of coming-to-be seems linear and not cyclical. The best that can be 
hoped for here is a cyclic regeneration of kind. In the regeneration of 
perishables, like begets like so that the species recur not the individual. 17 
Even tre elements seem to imitate this cyclic recurrence in its linear move-
ment, e.g. , the evaporation and condensation of the seas in which individual 
drops of water come and go while the same water recurs . 18 
It is this notion of the more perfect being describing a perfect (self-
contained) sphere that marks the greatest distinction between perishable 
(phtharte) and imperishable (aphtharte) beings. All other distinctions are 
rendered intelligible in the light of the eternal cycles--a notion willed to 
Aristotle and passed on and solidified in the Ptolemaic system, and which 
influenced such thinkers as Copernicus and Galileo who never questioned 
the cyclic perfection. 19 
16ne Coelo, 273 a 7-18. 
17ne Generatione et Corruptione, 338 b lOff. 
18 Meteorologic a, 34 6 b 24ff. 
19Johannes Kepler seems the first to challenge the concept when he 
introduced his notion of the elliptic orbs. Cf. "On the Principal Parts of 
the World," Theories of the Universe, ed. Milton K. Munitz (New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1957), pp. 198-201. 
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As would be expected, the archai play a basic role in explaining the 
different motions of "heaven" and earth. The earthly, rectilinear motion 
involves some principle of contrariety, i.e. , an understanding of motion as 
tending toward an opposite place. The arc he of privation, in this instance 
of local motion, takes the nature of a terminus ad quern. There are no such 
principles involved in the entities that move in a circular path. 20 Aristotle 
rejects any opinion that rectilinear motion is the contrary of circular motion, 
although he does admit that: "If there is an opposite to circular motion, it 
must above all be rectilinear motion which is the opposite. 11 21 However, a 
closer inspection of straight-line movement reveals that sets of opposites 
are contained within straight-line motion itself. "But the two rectilinear 
motions are the contraries of each other on account of their places, since 
up and down form a difference, in fact a contrary, in respect of place ... 22 
In other words, when simple movement is rectilinear, it contains its own 
set of contrary principles. To posit, therefore, that circular movement is 
the opposite of straight-line movement is to destroy the concept of simple 
motion or destroy the meaning of contrariety. Aristotle will do neither. 
Simple motion involves one set of contraries (e.g., up and down) and no 
more. To deny this assumption would destroy the intelligibility of simple 
movement. 
Perhaps, then, simple circular motion contains its own set of con-
traries--within itself. For example, clockwise motion may have as its 
20ne Coelo, 2 70 b 32; 2 71 a ff. 
2lne Coelo, 271 a 1-4. 
22De Coelo, 271 a 5. 
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opposite counterclockwise motion. Aristotle, likewise, rejects this type of 
contrariety in the heavenly spheres. 23 First, he shows that when a body 
is referred to as moving from one point to another (a to b), it must be 
moving in a straight line since there can be "an infinite number of circular 
paths through the same two points.,, 24 Secondly, the principle of finality 
' will never allow contrary motion to take place in the circular motion of the 
heavens. Assuming that one sphere moved in a circle counter to another 
contiguous sphere: 1) if the motions were of equal force, there would be, 
in effect no motion at all since the equal and opposite forces would result 
in a 'stalemate"; 2) if one motion were weaker than the other, it would be 
"without purpose" since it would be pulled along in the direction of the 
other sphere and, hence, its (the weaker sphere) nature would be frustrated. 
Aristotle assumes several significant factors in this discussion of 
the imperishable heavens: 1) he assumes a contiguous layer of spheres in 
which the outermost spheres move the innermost spheres. Contrary motion 
under this assumption is impossible. Nothing "opposes" the heavens. More 
specifically, there is no limiting principle. There is no privation in the 
form of an end-not-yet-reached. 2) Finality reigns supreme in this realm, 
whereas in the realm of perishables the end of rectilinear motion is always 
contrary (opposite) to the starting point. There is serious limitation in this 
latter realm; there is no natural necessity. To be sure, the simple elements 
(fire, earth, air, water) have theoretical, natural necessity of a simple 
movement; but the real world of perishables is not simple; it is "mixed," 
23ne Coelo, 271 a 6ff. 
24ne Coelo, 2 71 a 10. 
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and wherever mixture is involved "action" (poiein) and "passion" (paschein) 
and, subsequently, "contact" (aphe) become necessary _25 The best that 
can come out of these mixtures is a cyclical regeneration of species, 26 
while individuals in this limited sphere run a rectilinear course having 
extreme limits of coming into being (genesis) and running an orderly course 
into phthora. 11 
The aetherial bodies, on the other hand, are eternal having no 
limiting opposition. It would make no sense, therefore, to speak of one 
circular motion (e.g., clockwise) being contrary to another (counterclockwise) 
since the same end is reached. Perhaps it may be said that the eternal cycles 
have neither a beginning nor an end or that the beginning is the end. Through 
the primacy of circular motion, Aristotle's realm of ouranos becomes a "tight" 
system. Every sphere is in its proper place "moving with its proper motion." 
If one sphere's motion were caught up in a counter motion, it would have no 
purpose of its own and would be, in effect, like a "purposeless shoe which 
is never worn." "But God and nature create nothing that does not fulfill a 
purpose. "2 7 There is simply too much manifest order and regularity in the 
heavenly bodies for Aristotle to admit anything but a universe dictated by 
ultimate purpose. The order of the spheres is self-contained; there can be 
no infinity of bodies. Aristotle offers six proofs why the heavens are finite 
rather than infinite, and each proof draws its premises from the concept of 
2 5 De Gen . 3 2 2 b 2 0- 3 5; 3 2 3 a 1- 3 2 . 
26ne Gen. 338 a 17. 
27De Coelo, 271 a 35. 
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circular motion. 28 The entire structure, including both sensible realms (physis 
and ouranos), is plotted in a circular way with the earth as immovable center 
and the outer most sphere of fixed stars, drawn from a radius from the center, 
constituting the upper limit. There can be but one universe, therefore, since 
everything would tend toward its natural place and final end. Hence, if 
there were earth and fire of another world, it would naturally move to the 
center and circumference, respectively, and would coincide with the earth 
and fire of this sphere. 
Either, therefore, the initial assumptions must be rejected, 
or there must be only one center and one circumference; 
and given this latter fact it follows from the same evidence 
and by the same compulsion that the world must be unique. 
There cannot be several worlds. 29 
Aristotle's assumptions in this case are based (negatively) on the 
absence of a limiting principle of contrary motion and (positively) on the 
principle of finality. Both his principle of contrariety and his principle of 
finality influenced future cosmologists with each adding their own points of 
view. For example, Nicholas of Cusa speaks of a paradoxical "coincidence 
of opposites" in which everything is cent~r and circumference; or, there is 
no center nor circumference, depending upon one's point of view. 3o And 
even in Cusa' s relative shifting of reference point, the finality of God 
and/ or Nature reigns supreme. 
The second significant assumption is that local motion or change of 
place is viewed as a process rather than as a state of being. The process 
28De Coelo, 2 71 b ff. 
29ne Coelo, 277 a 10-12. 
30Nicholas of Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, trans. Germain Heron 
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954). 
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operates in terms of the act-potency principles. If movement is the transi-
tion from potency to actuality31 and if actuality is prior to potentiality, 32 
then "whatever is moved is moved by something else. 113  That is, something 
cannot actualize its own potentiality. In order for change to be initiated 
and sustained, there must be something (the mover) which possesses the 
actuality toward which another thing (the moved) is merely potential. In 
the realm of things that are generated and corrupted, such movement demands 
actual "contact" (aphe). 34 The principle of movement in such beings is the 
passive principle needing some external agent to sustain movement. 35 In 
the realm of the aetherial bodies, the motion is prompted by degrees of 
desirability , concluding with the most desirable cause of all motion, PURE 
ACT. 36 No matter how analogous may be the comparison of Aristotle's two 
realms (this comparison shall be dealt with), the primary motion, local 
motion, is a process of moved movers with the only inherent principle of 
motion being a passive capacity of motion which must be actualized from 
without. 
It is curious to note that for Aristotle, while movement is a process, 
knowledge is a state, whereas the contemporary view tends to view movement 
3lphysics III, 201 a 11. 
32Meta. IX, 1049 b 12. 
33physics VIII, 259 a 30; Meta. XII, 1073 a 25. 
34ne Gen. 322 b; 323 a ff. 
35physics VIII, 255 b 30; 256 a 1-5. 
36Meta. XII, 1072 a; 1072 b ff. 
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as a state (inertia) and knowledge as a process. We have already seen how 
Aristotle's actuality and potentiality principles rendered movement as a 
process. The same principles explain knowledge as a kind of state. The 
highest kind of knowledge (theor.gi) involves a state of actuality. Basically, 
of course, thinking involves more of the actual than it does the potential; 3 7 
so that when a state of mind is reached, there is a kind of cessation of 
human motion insofar as the passive limits of motion are concerned. It may 
seem ironic to speak of knowledge as Act and, at the same time, to equate 
it with the cessation of movement; but Aristotle is simply bearing witness to 
his predecessors and assuming that change and/or motion involve some 
limitation. For him, the limitation rescues that being from sheer nothingness; 
and he categorizes it as potential being. But, nevertheless, a human being 
is more fully actual when he attains to the knowledge (episteme) that puts 
his mind at rest. Wicksteed and Cornford point out that episteme is etymo-
logically connected with "coming to a stand" (stenai) 38 and that for 
Aristotle "intellectual states are not modifications ..• they consist in 
'being a certain state in relation to something,' viz. , the object known. u 39 
Aristotle's principles of motion and the limitations involved will not 
allow episteme to be sullied by change and disruption. Knowledge (highest 
kind) occurs precisely when instability ceases and our minds rest on something. 
37ne Anima, 430 a !Off. 
38Aristotle, Post. Ana., 100 a 5-10, fn. a, The Loeb Edition. Cf. 
also Plato, Cratylus, 437 a; Phaedo, 96 b. 
39physics VII, 247 b 5 fn. a, The Loeb Edition. 
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Children cannot acquire knowledge nor render judgments because "their 
bodies are in a state of great turbulence and instability ... 40 
While Aristotle's view of motion as a process of moved movers has 
no place in the contemporary explanations of physical forces, his concept 
of human understanding may not be as sterile as it first appears. To call 
knowledge a "state of rest" need not mean that such a knowledge is the 
final explanation of a given reality, and that nothing more could ever be 
known about a given set of experiences. It may mean that the uniqueness 
in the human animal lies in his ability of "fix" the stream of experiences 
in some kind of meaningful whole. It is significant enough that Aristotle 
firmly grounds all human knowledge in experience (empeiria) and then 
acknowledges the role of memory and intellection in establishing some unity 
of meaning. If this is Aristotle's meaning--viz. , the acknowledging of some 
kind of mental model which gives meaning to a flow of experiences--then he 
has pioneered a mighty array of thinkers whose views have dotted the history 
of philosophy, including as well the contemporary scientist working with his 
mental (mathematical) models as a meaningful calculus of the observable 
data. One can quickly call to mind Kant's categories giving unity to the 
manifold of sensations; Hegel's "quiescent kingdom of laws"; Whitehead's 
actual occasions "fixed" in a background of eternal essence; Santayana's 
scepticism induced by the flux of experience and yet grounded in a belief 
through animal faith. There is no intention to group these thinkers (and the 
countless others) into an Aristotelian theory of knowledge. It is hardly 
40physics VII, 24 7 b 20; 248 a l. 
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likely that Aristotle was aware of the implications of his own theory of 
knowledge. How similar and yet how different philosophers are from one 
another remains one of the unsolved meta-philosophical problems. The 
intention here is to indicate the solid stance Aristotle took concerning 
man's cognitional relation with experience. The fact is that: 1) he 
acknowledges the reality and importance of empeiria; 2) he acknowledges 
the reality, importance and necessity of a mental fixation of experience. 
And he effects all of these with but a handful of predecessors to draw from. 
First acknowledging an animal ability to perceive things, Aristotle 
proceeds to disucss the grouping of such perceptions by the memory into 
a "single experience. " 
And experience, that is the universal when established as 
a whole in the psyche--the unity that corresponds to the 
multiple, the unity that is identically present in them 
all--provides the arcne of art and science: art in the 
realm of process, science in the realm of facts. 41 
The generalized and mentally fixed experiences become the principle--
the starting point--of art (techne, i.e. , productions, manufacturing, 
invention, etc.) and of science, i.e. , speculative learning. What is more, 
this growth of experiences within man's "mental life" indicates that it 
was an anemic life prior to the experiences. Experience nourishes man's 
mind with its richness; and man returns his developed structures to the 
world and enriches experience through the arts and sciences. There is 
reciprocity between man and the world of experience: 
4lpost. Ana., 100 a 5-10. 
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Thus these faculties are neither innate as determined and 
fully developed, nor derived from other developed faculties 
on a higher plane of knowledge; they arise from sense-
perception, just as, when a retreat has occurred in battle, 
if one man halts so does another, and then another, until 
the original position is restored. The soul is so con-
stituted that it is capable of the same sort of process. 42 
Knowledge (episteme) is indeed a state of grasping first principles, 
but experience has dictated the whole process whether or not those 
principles are referred back to experience in an exhaustive and complete 
sense so that it remains to be seen whether new experiences are possible. 
At any rate, it would seem as if the answer lies in whether or not the same 
principles that explain the perishables also explain the eternal structure 
of the heavenly spheres. Undoubtedly, this is why Aristotle is so con-
cerned with seeing the relations between the two realms. He is amazed 
that no previous thinker had raised the problem. We see and attempt to 
understand this realm of flowing experiences; we see and attempt to under-
stand that realm of stable entities. Can we have the same principles 
provide an understanding of both realms? Are the prin:::: iples of perishable 
and imperishable things the same or different? 43 
SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES - A RETURN FROM A DIGRESSION 
The type of local motion marks the most significant difference between 
"heaven" and "nature." The former moves in an eternal circle; the latter 
moves in perishable straight lines. The inherent principles of contrariety help to 
42post. Ana. 100 a 11-15. 
43 Meta. III, 1000 a 5. 
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establish this difference when circular motion is found to be "deprived" of 
a contrary principle of privation, L ' e. , there is no opposite to circular motion. 
The principle of finality also marks the heavens as distinct from a perishable 
realm which admits of chance occurrences and in which nature suffers 
"failures of purpose. ,.44 The heavens manifest an order that does not miss 
the mark- -their nature does nothing in vain. 45 
Also, the type of motion in the different realms differs according to 
what sustains the process of change. Here actuality and potentiality serve 
as the explanatory principles of motion as a process. But in the sublunar 
realm, "contact" is needed to effect the desirable transition from potency 
to act; whereas in the heavens, there is a "desire" of natural necessity which 
best imitates PURE ACT itself. 46 Almost in spite of himself, Aristotle's 
different realms affect his theory of knowledge. The theoria that contem-
plates the heavenly spheres is not the type of knowledge that depends upon 
an organization of "earthly" experiences. There is, undoubtedly, a tension 
in Aristotle's thinking. A tension wrought by his polar tendencies toward his 
Platonic inheritance, on the one hand, and liis own apparent naturalistic 
tendencies on the other. 
Perhaps nowhere does this tension become more pronounced than in 
his discussion of "movement" in the Physics. He wants to "locate" nature 
44physics, II 199 b 1-5. 
45De Coelo, 271 a 35. 
46rn the De Coelo, Aristotle speaks of the natural motion of the four 
elements; but this seems to be a consideration of the elements in an abstract 
and rational manner. In the perishable realm, the elements are "mixed"; and 
any- natural tendency must be aided by "contact." 
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in forms having a principle of motion, 4 7 i.e. , in forms that are conceptually 
but not actually separable from matter. Matter qua matter will not do for 
Aristotle since, as potency principle, matter qua matter represents mere 
universality; whereas it is the actual kind of thing (eidos) which primarily 
indicates a being's natural state and not its universal potency. 48 
Aristotle had first defined nature as that which contains within itself 
principles of motion and rest. 49 He revises this definition in order to in-
elude matter but with emphasis still on form. Thus, nature is the form of 
things that have a principle of motion. Natural entities--the matter-form 
synelon--are inseparably bound up with motion. The principle of movement 
is an inherent ratio of natural, concrete entities. Aristotle is quite clear 
in this naturalistic commitment. One need not look beyond nature for any 
explanatory principles of nature. Nature is basically movement, and the 
arcne kineseos is in and of nature itself. 
--
However, the movement of the natural cannot seem to look any other 
way except up to the movement of the II super" natural--the heavenly 
spheres--the sensible but imperishable realm 'Of more perfect forms. Even 
in this realm, it would be consistent for Aristotle to speak of the "natural II 
movement of the heavens, as long as the source (arche) of their motion is 
self-contained. It is only when the relentless upward process of motion 
47physics II, 193 b lff. 
48For Aristotle, universals as such do not exist--individuals are 
the actualities. Aristotle's problem lies in his attempt to explain (through 
principles) in universal terms the motion of individual entities--entities 
whose individuality must include matter. 
49 Physics II, 19 2 b 14. 
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carries him outside of and beyond "both" natural realms does Aristotle 
manifest the Platonic pole of his thinking. Restricted to the movements of 
the sublunar and celestial spheres, his naturalistic principles5 0 accomplish 
the task of ridding nature of the myth-form for which Aristotle had such 
distaste. 51 Principles provide the basis for demonstration, and thus the 
realms of ousiai are raised to the level of a science (episteme). Nature, 
however, gradually seems to lose its explanatory powers as it gains its 
reflective image of matter-less nous. All the hard-earned effort of including 
matter within the definition of changing, informed nature is lost when, at 
last, the ultimate arc he kineseos, the unmoved mover, is separate from nature. 
Aristotle applauds Anaxagoras for recognizing that nous is itself motionless 
since it can only control matter if it is free from matter and motion. 5 2 But 
to say this is to look beyond nature (which he defines in Physics, 192 b 21 
and 25 3 b 5 as principle of movement) for an explanation of nature. This 
seems to be the focal point of Aristotle's own criticism of Plato in that the 
latter had separate universals as explanatory of changing particulars. 5 3 
Many commentators of Aristotle have cited this "tension" as a 
basic, irresolvable inconsistency. Solmsen asks, "Does Aristotle, in 
order to find the way to his first principle of movement, actually ignore 
50Naturalistic in the sense of being inherent in nature and not 
naturalistic in the sense of the positive sciences. 
51Meta. III, 1000 a 19. 
52Physics VIII, 256 b 25. 
53Meta. XIII, 1080 b 5. 
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his own definition of nature? .. 54 His answer is affirmative, contending 
that Aristotle by appealing to an unmoved mover "takes away" much of 
what was lavishly bestowed upon nature, and that 
When he refutes his own opinions, Aristotle is as merci-
less as when he criticizes the doctrines of his predecessors; 
the only difference is that he does not accuse himself of 
superficiality, vagueness, or obscurity. 55 
It is interesting to note that Solmsen dedicates his book to 
Werner Jaeger whose commentary on Aristotle, at times, makes a similar 
though less polemical approach to Aristotle's view of nature. Jaeger sees 
Aristotle as one who is searching nature in order to find justification for 
Plato's "supersensible reality." According to Jaeger, Aristotle comes upon 
the philosophical scene as a Platonic believer looking for understanding 
{credo ut intelligam). 5 6 He compares Aristotle's relationship to Plato to 
that of Kant's relationship to the dogmatic rationalists, with this exception, 
that Aristotle searched for justification of an objective super-reality; while 
Kant searched for justification of "methodological meaning. 115 7 It may 
indeed be true that Aristotle's whole approach to nature was a credo ut 
intelligam; that the search for a science of being qua being was to have 
terminated in the principle of principles, the Nous whose thinking of self 
makes all of sensible nature (perishable and imperishable) thinkable. 
54r. Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World (New York: 
Cornell Press, 1960), p. 233. 
551bid, I p, 234, 
56w. Jaeger, Aristotle {Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), 
p. 378. 
57Ibid., p. 379. 
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However, even granting this Platonic commitment, Aristotle's own approach 
to the problem--through nature--establishes firmly enough the independence 
of the principles of perishable things so that even if in the end a supreme, 
unifying principle is "demonstrated" or posited, the natural realm need not 
retreat into some shadowy Platonic realm of images. It was established 
above that the archai are basically analogous. This notion of analogicity 
is a curious device which both joins and separates. In its divisive role, 
independence is established so that "even in the natural world the prin-
ciples from which these things (perishables) are derived are perfect and 
complete ... 58 One can hardly accuse Aristotle of mollifying the role of 
principles and causes of the natural world simply because such a realm may 
imply an absolute principle. The implication is clearly there; Aristotle is 
hard put to explain all the order and harmony that he has found in the sen-
sible realms if an infinity of principles is possible in which "every principle 
will be based upon another ... 59 Yet his inconsistency does not rest in his 
"demonstrating" an eternal principle while attempting to "make much" of 
the sensible realm. Aristotle never criticizes Plato for holding to a Being 
apart from nature. He may, indeed, as Jaeger suggests, accept this ab 
initio. Rather, Plato is criticized for positing universals that are apart 
from nature. 
58Meta. XIV, 1092 a 15. 
59Meta. XII, 1075 b 26. 
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Socrates ... did not separate universals from particu-
lars; and he was right in not separating them .... The 
separation of the universal is the cause of the dif-
ficulties which we find in the ideal theory. 60 
If motion and time are eternal and continuous and if what changes 
is divisible, 61 so that the continuity can only be preserved in an im-
material something--then we can be certain that the prime mover is no 
universal form. If it is anything, it is a perfect, individual actuality. 
Universals as such are rooted in potentiality, and potentiality cannot explain 
the actual order of moving things. 62 This is an instance in Aristotle's 
system in which arche and ousia coincide. 63 Still, as Solmsen charges, 
-- --
Aristotle at first claims nature to be its own source of motion, and then 
deduces that nothing really moves itself, and that something outside of 
nature is the explanatory source of all natural movement. It would seem 
that nature is and is not the reason (arche) for its activities. Aristotle him-
self seems aware of this difficulty and attempts to distinguish a passive 
from an active principle of motion. This would admittedly facilitate the pro-
gression of movement up to an unmoved mover. Living things present a 
greater problem since "self-motion" seems more apparent within their nature. 
But such movements as "growth, decay and breathing" are caused by external 
60Meta. XIII, 1086 b 4-6. 
61 Physics VI, 234 b 10. 
62Meta. XII, 1071 b 20. 
63Meta. VII, 1040 b 19. Aristotle states that principles are not sub-
stances. In fact, principle is less substantial than unity and being which 
are not substances either. However, in Physics VIII and Meta. XII, the 
unmoved mover and the pure actuality are described as archai. 
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agents (e.g. , food) which enter into the organisms. At any rate, living 
organisms do not "maintain continuous and unceasing self-movement, 1164 
and this is enough to proove the need of an arche of continuous and eternal 
motion. These distinctions may not entirely free Aristotle from inherent 
inconsistencies, but perhaps they will allow a wider range of interpretation 
which may mollify the inconsistency. The distinctions are indicative of 
what was called above the bipolar tension between naturalism and Platonism. 
He will not allow that his naturalism be reduced to a Platonism of a Really 
Real world which takes away all meaning and significance from "nature." 
Nor will his Platonic tendencies be reduced to a naturalism which turns out 
to be a merely positivistic and quantitative approach. 65 Aristotle is neither 
wholly Platonic nor wholly naturalistic. He is both and neither through his 
unique theory of principles. The archai are never wholly Platonic since 
they are never separate from natural things (the one exception links 
Aristotle with Platonic tendencies, 66 the unmoved mover). The archai 
are not positivistic in the pre-Socratic sense because of the inherent qual-
itative forms and the extrinsic principles of efficiency and finality. They 
are not positivistic in the modern sense for the historical reason that 
refined observational techniques were not available for Aristotle to devise 
64physics VIII, 259 b 15. 
65 The pre-Socratic version of positivism might be the reduction 
of archai to matter. 
66we would distinguish here "being Platonic" from "having 
Platonic tendencies." Aristotle's over-all theory of principles prevents 
him from "being Platonic"; but we would agree with Jaeger that Aristotle's 
ambition of looking for some kind of unifying perfection is indicative of 
his "having Platonic tendencies." 
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explanatory principles in terms of quantitative analysis. 6 7 Yet this tension 
of the bipolarity finds its own unique value in a metaphysics that is suf-
ficiently committed to sensible nature to appeal to the more empirically 
minded thinker and transcendent enough for the more theoretical philosopher. 
Aristotle offers a metaphysics of analogous principles that replaces the 
Platonic myth. Without analogy to ground his mythical ideals, Plato's 
option is a bit puzzling. Is one to opt for a "world" that is not real, or 
a reality that is not a world? With Aristotle's mythless analogy, one would 
seem to have a better choice. Explanations (principles) are offered of a 
real changing world. Yet a total system is also offered in terms of more or 
less the same principles. The "more or less" rubric manifests the analogous 
character and would seem to render the option as not mutually exclusive. 
The differences of his two realms have been stressed. Investigating 
the similarities of these realms will complete our investigation of 
Aristotle's analogous principles and help to define further the terms of 
Aristotle's metaphysical option. 
Similarities between the Two Realms 
Aristotle's description in the De Coelo of the sensible but imper-
ishable realm would seem to effect an irresolvable dichotomy between 
"heaven" and "earth." Indeed, the "dual physics" of Aristotle has become 
a commonplace expression usually uttered as a point of contrast to the 
universal gravitation theory of Newton which "swept away" the dual realms. 
67cf. Jaeger, op. cit., p. 383. 
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It is true, of course, that once Galileo had begun to view Aristotelian 
formal structure as quantitative rather than qualitative, the path was open 
for a "new science" based on the quantitative approach of mathematics. 
There is, however, nothing of a "dual physics" in the mind of 
Aristotle; i.e. , there is no double set of principles which explains each 
realm independent of the other. The common misconception that there 
are two different sets of physical principles arises from the misuse of the 
term 'physics,' whereby its modern connotation as an inductive, positive 
science is applied to Aristotle's "physics" which was intended, of course, 
as a philosophy of natural things. 
To be sure, there are differences which mark off the two realms; 
and these differences have been pointed out. However, Aristotle would 
insist that different realms can still have common principles and, further, 
that such common principles afford a unifying view of what is real without 
denying the differences between what is real. The differences are too 
observable for Aristotle to deny; "things around the center" come into and 
pass out of being, whereas the heavens al~ays are. The rectilinear move-
ment of the perishables tends toward infinity, while the circular motion of 
the aetherial bodies is eternal. Yet, in spite of these "undeniable" ob-
servations, Aristotle hoped for a world system that would be as "universal" 
as the system Newton laid down centuries later. It has already been noted 
that in the Metaphysics he groups the perishable and imperishable ousiai under 
the common classification of sensible things that move, hence both types 
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have a common bond that makes them object of one discipline. 68 This 
vision of a universal "science" is more clearly expressed by Aristotle in 
the De Generatione et Corruptione when he writes that the principles of 
perishable things "are equal in number to and identical in kind with those 
of eternal things. 11 69 
The fact that the two realms share the common attributes of being 
sensible and being in motion gives Aristotle hope for a "science" of common 
principles of being. He identifies these common principles as his famous 
four causes beginning with the material cause which revolves the whole 
discussion around an ontology of being and non-being. 
The Material Principle 
"Now cause in the sense of matter, for things which are of a nature 
to come-to-be, is 'the possibility of being and not-being . .,,70 The "material 
principle" of eternal things is the "impossibility of not-being, 1171 or, in 
positive terms, the necessity of their being. 
In this passage of the De Generatio1;e et Corruptione, Aristotle dis-
tinguishes 1) things that necessarily exist; 2) things that, of necessity, do 
not exist (impossibilities); and 3) things that exist but do not have to exist. 
68Meta. XII, 1069 b l. 
69De Gen. 335 a 28. 
70ne Gen. 335 a 33. 
71De Gen. 335 a 35. 
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The first distinction marks off the realm of being in all its eternal necessity; 
the second establishes non-being as a total negation of what is; the third 
bridges the gap between being and non-being and becomes the realm of be-
coming which was the cause of so much speculative consternation among 
the pre-Socratic and Platonic thinkers. Aristotle accepts his heritage of 
being, non-being and ' becoming and integrates all of these notions under 
his archai theory. An understanding of the basic categories of what there 
is can be found in the "matter" of the entities. 
At first glance, it seems odd that Aristotle should list these meta-
physical classifications under the material principle. Is he using "matter" 
in a general and analogous way to indicate that all realms have a general 
"subject matter"? Or is he indicating a more antic meaning that would en-
vision a common material principle which explains the being-structure of the 
heavens and the becoming-condition of earth? He could mean both, of 
course, and still use the term analogously. 
Judging in the light of Aristotle's assumption of a real world rendered 
intelligible through principles,, and in view of his general tendency to syn-
the size reality into a limited number of principles, we would conclude that 
the "material" principles of both realms have ontological significance. That 
is to say, Aristotle recognizes the respective reasons for being and becoming 
in the basic material structure of the entities (imperishable and perishable). 72 
This interpretation--which is consistent with Aristotle's realistic 
72There are, indeed, other equally important causes which will 
soon be listed. 
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commitment--reduces considerably the dichotomous character of his physical 
system. To be sure, the "matter" of the heavens is eternal and necessary 
and cannot not be, while the "matter" of earth is temporal and contingent 
and can be and not be. These metaphysical differences have practical con-
sequences insofar as the heavens being "unearthly" possess no weight. 73 
Also, the "differences" of the "material" principle cut so deeply that in 
pondering the sphere of the universe "nothing made by man, nor anything 
visible to us on earth can be compared to it.,, 7 4 
In the face of such statements, why does Aristotle attempt to hold on 
to "principles of perishable things that are equal in number and identical in 
kind with those of eternal things"? 75 Specifically, why would Aristotle 
claim that both realms have a material principle that explains their respec-
tive Being-Becoming status? It could be that the attempt to explain 
"observable" differences of the two realms in terms of an analogous prin-
ciple strains consistency beyond endurance. On the other hand, if 
Aristotle's faith in the reality of physical existence and experience is to be 
taken seriously, then Aristotle simply might be saying that nothing in the 
way of physical experience here on earth can compare to the realm of ouranos. 
Yet it is sensible and is moving so that it must have some kind of material 
arc he. The greatest inconsistency in Aristotle's texts seems in his 
identification of highest knowledge with "highest" things on the one hand, 
73ne Coelo, 284 a 21. 
74De Coelo, 287 b 16. 
7 5 De Gen. 3 3 5 a 3 0 . 
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and yet his constant return to the certitude of what we experience here and 
now. Unlike Plato, Aristotle is quick to point out instances in which sen-
sory experience can support his theory: "The evidence of sense perception 
supports our view." 76 
His empiricism--as we noted in a previous chapter--is based on 
gross observation rather than controlled experimentation, yet Aristotle is 
empirical enough to assert his doubt about the eternal heavens even though 
some material principle must apply. 
Rather than appear as an inconsistency, it might be taken as a the-
oretical hope on the part of Aristotle arising out of what was called a bipolar 
tension of Platonic rationalism and empirical naturalism. The same tendency 
might be seen in Newton's adamant "Hypotheses non fingo,"77 on the one 
hand, and his theoretical hypothesis on the nature of light found in the "Queries II 
of his Optics. The tension of theory and experience can apply as well in 
Newtonian terms. The universal theory of gravitation gave mathematical ex-
pression to the material arche of celestial bodies, and thereby gave new 
insights into their "nature and properties : 11 Yet more certain knowledge of 
a weightless state or of motion in a different gravitational field waits upon 
the actual, individual experience. Even though the same gravitational 
principle applies throughout the universe, yet there are different experiences 
falling under that principle. 
76De Gen. 336 b 16. In this passage Aristotle is speaking of the sun 
as efficient cause of generation and corruption on earth. All of the physical 
treatises rest on empirical observation. 
77 Sir Isaac Newton~ Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica 
Vol. II (London: J. Tegg, 1833), p. 198. 
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Aristotle, likewise, hopes to bring the whole study of nature under 
common principles. 78 Since mathematics is still considered as somewhat of 
a divine science looking up toward the One rather than down toward the 
physical Many, Aristotle will not adopt the quantitative approach of mathe-
matics. His qualitative principles face a severe test. How can the same 
qualitative principles apply to a ,realm (the imperishable heavens) which by 
all observation is qualitatively different? Only by reducing both realms to 
most general expressions of being and non-being can the same principles 
be applied. Aristotle's synthetic approach wants to have the study of 
nature include all bodies--the whole heaven ( C1UVOAOV oupavov ).79 
In addition, there is the tendency to reduce all physical phenomena to com-
mon physical explanations. In the Meteorologica, which deals with an "in-
between" realm that is close enough to earth and far enough from the 
heavenly spheres so that natural events happen with "less regularity" than 
the more ordered heavens, 80 a common physical cause of three basic 
phenomena is cited. The "dry exhalation" (llvEµov ) is said to be the 
material cause of wind (on the surface of the earth), earthquakes (beneath 
' 
the surface of the earth), and thunder and lightning (above the surface of 
the earth). 81 
78This tendency to synthesize was cited above. 
79ne Coelo, 298 a 30; 298 b 1-5. In these passages Aristotle 
concludes that the term "nature" refers to all bodies. 
SO Meteor., 338 b 22. 
81Meteor., 370 a 22. 
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Also, Aristotle's whole discussion of generation and corruption is 
based on the transmutation of one basic element into another, which in turn 
rests on a "matter that is common to all, II ( o~n KO l vn ) . 82 
In the De Coelo, Aristotle states in typical fashion that in one sense 
the four elements must have different matter since their properties are dif-
ferent. 83 Yet in another sense, matter is common to all since the bodies 
are generated out of each other. 84 His answer is that there is a common 
material principle realized in different material bodies. 85 
If Aristotle has difficulty reconciling "sameness and difference" in 
and among the perishables, how much more difficult must a universal under-
standing be? 8 6 Yet he would maintain that the realms are the same in their 
very differences. Both involve a material principle. The perishable realm 
involves matter that "can be and not be"; the imperishable realm involves 
matter that "is" of necessity. 
82De Gen., 332 a 19. 
83De Coelo, 312 b 20. 
84De Coelo, 312 a 31. 
85Leo Elders maintains that Aristotle's use of matter in this section 
of De Coelo III, is different from the "matter" of the De Gen. and the Physics. 
He gives no reasons for this claim. Cf. Aristotle's Cosmology (The Nether-
lands: Van Gorcum and Co., 1965), p. 361. 
86Aristotle compounds the difficulty by failing to distinguish or 
attempting to distinguish "matter" as physical sensibilia from "matter" as 
something intelligible. 
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The Formal Principle 
In spite of the "dual physics" which developed historically out of 
the writings and interpretations of Aristotle, we have seen that "heaven" 
and "earth," the circumference and center, are joined under the common 
name of "nature." Furthermore, a common material principle helps effect 
the merger whereby "nature is se nsible and mobile. " However, the material 
principle is analogously realized so that in addition to the similar natural 
traits mentioned above, there is also a natural difference. Expressed in 
ontological terms, the difference between "heaven" and "earth" is the dif-
ference between "must be" and "need not be." 
In addition to the common material principle, there is a "second 
(principle) in the sense of formal principle." 8 7 Aristotle's formal principle 
serves as a "mean" in several ways. First of all, in the realm of perishable 
entities, the formal principle bridges the gap between a materialism which 
would "explain" generation by the mere juxtaposition and accretion of 
material elements and a Platonism which bogs down in a theory of participation 
in pure forms. 88 In either case, the view ·is "unnatural" as far as ex-
plaining comming-into-being is concerned. "For they exclude the essential 
nature and the form. 11 89 Perhaps Aristotle's "naturalism" is best seen here 
where he identifies the natural development of things with their ousiai. 
8 7 De Ge :o • , 3 3 5 a 31. 
88De Gen., 335 a 8ff. 
89ne Gen., 335 b 35. 
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What things are by their nature is the cause of generation. Empedocles, 
who had done well according to Aristotle to cite the four basic elements, 
nevertheless could not explain the natural mixture of those elements. He 
envisioned no formal principle. For Empedocles, growth could be effected 
only by accretion. What is more, only fire increases fire, and earth in-
creases earth. 90 For Aristotle, the mixture of elements needs no forces 
(love and strife) which lie outside of the natural elements. Rather, the 
mixture is the natural thing itself. It is "matter" plus an inherent deter-
minant "which constitutes the nature of each thing"; and Empedocles, in 
effect, has "nothing about the nature of things" in his treatise. 91 Formal 
principle, in the perishable world of things that come into and pass out of 
being, is a proper mixture of actuality and potency which destroys excesses 
and establishes a mean. 92 
Aristotle's conception of "form" as principle, i.e., as rational 
structure, mediates an a-structural materialism, on the one hand, and a 
Platonism of Forms-as-entities, on the other. (Cf. Physics II, 194 a 13ff .) 
With "Form" established as a principle, Aristotle can now span a wider 
gap--the difference between things that are generated and things that are 
necessary. The perishable things are not "mere matter"; the imperishable 
things are not "pure forms. " Both realms contain individual, physical 
9 0 De Gen . , 3 3 3 a 3 5 ; 3 3 4 b 1- 3 . 
91 De Gen. , 3 3 3 b 17 -19 . 
92De Gen., 330 b 25ff. Aristotle maintains that freezing and boiling 
are excesses of the formal structure of what is cold and hot, respectively. 
Therefore, nothing can be generated from ice and fire. 
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realities which are rendered intelligible in terms of the matter-form archai. 
Aristotle would insist that formal predominance is in direct proportion to a 
being's imperishable state. That is why "fire alone--and to a greater 
extent than the rest (of the elements) is of the nature of 'form, 1 because 
it naturally tends to be borne toward the limit. ,, 9 3 It may be said, then, 
that the beings of the heavens ' are "more formal" than the beings of the 
earth; i.e. , the heavenly bodies are more fully determined, more actual 
than potential. This is Aristotle's intention. There is less potentiality in 
the eternal entities which are not capable of qualitative or quantitative 
change, nor are they capable of generation or destruction. They are, how-
ever, potential for local motion. They are dynamic in the sense of ever 
moving; and in this sense, their circular motion defines their more perfect 
forms. 
The difference between the two realms, therefore, does not seem to 
be as great as it might appear to be. Both realms partake of beings whose 
principles involve them in the natural order of things that are sensible and 
mobile. Both types of entities have mate .rial and formal characteristics. 
Both types of entities manifest actuality and potentiality. These are the 
principles that Aristotle searched for in looking for "principles of perishables" 
that are "identical in kind" with those of the eternal things. Aristotle wanted 
no "dual physics." He favored no double set of explanatory principles for 
each realm. Both realms were counted under the study of "Physics, " i.e. , 
9 3 De Gen . , 3 3 5 a 19- 2 0 . 
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a study of nature that was "metaphysical" as much as it was "physical." 
When "Physics" assumes the quantitative, experimental approach of modern 
science, then Aristotle's sublunar "physics" appears wholly inadequate 
in its application to the celestial bodies. 
All of this, however, ignores the basic problem within the Aristotelian 
doctrine itself. Aristotle wants the same principles to apply to both realms. 
The analogous character of his archai will allow the same intelligible prin-
ciples to be applied in different instances. However, in preserving unity 
in and among differences through analogous principles, the differences 
would almost always be qualitative rather than quantitative. And when 
beings differ qualitatively, there would seem to be a difference in kind 
rather than in degree. Yet Aristotle hopes for principles that are "identical 
in kind." Aristotle asks in the Metaphysics, "Why is it that some things 
are perishable and others are not, assuming that they are derived from the 
same principles? 1194 He rightly identifies this as one of the major problems 
facing a "lover of wisdom." How can the same kind of principles explain 
different kinds of beings? ,His analogous principles (especially formal 
principle) are an attempt to solve the problem, which extends to all modes 
of reality, including ethical values, political norms, poetic rules. His 
task is an immense one in which all aspects of reality are approached 
through a limited number of general principles. 
94Meta. III, 1000 b 20. 
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The "scientific" endeavor became much more simple and effective 
when Galileo viewed formal principles as quantitative rather than qualita-
tive. It became much more consistent since now the whole of physical 
reality could be viewed as differing merely by degrees--degrees of mass 
in spatial and temporal relations. 
This latter approach, howe'i.l,er, engendered another problem. What 
should be done with qualitative values? Aristotle's philosophical princi-
ples save the realm of values at the price of an effective "physics." 
It may be argued that Aristotle's "values" are not worth the price 
of his sterile physics, and that his rational approach to ethics is as vain 
as his explanations of earthquakes and thunderbolts. To understand 
Aristotle's philosophical endeavor, however, one must first understand 
his unique brand of naturalism in its historical setting, and then venture 
to see if and how his vision may be of any value today. This would take 
us far afield of the task at hand. The suggestion offered here is at first 
negative: Aristotle's view of nature should not be compared pari passu with 
the task of modern physics. Aristotle's visi?n is quite different. His scope 
is broad, perhaps too broad; his approach is common sensical, perhaps too 
much so. But the questions he asks are legitimate questions. He asks why 
it is that stones tend to fall and trees grow and men think. He asks why 
hailstones occur in warm weather and why comets appear to have tails and 
why there is salt in the sea. He asks why the sun and moon seem to move 
in a circular motion while the stars appear fixed. His practical answers 
turned out to be more wrong than right. But his general approach to any 
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realm, or rather to the one realm of nature through principles, has willed 
something to posterity that constantly recurs--the notion of nature as an 
intelligible dynamism. This view of nature is especially true when the 
principles are the inherent matter-form or act-potency principles. Aristotle's 
nature is material enough not to be absolute and formal enough not to be 
sheer necessity. In positive • terms, nature is material enough to be dy-
namic and formal enough to be understood. Whether perishable or 
imperishable in the final analysis, it is one realm--the natural realm. 95 
Expressed in terms of material principle, it is nature as moving; under the 
rubric of formal principle, it is nature as expressible. Once the inherited 
distinctions of perishable-imperishable are made within nature, Aristotle 
can further distinguish his principles. As was mentioned above, the mate-
rial principle becomes the "must be" characteristic of the eternal beings, 
and the "need not be" characteristic of ephemeral things. The formal prin-
ciple of imperishables takes the expression "everything is what it is and 
will remain so." The formal principle of the perishables is uttered as 
"everything is what it is and can beco ,me other." 
95Aristotle begins the Third Book of the De Coelo with an analysis of 
the word "natural": 
"Now the word 'natural' is applied on the one hand to substances, 
and on the other to functions and attributes of substances. By substances 
I refer to the simple bodies, fire and earth and the others, and things com-
posed of them, e.g., the heaven as a whole and its parts, as well as 
animals and plants and their parts; attributes and functions include the 
movements of each of these substances and all movements of the others 
for which each is responsible by virtue of its proper power, and also their 
alterations and mutual transmutations. It is obvious therefore that the 
study of nature is concerned for the most part with bodies, seeing that all 
natural substances either are bodies or are dependent on bodies and mag-
nitudes." (298 a 27; 298 b 4.) 
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The Final Principle 
The third common principle that Aristotle cites in his attempt to 
effect a common bond of being is the "final cause" or the "end-in-view. " 
In a certain sense, the finality of a being is identified with its formality. 
The formal expression of "what something is," involves a final understanding 
of "what something is for." As Aristotle phrases it, "Cause in the sense 
of their 'end-in-view' is their shape ( µop<j,n ) ( ,,.. ) 96 and form e: 1 o o s • 
In the Physics, he is even more explicit concerning the coincidence of 
form and end. "For the essential nature of a thing and the purpose for 
which it is produced are often identical--so that the final cause coincides 
with the formal. .,97 And again: "Also since the term 'nature' is applied 
both to material and to formal principles, and since it is the latter that 
constitutes the goal, and all else is for the sake of that goal, it follows 
that the form is the final cause. 1198 
This identifying of the formal with the final does not exclude un-
achieved ends in Aristotle's system of nature. On the contrary, there are 
"failures of purpose in Nature • .,99 But.failures of purpose occur not be-
cause the end-striven-for is outside of natural happenings, but rather 
because of a "miscarriage of some arche" within nature itself. The 'end " 
or realization of nature is contained within the formal expression of nature 
96oe Gen., 335 b 7. 
97physics II, 198 a 26-27. 
98physics II, 199 a 32-33. 
99physics II, 199 b 4. 
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itself. This is what "nature" primarily means: beings that are intrinsically 
goal directed. Things which exist by nature "have within themselves 
principles of motion ... 100 For Aristotle, nature is self-explanatory, i.e., 
the reasons for understanding that which is natural are found in natural 
things themselves. There is nothing artificial about nature. All of this 
seems to beg the question, and perhaps it does. Aristotle never maintained 
that "nature" could be "proven." He explicitly denies that "the natural" 
can be proven, 101 Either one sees it or he does not. Also it cannot be 
proven that the goals of natural things are contained in nature itself (for 
this is part of the meaning of nature). It is an Aristotelian assumption 
couched in the language of his principles "that nature is a principle, then, 
and a goal-directed one, is beyond dispute ... 102 Teleology, of course, 
permeates the thinking of Aristotle. Even his treatment of chance occur-
rences is set in a framework of finality . 103 The specific task at hand is to 
ascertain how the principle of finality 104 unites the beings above and below 
lOOphysics II, 192 b 14. 
lOlphysics II, 193 a 2-9. 
102Physics II, 199 b 3 2. 
103Physics II, especially 198 a 6-13. 
104The English word 'finality' or 'finite' does little justice to the 
Greek t e). os in that the former terms connote a cessation or termination 
of a deed or state of being. In this sense it would seem quite paradoxical 
that te:).os should be an &pxn . The meaning of the term in this 
discussion shall connote a "completion" or "fulfillment" or "perfection" 
that beings have or are striving for, depending upon their state of being. 
To say with Aristotle, therefore, that something has "reached its end" 
is not to utter pejorative words, but rather it is to indicate an arche of 
realization. 
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the sphere of the moon in some kind of a natural order. Aristotle's length-
iest and most complete analysis of the teleological principle of nature is 
found in the second book of the Physics, Chapters 7 to 9. The discussion 
is a rather general one in which it is seen how the basic principles are to 
be applied in a study of reality and what division of sciences ensues. The 
claim is made by Aristotle that wherever things are found that cause motion 
or are themselves in motion, the "domain of physics" prevails and the four 
general principles are to be applied .105 
He then goes on to classify "three fields of inquiry" basing his 
distinctions on whether or not the objects of inquiry are in motion. The 
first field of study deals with "things motionless," the second with "things 
that, though in motion, are imperishable" and the third with "things per-
ishable. 11 106 However, since motion and non-motion provide the basis for 
his distinctions, the division falls into two main categories rather than 
three: 1) study of immobile being; and 2) the study of mobile being. The 
second category is then subdivided according to whether or not what is in 
motion is perishable or imperishable. , · 
Aristotle did not name at first the two general branches of study in 
the Physics, but he later (Metaphysics VI) identified them as theology and 
physics. In a passage of the Metaphysics, he adds a third speculative 
science, mathematics, which finds a middle position between theology and 
105 Physics II, 198 a 2 7-29. 
106physics II, 198 a 30-32. 
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the study of nature . 10 7 In his treatment on nature, then, both the perish-
able and imperishable entities are to be studied; and, specifically, nature 
is better understood in terms of nature's purpose. 
In approaching the problem of purpose in nature, Aristotle examines 
"finality" and "necessity." 
"We must now consider •why nature involves a ''for the sake of which' 
cause, and further we must consider what is meant by necessity. 11108 
First of all, Aristotle rejects the notion that natural movements and 
changes are the result of blind, random necessities. Such a mechanical view 
can never explain why regular patterns of action develop in nature. The 
orderly sequences of nature could hardly be due to chance coincidences . 109 
Those who held to such a view, according to Aristotle, recognized only the 
material factors of nature. And when only "matter" is considered, it is 
right to expect things to happen "out of necessity" (lf; chayKns ) . How-
ever, nature involves more than just nature's materials. Nature is self-
preservative. Just as in the art of house building we would not expect the 
materials to all of a sudden put themselv:e ·s into place, so also in the realm 
of things natural one does not expect blind, random motion. There is an 
inherent ordering principle in nature. Just as the house is built for the pur-
pose of keeping and preserving certain goods, so too nature acts for its 
good--that of sustaining itself •110 Aristotle does not deny necessity as part 
107Meta. VI, 1026 a 19ff. 
108physics II, 198 b 10-11. 
109Physics II, 198 b 17ff; also cf. De Partibus Animalium, 642 a 1. 
llOphysics II, 200 a 6-9. 
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of the natural make-up. The necessity, however, is a conditional neces-
sity ( i, &1ro6e:a£ws ) which the being's purpose demands of its "matter." 
Material structure alone cannot explain how certain ends are regularly 
attained; but if ends are attained, then a certain material structure is re-
quired. 
It (purpose) cannot be accomplished without materials having 
the required nature .... The necessity, then, is conditional, 
or hypothetical. The purpose, mentally conceived, demands 
the material as necessary for its accomplishment; but the 
nature of the material, as already existing, does not neces-
sarily lead to the accomplishment of the purpose .111 
Aristotle draws from technical skills to exemplify his reasoning. 
Thus, if a saw (form) is to be used for cutting {purpose), there must be 
iron present (matter) out of which the saw is made. The fact that iron exists 
is no guarantee that a saw-for-cutting exists. The necessity does not run 
in that direction. However, the saw's purpose does necessitate the 
existence of a certain material. Since "art imitates nature," it is not 
surprising that Aristotle sees the same kind of "hypothetical necessity" 
in nature, both perishable and imperishable realms. In the latter realm, the 
heavenly natures never fail. There is complete coincidence of form and end. 
But even here, the self-realization that is manifested in circular motion 
dictates a "necessity of being" that is rooted in a strange and mysterious, 
but material, principle. Such is the nature of the heavens whose "best 
possible arrangement" is explained by self-contained, intelligible principles 
so that no appeal to an Atlas nor any mythical figure is necessary .112 Such 
lllphysics II, 200 a 10-15. 
112oe Coelo, 284 a 5-20. 
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also is the nature of things generated: that an intelligent ordering within 
nature itself dictates certain structure which is a sine qua non of all 
purpose and finality. The ultimate model that guarantees the application 
of finality to both realms is that of circular motion applied with ontic 
meaning .113 The process of generation will never cease since nature 
always intends the better, and , "being" is better than "non-being ... 114 
This eternal generation, of course, reflects the eternal order of the spheres; 
and the "cause of this continuous process, as has been frequently re-
marked is cyclical motion, the only motion which is continuous. ,,115 
The tendency of sublunar beings toward rectilinear motion (which 
has no end but tends toward infinity and/or a void) is obviated by the re-
current transmutation of the four basic elements which recurrence gives 
cyclical characteristics to the process of generation.116 
1131n the Physics, Aristotle uses the terms "perishable" ( ~0apt6s) 
and "imperishable" ( &~0apt6s ) to indicate "movement on a finite 
straight line. " He denies that rectilinear motion ad infinitum is possible. 
Rectilinear motion that does aim at an end either 1) "does not return upon 
itself and having no intrinsic completeness must be broken off" ( ~ e apt 6s 
or 2) "is not capable of being broken off• ( a~6apt6s ). Physics 
VIII, 265 a 21-28. 
Aristotle recognizes that even in the sublunar realm of recti-
linear motion there is an "imperishable" circularity of the generation of 
species along with the "perishable" nature of individuals. Cf. De Gen., 
338 b 14-16. 
114ne Gen., 336 b 25-30. 
115ne Gen., 337 a 1-2. 
116ne Gen., 337 a 4-6. 
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Yet if the tension in Aristotle's philosophy seems to be tending 
toward the pole of his Platonic inheritance, he quickly reasserts his real-
is tic naturalism and maintains that, while the ordered cycle of 
imperishables is numerically the same, the cycle of generation is 
specifically the same.117 As expected, the necessity of things generated 
is less imposing than that of things eternal. Individuals, as such, have 
no guarantee of existing. "There is no necessity, because your father 
came to be, that you should come to be; but if you are to come-to-be, he 
must have done so. 11118 While recognizing order and purpose in both 
realms, Aristotle's teleological principle applies differently. In both 
realms, nature is expressed as end-directed. In the perishable realm, 
finality manifests a conditioned necessity of an ephemeral nature .119 
In the imperishable realm, finality manifests an absolute necessity of a 
permanent nature. 
The Efficient Cause (Moving Principle) 
One can do well in a study of nature by analyzing the "stuff" out 
of which things are made, the "structure" or "form" that the stuff assumes, 
and the "reason why" the stuff is so constructed. But nature is basically 
117ne Gen., 338 b 15. 
118De Gen., 338 b 10-11. 
119In the Meteorologica, Aristotle states that "the final cause is 
least obvious where matter predominates" (390 a 3). The heavens being 
more "formal" would naturally exhibit more "finality." 
, 
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movement; 120 so that if one is to understand nature, one must understand 
movement . 121 The precise principle of movement in the Aristotelian theory 
of archai adds the dynamic character to nature, whereby "there must be 
something to initiate the process of the change or its cessation when the 
process is completed ... 122 It is true that matter is potential for many 
different forms, but matter is • to form as potentiality is to actuality. Change, 
in fact, is precisely the movement from potentiality to actuality. This 
movement (since actuality is prior to potentiality) demands an agent outside 
of change itself. Aristotle's well-known principle of efficiency--that "if a 
thing is in motion it is of necessity being kept in motion by something"l23 __ 
relates to his theory of finality. The order of nature which, as was seen, 
demands some necessary material structure, likewise demands some 
"orderer." Since the goal-directed aim of nature will not admit of a 
blindly developing potentiality, the reason why such a potentiality tends 
toward a goal cannot be found in the potentiality itself. Something cannot 
actualize its own potentialities. An agent is needed to effect the change. 
The general notions of efficient cause as principle of motion which 
Aristotle outlines in the Physics and the Metaphysics are applied to the 
whole of nature and also to specific instances of natural events. First of 
120Physics II, 192 b 14. 
12lphysics III, 200 b 12-13. 
122physics II, 194 b 30; also Meta., 1013 a 30. 
123physics VII, 241 b 24-25;. also cf. VIII, 256 a 5; III, 201 a 24; 
also Meta. XII, 1073 a 26-27. 
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all, the general principle of a moving agent is to apply to the whole of 
nature, since "movement is imperishable. 11124 Movement is an eternal 
characteristic of nature for "if we suppose movement to have had an origin 
we shall have to suppose that there was a change anterior to the first 
change, so also if we suppose it to cease, we shall have to admit a change 
posterior to the last change . 111125 The movement of nature will not admit of 
beginning or end in a total sense of The Infinite. Whether the natural move-
ment is the cyclic revolutions of the heavenly bodies or the regeneration of 
the specific sublunar bodies, movement is inseparable from nature .126 And 
to say that movement is inseparable from nature is to say that movers are 
inseparable from nature. 
In Aristotle's specific and more practical investigation of nature 
and the natural, there are any number of "moving principles." The smith 
who makes the saw from the iron, the builder of houses, the parents of 
children, all are agents who are effecting changes aimed at a definite end 
in mind. In a more theoretical vein, Aristotle cites two agencies that 
explain motion in the whole of nature. , · Agents which both distinguish and 
unite the two realms of nature are: 1) the sun as the moving principle of 
all generation and corruption beneath the sphere of the moon; and 2) the 
124physics VIII, 251 b 29. 
125physics VIII, 251 b 30-33. 
126ne Coelo, 268 a 1-6. 
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movement of the outermost sphere ,,._ J I ,rpwTos oupavos ) as the 
moving principle of the heavenly bodies. 
Concerning the approach and withdrawal of the sun as efficient 
cause, Aristotle supports "the evidence of sense perception" with some 
metaphysical theory. He appeals to the realm of things-that-are (in this 
case the sun) to explain why things come-to-be, since "movement is prior 
to coming-to-be. 11127 He reasons that that-which-is ought to be the 
proper explanation of that-which-comes-to-be. Furthermore, that-which-is 
is necessarily in motion. It seems quite natural to Aristotle that what already 
is and is moving should be the cause of coming-into-being and motion.128 
The senses seem to confirm that the heat of the sun, as it approaches, causes 
things to grow and reproduce, while the approach and withdrawal of the 
sun's motion provides an analogous role of contrariety, which is an es-
sential characteristic of motion of perishable entities. Simple, continuous, 
circular motion is not adequate, according to Aristotle, to explain the 
contrary motion of coming-into-being and passing-out-of-being. "Con-
traries are the cause of contraries. It is not, therefore, the primary motion 
which is the cause of generation and destruction ... 129 
Yet Aristotle is not satisfied. Having already bridged the gap between 
things-that-are and things-that-are-becoming, he unites the realms even 
12 7 De Gen . , 3 3 6 a 2 4 . 
12 8 De Gen . , 3 3 6 a 15 - 2 4 . 
129De Gen., 336 a 31-32. 
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further. If it is true that the motion of perishable beings runs a course of 
contraries (coming into and passing out of being}, it is also true that there 
is continuity in the very contrariety. That is, the sequence of pas sing 
through contrary phases is continuous .130 He must explain not only the 
"double movement" ( 060 K 1 vnaE 1 s ) but the "continuous" ( auvExns) 
movement as well. It might be asked why Aristotle does not cite the 
continuous movement of the sun as it approaches and withdraws; thus both 
attributes can be found in a single cause. Aristotle does not do this for 
the apparent reason of not wanting to exclude the planets and stars from 
the general order of nature. Aristotle consistently (though erroneously} 
identifies the outermost sphere (the movement of the whole) as the cause 
of continuity in things that come-to-be. 
There is, then, an interaction of efficient causes or moving prin-
ciples that explains why things come-to-be. In order for there to be 
generation and corruption, there must be continuity and double movement. 
The "first heaven" provides the continuity; the sun provides the double 
movement .131 Aristotle's archai" span both realms of nature. Motion on 
earth can take place "between opposites" and yet be continuous. For 
example, the approach of the sun causes evaporation of water and the 
subsequent cycle of rainfau.132 
130An example of this was already seen in cyclic generation of 
species in the animal and vegetable kingdoms. 
131 De Gen . , 3 3 6 b 1 ff. 
132Meteor., 346 b 22. 
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All of this speculation on the part of Aristotle takes nothing away 
from the causal efficacy of blacksmiths, parents and house builders. His 
theory of principles is practical enough and flexible enough to admit of a 
host of principles. Indeed, sometimes it seems that anything can be an 
arc he. In the perishable realm, "principle" can be anything from a father 
to the "starting point" of a jqurney. In the imperishable realm, archai are 
sometimes multiplied ad absurdum (55 movers). 
Yet Aristotle manages to keep a tight rein on his archai and prevents 
a madcap dash into a meaningless infinity. The general classifications 
effect this; and since "principles" are explanations of what-is-real, a 
somewhat synthetic view of "what-there-is" is also effected. 
According to modern standards, of course, Aristotle's "synthesis" 
may be wholly impractical and without meaning. Even to interpret his 
theory of the sun-as-cause-of-generation as a visionary forerunner of the 
sun-as-source-of-all-energy is not to find originality or exceptional genius 
in Aristotle's philosophy. What value there is in his classification of 
principles--especially in this case of efficient causality--may be seen 
1) in his systematic approach to practical cause-effect sequences; 2) in 
the fact that the realm of nature for Aristotle extends to all observable 
data; 3) in that the unmoved mover plays no necessary role in the present 
explanations of nature. 
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The Transcendent and The Transcendental 
It was seen that Aristotle's general principles are analogously 
applied to the natural realm of perishable and imperishable entities. 
Insofar as the principles are general enough and analogous enough to 
cut across all classifications of beings, they (principles) can be called 
"transcendental." That is, they are transcendental in the negative sense 
of being "unclassifiable," and not as the exclusive principles of any 
particular type of being. In a more positive sense, principles as tran-
scendental extend to all types of realities and serve as intelligible 
explanations of what-there-is. 
For the most part, Aristotle is preoccupied with attempting to 
explain (seeking the principle of) the two kinds of substances coming 
under the general heading of "the natural." "We have seen that there are 
three kinds of substance, two of which are natural and one immutable ... 11133 
This unique brand of Aristotelian "naturalism" breaks down into two realms 
of imperishable and perishable ousiai studied by astronomy and natural 
philosophy. Both studies, of course, , employ the same transcendental and 
analogous principles. This metaphysical naturalism of Aristotle was 
located at one end of a "bipolar tension" which manifests the constant 
struggle in Aristotle to rescue his Platonic heritage from lapsing into 
either the unnatural or supernatural. It is not to be inferred that Aristotle 
133Meta. XII, 1071 b 3-4. 
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fore sakes his Platonic heritage. On the contrary, he quite willingly 
embraces it and remolds it into his own systematic approach. 
"We must now discuss the last named substance (immutable) and 
show that there must be some substance which is eternal and immutable. 11134 
The enigmas surrounding the Pure Act of the Metaphysics and the Prime 
Mover of the Physics are well known in philosophical circles. Perhaps 
the greatest puzzle is Aristotle's inconsistency in positing nature as an 
inherent principle of motion and, finally, in looking beyond nature for 
the ultimate explanation of natural movement. 
In both his approaches, whether it is the approach through eternal 
motion to the Unmoved Mover of the Physics or the more axiological ap-
proach to the self-thinking Good of the Metaphysics, Aristotle arrives at 
a Transcendent Bring--a Being that stands outside of and is independent 
of the natural realm, and yet whose existence is necessary for the natural 
realm. Our main concern here is not the consistency or inconsistency of 
Aristotle's Transcendent Being. Nor is the concern the necessity or non-
necessity of such a being for the natural rea ,lm which Aristotle has explained. 
The question that should occupy us here is how does Aristotle's theory of 
principles fit the notion of an Unmoved Mover? Is, for example, the Prime 
Mover a principle? If it is a principle, does it apply analogously 
throughout reality? Aristotle distinctly calls the immutable ousia an arche. 
In the Physics, it is "the principle of everlasting motion" ( &p xn 
134Meta. XII, 1071 b 4-5. 
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Tr\s al cS ( ou ) .135 In the Metaphysics, it is the "principle whose 
essence is actuality" ( &pxn 'h's ooa1a tvepy£1a).136 
In attempting to solve the aporiai presented early in the Metaphysics, 
Aristotle was careful to preserve the "referential II character of archai. 
II Principle" is not an ousia. It is not a thing-in-itself. "Principle" is 
the reason or understanding of something .13 7 It is the principles of sub-
stances that are to be investigated: whether there is a finite or infinite 
number of principles; whether the principles are of a perishable or im-
perishable nature. Aristotle remained faithful to this notion of "principle" 
as he explored the natural realms and analyzed actual and potential aspects 
of beings, distinguished formal characteristics from privations, and so on. 
But even then, early in the Metaphysics, Aristotle's theory of principles 
remained open to a Transcendent Principle. While it is true that principle 
is not a substance, yet "substance is a kind of principle and cause. 11 138 
All the while Aristotle viewed the transcendental first principles 
of changing nature, his gaze was also fixed on a Transcendent First 
Principle. The poles of ,Aristotelian tension come to grips in the form of 
the transcendental principles and the Transcendent Principle. The former 
embodies Aristotle's philosophy of nature (Aristotelian Naturalism) which, 
in a sense, is more "metaphysical" than "physical" since its transcendental 
135physics VIII, 266 a. 
136Meta. XII, 1071 b 20. 
137cf. Meta. VII, 1040 b 20. 
138Meta. VII, 1041 a 10. 
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principles are non-empirical explanations of natural experiences. The 
latter embodies the rationalistic tendency to explain everything in terms 
of The One. "The rule of many is not good, one ruler let there be. 11 139 
The Transcendent Principle of principles stands apart from the sensible 
realms of perishable and imperishable nature. While causing motion, it 
does not move, it has neither parts nor dimensions. Indeed, it has no 
magnitude . 140 It is the Pure Act of Thought thinking itself .1 41 
Aristotle even gallantly attempts to apply his Transcendent Prin-
ciple throughout the transcendental realm of his principles. Nous is 
Perfect Form ("the principle whose essence is actuality"), the first ef-
ficient principle of change 142 and, since form and end coincide, the 
epitome of Goodness and Finality itself. "It (Prime Mover) is good and 
is in this sense a first principle ... 143 Only matter and privation are 
dropped from the characteristics of The One. 
Since the Perfect Form is a complete identity with its end or purpose, 
it represents an Absolute Goal and ought to be studied by natural philoso-
phers since nature is essentially goal directed.1 4 4 Thus, Aristotle attempts 
to justify his rationalistic Transcendent in terms of his transcendental 
naturalism. 
139Meta. XII, 1076 a 5. Aristotle is quoting from Homer's Iliad. 
140physics VIII, 267 b 25-27. Cf. also Meta. XII, 1073 a 4. 
141Meta. XII, 1074 b 35. 
142physics VIII, 267 a 25. Also Meta. XII, 1072 a 22. 
143Meta. XII, 1072 b 11. 
144physics II, 198 b 4. 
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In the end, Aristotle's theory of principles does not pay sufficient 
attention to the epistemological problems incurred when one tries to under-
stand something. Objectively, it is the perishable realm of earthly 
activities that is his greatest concern. The puzzle and wonder of things 
that come into being and pass out of being seem to preoccupy most of his 
thoughts. How is one to understand such common events as birth, growth 
and development, reproductive continuity and death? There is, of course, 
the wonder of the heavens also. But the heavens are there--always there. 
Their more regular patterns of cyclic motion can perhaps yield principles 
that might explain the less regular patterns of the things of earth. This 
might suggest that Aristotle deduces the eternal principles of the heavens 
and applies them to the "things below the sphere of the moon," but it 
need not suggest this. What it might suggest is the "eternal" character 
of principles no matter what was being explained. Aristotle is too preoc-
cupied with the earth to explain it away as a fleeting image of eternity. 
What he wanted were explanations (principles) of the real earth-beings, 
and he wanted the explanatipns to be durable. He does not begin with 
the "heavenly" bodies and deduce a principle of potency that applied to 
earthly bodies. He does not seem to say that since the heavens neither 
increase nor decrease in size and are neither generated nor corrupted, then 
the things of earth must have a potency principle because they do increase 
and decrease in size and are generated and corrupted. Rather it seems 
that he is reluctant to discuss the heavenly realm and the prime moving 
nous until he has first understood the puzzling non-fulfilled nature of the 
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physikoi. Once the principle of potentiality as a halfway house between 
what is and what is not is satisfactorily developed for Aristotle, then and 
only then can he infer that the heavenly entities have no potency (except 
for local change) and that nous is Pure Act. 
First and foremost, there must be a real world of perishables. 
The Platonic myth in deducing many from The One never explains "the 
many" to Aristotle's satisfaction. There was too much of the Parmenidean 
reduction to unity in Platonic thinking to convince the more realistic 
Aristotle. Pluralistic thinkers are commended by Aristotle in that change 
was admitted by them and to a degree explained, but their techniques of 
"combining" and "separating" were poorly done so that the explanations 
could never be distinguished from what was being explained. "Their prin-
ciples were wrong to begin with. " Explanations must in some way be 
distinguishable from the quantitative bodies that they explain. Hence, 
principles are qualitatively rather than quantitatively conceived; and 
the salient quality seems to be analogy. It was for this reason that 
Aristotle had to have two natural realms. 
In order to save the durability of principles and explain the per-
ishable realms, principles could only apply to other realms in an analogous 
way. But at all costs, this realm must be saved, recognized and explained. 
It is true that the conception of two different systems as qualitatively 
distinct hindered the development of the "new sciences" in which the 
universe is seen and measured as a quantitative whole. But at least 
- 158 -
Aristotle established the events of the perishables as real. And, perhaps, 
since Aristotle wanted to do too much--i. e., explain the whole of 
human experiences: Ethics, Poetry, Politics, etc. --he quite plausibly 
avoided the quantitative approach to reality. We may, perhaps, be 
witnessing the reverse problem today. In approaching reality in terms 
of numerical quantities ih the positive sciences, one finds it increasingly 
difficult to understand and perhaps justify the more qualitative values 
such as the moral and aesthetical. Like most philosophical systems, 
Aristotle's scheme was grandiose. Through the archai, everything was 
given some sort of understanding. To effect this scheme of things, the 
principles must be durable and analogous--durable if the explanations are 
to have meaning; analogous if the principles can apply in some way to 
the entire structure. Just what role the human understanding played in 
the "fixing" of these "durable" principles never seemed to occur to 
Aristotle. The necessity of the principles for him is undoubtedly rooted 
in the things themselves, yet he begins his philosophy with things that 
are not necessary. Even so, if there seems to be no necessity involved 
in individual things, there may be something necessary about the classes 
of things to which those individuals belong. Individual men may come 
into and pass out of being; but as a definable class of objects, there is 
something more or less permanent about men. Individuals as such are 
indefinable because all talk about individuals involves the general, 
necessary classifications. This tension between the general concep-
tualizing, on the one hand, and the particular, individual on the other, 
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is rarely absent in the writings of the philosophers. Aristotle, although 
perhaps not explicitly aware of the problem, manifests this tension more 
than any of those who preceded him. The tension increases when the 
poles of "explanations" and "what is explained" converge. Aristotle's 
theory of "principles" effects such a convergence. And because Aristotle 
chooses to begin with "the many" rather than with The One, i.e., since 
he looks for necessary principles in the perishable, individual things 
themselves, he can refer the principles of necessity to what is qualita-
tively different only by analogy. Aristotle does not need the heavenly 
bodies nor the prime mover to explain the perishable realm. It happens 
that the same principles apply (analogously) in a different way so that 
the hypothesis of a perfect Good fits into the whole scheme. Therefore, 
the proximate goals of perishable beings may reflect the ultimate 
purpose of nous, but nothing prevents nous from being a speculative 
hypothesis in his system--once he begins with the perishables. 
Aristotle did not err in the fact that his whole philosophical endeavor 
was aimed at formulating general, meaningful principles that might 
explain things. Nor did he err in assuming that what was real was intel-
ligible. His error--which led to a dual system--lies in his assumption 
that the heavenly bodies were qualitatively distinct from earthly bodies 
and therefore were knowable in a different way. This does not mean that 
everything on earth was given the same explanation--not at all. 
Analogous principles permeated qualitatively different areas here on 
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earth, e.g., politics, rhetoric, ethics, mathematics. However, he 
assumed .that the circular motion of the celestial bodies was so dif-
ferent that the bodies themselves differed radically. They had to be 
eternal. 
IV. THE ROLE OF PRINCIPLES IN DEMONSTRATION 
THE REALM OF REASON 
It was seen that Aristotle's vacillation between a rationalistic 
tendency to explain all of reality in terms of an all-pervading One and 
an empirical preoccupation with a pluralistic reality led him to postulate 
a dichotomous realm of nature that was nevertheless somehow bound 
together by analogously applied principles. 
In analyzing the role that Aristotle assigns to the archai in 
demonstration (the realm of reason), we shall attempt to point out the 
prevalence of the same tension existing in his view of scientific meth-
odology. The tension at one pole manifests itself in the a priori 
character of Aristotle's axioms, which are the self-evident objects of 
intellectual joy and contemplation. At this pole, the first principles of 
demonstration have a greater intrinsic value (cognitional value) than the 
very conclusions which are deduced from such principles. These prin-
ciples are "prior" and "more knowable" in their own rightl and embody 
the discipline of theoria, which far exceeds techne in excellence. 
At the other pole, Aristotle's principles of demonstration manifest 
a more empirical search after facts--facts that are acquired through 
1 Post. Ana . , 71 b 2 0- 2 5 • 
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experience. Such a search begins with things that are "prior and more 
knowable to us," 2 i.e., the world of sensory experience. In this view, 
a welter of facts necessitates that there be different sciences with dif-
ferent principles. There is no one master plan which explains the whole 
of reality. There may indeed be a general plan of demonstrating facts 
and the reason for those facts, and there may also be "common prin-
ciples" of demonstration that in some way unite the sciences. At least 
all the sciences--if they are sciences--employ demonstration, but for 
Aristotle there are always particular principles that guarantee a certain 
autonomy to the individual branches of learning and thus impart a more 
flexible and pliable character to the role of archai. 
There is no intention here of justifying Aristotle's demonstrative 
science in the light of modern methodology and the results produced by 
the modern method. 3 Certainly it remains true that Aristotle generally 
subscribed to the notion of science (episteme), willed to him by Plato, 
as the highest kind of universal knowledge which is complete in itself 
and that theoria consisted in ,the contemplation of self-evident principles. 
2post. Ana., 72 a 1-6. Emphasis mine. 
3rt is interesting to note that at the 1965 Hayden Colloquium on 
Scientific Method and Concept Ernest Nagel, in listing the "four types 
of causal explanations in science, " lists the first as the "deductive 
form." Such causal method, "recognized since Aristotle," has as its 
aim "not simply to discover facts but to show that the discoveries are 
reasoned facts by exhibiting them as necessary consequences of 
explanatory premises." Given at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, published in Cause and Effect, ed. D. Lerner (New York 
Free Press, 1965), p. 14. 
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"Theory," in this sense, is contrasted with "practice" in that the former 
involves the almost ecstatic contemplation of knowledge for its own 
sake, whereas the latter involves the skillful application of principles 
in doing or making something. The relationship between theory and 
practice in this Platonic-Aristotelian version is a hierarchical one in 
which the higher (theory) contains the "what" and the "why" of the 
lower (practice). The "practitioner" or "technician," on the other hand, 
may know how to do or make something but does not necessarily know 
what the reasons are. 
Today, in scientific methodology, the term "theory" usually denotes 
a certain hypothesis that awaits some factual verification. In such a 
case, "theory" and "fact" are mutually exclusive: if a theory admits of 
practical verification, it ceases to be a theory and becomes a fact. 
There is still, perhaps, much of the Greek distinctions still prevalent 
today in the division of sciences as pure (theoretical) and applied; but, 
by and large, the men of the well-known Copernican revolution, through 
the application of mathemat ,ics, controlled experimentation, etc., have 
considerably changed the method and meaning of "science. " The purpose 
here is simply to trace the role of principles in Aristotle's concept of 
demonstrative science and attempt to show how such principles are 
instrumental in effecting the bipolar tension, which was mentioned above, 
and which, it is claimed, permeates Aristotle's philosophy. If the 
rational-empirical tendency likewise appears in science today (even 
though in different forms), so much the better for Aristotle. 
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Perhaps the terms that best describe the polarity in Aristotle's 
realm of demonstrative reason are "axiomatic II and II postulational. 11 The 
former term de scribes II demonstration II in the strict sense ( ft 1r 6 o e: 1 F; 1 s 
~1r ).@s ) and employs principles in a rationalistic manner. The lat-
ter term describes II demonstration" in a loose sense ( & 1r 6 o e: 1 F; 1 s 
ouµSt!3QKQS) and employs principles in a more empirical and 
probabilistic sense. 
PRINCIPLES AS AXIOMS - AXIOMATIC DEMONSTRATION 
I Kata 
Demonstration, in the strict sense, is outlined with considerable 
clarity in the Posterior Analytics. Demonstrative knowledge is that 
syllogistic structure which produces "scientific knowledge, 11 viz., 
knowledge of the fact and the reasoned fact. 4 Aristotle never seems to 
question seriously whether or not the truths of certain facts can be at-
tained. He seems to assume that this is so and proceeds to explain why 
this is so. 
Now if knowledge is such as we have assumed, demon-
strative knowledge must' proceed from premises which 
are true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior 
to, and causative of the conclusion. On these condi-
tions only will the first principles be properly 
applicable to the fact which is to be proved. 5 
4post. Ana., 71 b 9-19. 
5 Post. Ana., 71 b 20-23. 
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These characteristics of the premises or first principles, 6 which 
are necessary if demonstration is to be possible, are clearly rationalistic 
and set the theme for the deductive form of reasoning which strict demon-
stration embodies. This form of reasoning advances from a universal 
understanding to some particular attribute predicated in the conclusion 
because of a necessary connection of terms. The universal starting 
points (archai) are thus "prior" and "more knowable" in themselves, 
i.e. , "in nature" and not prior and more knowable to human sense per-
ception. 7 This "removal" of universality from human sense experience 
gives an autonomous kind of "dignity"S to the first principles whereby 
they are more valuable in themselves than the conclusions which are 
derived from them. This inherent dignity and value of the first principles 
basically stems from their inherent truth and causative role in demon-
strating other truths. 9 
Aristotle assumes the truth of the archai of demonstration as part 
of his over-all aversion for the infinite. Just as any series ad infinitum 
was avoided in the realms of n9ture, likewise an infinite series is 
6Aristotle identifies "premise" and "first principle"--"for by 
'premise' ( 1rp6Taa1s )and'firstprinciple' ( &pxn )I mean the 
same thing." Post. Ana., 72 a 7. 
?post.Ana., 71 b 34-72; a 6. 
Bror the schoolmen' s use of the term "dignitates" in reference 
to the axioms, cf. "The Discovery of First Principles According to 
Aristotle," E. Ziegelmeyer, Modern Schoolman, March 1945, p.140. 
9post. Ana., 72 a 26 ff. 
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avoided in the realm of reason. In the former realms, it usually is an 
infinite series of causes-as-movers which is denied; in the latter realm, 
it is an infinite series of causes-as-"provers" that is denied. In order 
to prove a fact as true, one must proceed from a prior truth. If that latter 
truth is a demonstrated truth, it, too, must depend on a more prior truth; 
but to regress ad infinitum is to prove nothing. The ultimate, primary 
principles are indemonstrably true. Aristotle acknowledges that other 
thinkers have recognized the necessity of first principles of demonstration. 
But while some have contended that because the archai cannot be demon-
strated, there can be no knowledge, others have maintained that 
knowledge is possible because even the archai can be demonstrated. 
The former group, according to Aristotle, rightly rejects the infinite 
regress but wrongly despairs of any kind of knowledge by proof; the lat-
ter rightly assumes that demonstrative knowledge is possible, but wrongly 
bases it on circular or reciprocal principles. Aristotle's own view, of 
course, is 1) that demonstrative knowledge is possible; and 2) that the 
first principles of demonstration · cannot be demonstrated. IO 
Whatever is the basis of all demonstrative truths is, then, true 
in its own right. All the other characteristics that Aristotle enumerates 
can be reduced to the self-contained truth of the archai. The archai that 
carry with them the greatest truth value and priority, insofar as they must 
be known if anything is to be demonstrated, are the axioms .11 
lOpost. Ana., 72 b 5940; 73 a 1-40. Also Meta. IV, 1006 a 8-12. 
llpost. Ana., 72 a 17. 
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Aristotle actually makes very few direct references to "axioms" 
in the Posterior Analytics. (The term &c;{wµa is used only three 
times.) He seems preoccupied in justifying his assumption that truth 
is possible to attain through demonstration, and he more or less assumes 
the prime truth of axioms. In the Metaphysics, however, after claiming 
that the philosopher is 1 entitled to study the axioms since the axioms 
apply to being qua being, Aristotle goes on to name the most certain of 
axioms as the principle of contradiction. 12 He follows this assertion 
with a lengthy discussion which attempts to justify this principle in terms 
of a basic meaning of "being." In the Posterior Analytics (assumed to be 
an earlier work than the Metaphysics), Aristotle still seems to be 
groping for accurate terminology so that he is not always consistent in 
his classifications of terms .13 Yet he clearly distinguishes "axioms" 
from "theses" so that the former comprises "what must be grasped if any 
knowledge is to be acquired. 1114 "Theses, " which do not seem to carry 
with them the same inherent necessitating role in cognition, are further 
divided into "hypotheses" and ",definitions." A later subdivision, 
"postulates," is added. 15 He again speaks of axioms in giving a 
12Meta. IV, 1005 a 19-35; b 1-35. 
13Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1949}, p. 540. 
14post. Ana., 72 a 17. 
lSThese terms shall be dealt with in distinguishing Aristotle's 
"postulational mode of demonstration." 
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general description of the elements of demonstration. Demonstration 
has three factors: 1) the conclusion which requires proof; 2) the know!-
edge of the underlying genus whose attribute is to be a predicate in the 
conclusion; and 3) the axiom on which the proof is based. 16 Finally, 
axioms are cited when Aristotle again names the three parts of demon-
stration. He refers to axioms as that "upon which the demonstration is 
ultimately based. 1117 
In all three instances in which "axioms" are mentioned, there is 
consistency with the description in the Metaphysics as the "most certain 
of all principles." Although Aristotle never gives a clear and concise 
enumeration of the axioms in the Posterior Analytics, l8 he conveys the 
notion that the ultimate necessity of reasoning is based on the axioms, 
especially on that axiom whereby it is known that "the fact cannot be 
otherwise ... 19 These axioms, as that on which demonstration is based, 
provide the necessary connections for demonstration in the strict sense 
( &1r>.'"' ) 20 ws • 
16 Post. Ana . , 7 5 a 3 8; 7 5 b 2 . 
17 Post • Ana . , 7 6 b 14 . 
18Aristotle at times seems to equate ~~\~µa-ra with the Kotva) 
6p xa \ so that, in addition to the principle of contradiction, the mathe-
matical axioms are also included. Post. Ana. , 76 b 21. Also cf. 
Post. Ana., Loeb ed., p. 34 n. 
19post. Ana., 71 b 13. 
20post. Ana., 75 b 25. 
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Aristotle is clear in distinguishing this strict and necessary 
demonstration from demonstration in an accidental sense ( Kat & 
ouµBtBnKos ). 21 The former type of demonstration rests on necessary 
and universal principles; the latter does not so that the conclusion may 
hold in this case but not necessarily in all cases. He further specifies 
that the axioms are grounds for strict demonstration whereas hypotheses 
and postulates offer demonstrations in a loose sense. Aristotle contends 
that the strict axiomatic demonstration "is conceived not with external 
but with internal discourse ( t v t~ ij,ux~ ); and while it is possible 
to raise objections to external discourse, it is not possible to do so 
with internal discourse. "2 2 
This seems to be a most significant passage in highlighting 
Aristotle's rationalistic view of demonstration. The appeal that he makes 
seems clearly to be directed at the inner, natural necessity of reason. 
One must "see the light," as it were. "In his mind" he must realize the 
connection that necessitates that something is the case and cannot be 
otherwise. This natural necessity of the · human mind to arrive at truth 
ultimately operates in virtue of the contradiction axiom. This latter 
principle--as axiom--is not a premise of a syllogism. Aristotle distin-
guishes axioms as the underlying principles of demonstration from the 
actual premises of syllogisms (which premises are usually definitions 
as seen in the Posterior Analytics, 75 b 31). Rather than serve as a 
2lpost. Ana., 75 b 22ff. 
22post. Ana., 76 b 25-27. 
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premise, the principle of contradiction provides the basis for uniting the 
premises in a necessary way. 23 The process, of course, is a conceptual 
one and the rigidity of the demonstration is in proportion to one's aware-
ness of the applicability of the contradiction principle. In other words, 
strict demonstration for Aristotle depends upon the conscious awareness 
that one's reasoning ' is supported by an indemonstrable axiom whose truth 
is irrefutable. In "seeing" the application of such a principle, one 
knows that something is the case and cannot be otherwise. 
To call such a process an inner, mental one that is beyond 
dispute is not to disparage the role of language, according to Aristotle. 
Certainly, he himself pleads that a would-be denier of the ultimate 
axiom should utter something lest he be mistaken for a vegetable. And 
once something is uttered, then he can be shown the application of 11the 
most certain principle. 11 24 
Nor should it be thought that this absolute mode of demonstration 
in the thinking of Aristotle must necessarily rule out a less stringent 
and more probabilistic mode of reasoning. Absolute demonstration rep-
resents only one pole of the Aristotelian realm of reason. It represents 
the rationalistic tendency of, first of all, attributing to human reason 
the natural necessity of arriving at ultimate truth; and, secondly, it 
stresses that this natural necessity operates through the basic understanding 
23Post. Ana., 88 a 36; 88 b 3. 
24Meta. IV, 1006 a 1-28. 
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that it is impossible for something to be and not be at one and the same 
time and under the same conditions. Without these two factors, 
Aristotle's discussion of "universals," "indemonstrables," "prior and 
more knowable, " in short his discussion of strict demonstration, cannot 
be properly understood. 
Principles as Postulates 
There is, perhaps, more favorable ground . to be found for 
establishing a postulational or hypothetical form of demonstration in 
Aristotle I s works in his treatment of the enthymeme25 and perhaps certain 
forms of argumentation found in the Topics. 26 
However, since the second Analytics is the more epistemological 
treatment of demonstration, it may be well to begin there with Aristotle's 
own distinction between the two modes of demonstration. First of all, 
Aristotle leaves little doubt that probabilistic types of argumentation 
come under the general scope of syllogistic demonstrations. In claiming 
that demonstration proceeds from pre-existing knowledge, Aristotle 
asserts that the same is true of enthymemes, "which are a kind of 
syllogism ... 27 The assumption can be made, then, that Aristotle wishes 
to include the less rigid forms of argument in his discussion of the value 
of demonstration. 
25prior Ana., 70 a Sff. 
26cf. Topics, ll5 a ff. 
27Post. Ana., 71 a II. 
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The distinction between strict demonstration and hypothetical 
demonstration rests on the degree of necessity wrought by the premises. 
Hence of connections that are not eternal ( odx ~6apt6v ) 
there is no demonstration or knowledge in the strict sense, 
but only in the accidental sense that the attribute belongs 
to the subject not universally but at a given time or 
under given conditions. When this is so, the minor 
premise must be non-eternal and non-universal: non-
eternal because only so will the conclusion also be non-
eternal, and non-universal because the conclusion will 
be true in some cases but not in others, and so cannot 
be proved to be true universally, but only at a given 
time. 28 
It is almost impossible to give a concise account of the type of 
premises that yield such non-strict demonstrations. Aristotle is neither 
clear nor consistent on this point. In one passage, under the general 
rubric of archai, he distinguishes the axioms of strict demonstration from 
"theses," "the grasp of which is not necessary for the acquisition of 
certain kinds of knowledge ... 29 He then subdivides "theses" into "hy-
potheses" which either affirm or deny existence of something, and 
"definitions" which prescind from the existential question and simply 
assert what something is. , 
Later, in attempting another classification of premises, Aristotle 
removes "hypotheses" from the ranks of the indemonstrable and neces-
sarily true and adds another type of premise--the postulate ( a){ t nµa). 
28post. Ana. , 75 b 24-31. 
29Post. Ana., 72 a 16. 
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"That which is in itself necessarily true and must be thought to be so 
is neither an pypothesis nor a postulate ... 30 
The distinction between hypothesis and postulate is not clear. 
He seems to say that a postulate is an unproved premise not yet accepted 
by a listener of an argument, while an hypothesis is a premise that a 
listener will accept even though it has not been proven. 31 
At any rate, both hypotheses and postulates are first principles 
(in the broad sense of "premises") which are not self-evident yet play an 
important part in demonstration--demonstration t~ b11'o8loe:ws. 
The following chart attempts to classify Aristotle's principles of 
demonstration. As many commentators have pointed out, Aristotle lacks 
precision of terminology and seems to be groping for a proper understanding 
of the basis for various types of arguments. The classification that fol-
lows falls into two main categories that correspond to the two types of 
argumentation--hypothetical and absolute. 
30post. Ana., 76 b 23. Aristotle manifests what appears to be 
an inconsistency here. In 72 a 16-17, "theses" are said to be "im-
mediate indemonstrable first principles of syllogisms .... " 
"Hypotheses" are then included "under theses" as species is to genus. 
But in 76 b 23, "hypotheses" are said to be not necessarily true. 
31 Post. Ana . , 7 6 b 2 7 - 3 4 . 
Principles 
of 
Demonstration 
Thesis - an immediate 
indemonstrable principle 
that is not necessary 
for specific knowledge 
Axiom- necessary prin-
ciples that must be grasped 
if anything is to be known 
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Hypothesis - an unproven but 
acceptable premise which states 
that something is or is not the 
case (existential) 
Definition - an assertion of what 
something basically consists 
(essential) 
Postulate - an unproven and, as 
yet, unacceptable premise 
Principles and The Division of Sciences 
Aristotle's insistence upon the division of sciences, each employing 
its own special principles, is indicative, first of all, of his rejection of 
any absolute master science which might demonstrate all archai, and, 
secondly, is indicative of his notion of demonstration in a "loose" sense. 
Concerning the former interpretation, Aristotle assumes a definite anti-
Platonic stance by denying that a single arche is to be used for all 
demonstration. He very clearly states that demonstration is impossible 
unless conclusions are drawn from premises appropriate to the genus in 
question. 32 There may be some disciplines which draw their principles 
from other sciences, but only if the latter science is in a "higher genus." 
In this case, the "fact proved belongs to a different science (for the subject 
genus is different), but the grounds of the fact belong to the superior 
3 2 Post. Ana . , 7 5 b 3 7 - 3 9 . 
- 175 -
science to which the attributes belong per se.,, 33 By way of example, 
Aristotle cites the principles of arithmetic which are used to prove facts 
in harmonics, the subalternate science. In spite of this "borrowing" of 
principles, Aristotle insists upon different and special sciences em-
ploying different and special principles. How, then, one might ask, can 
Aristotle consistently speak of "common principles"? He does so only 
in an "analogical sense.,, 34 In explaining the meaning of analogical 
common principles, Aristotle first gives examples of a special principle--
the assumed definitions of a line by a geometrician, and, secondly, the 
"equals from equals" principle of the mathematician. The geometrician 
may apply the common principle in deducing a conclusion about a line 
"if he assumes the truth not universally but only of magnitudes . .,35 The 
mathematician can use the same common principle in his own special way 
"if he assumes it only of numbers. ,,35 The common principles are only 
"common after a fashion," i.e., Aristotle never intends the common prin-
ciples to be universally applied in a univocal way throughout the sciences. 
If this were the case, there would not be "sciences," but rather "Science." 
Aristotle recognizes the diversity of sciences and their special principles; 
yet he desires to bind together this diversity, in some way, with common 
3 3 Post. Ana . , 7 6 a 11-13 . 
3 4 Post . Ana . , 7 6 a 3 9 . 
35 Post. Ana. , 76 b 1. 
36Post. Ana. , 76 b 2. 
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principles analogously applied. And in calling the principles "anal-
ogous," the "binding" work does not destroy the diversity. We see here 
the same plan and pattern that Aristotle's theory of archai follows in the 
realms of nature. 
There is, on the one hand, a clear-cut distinction between 
sciences and their principles (geometry's definition of a line is of no use 
to arithmetic). Yet there is a principle of arithmetic that can be used by 
geometry in dividing a line, if the principle is not used in geometry the 
way it is used in arithmetic. All of this implies that demonstration oper-
ates within a frame of reference that tempers quite considerably the 
meaning of "universal" in Aristotle's writings. In spite of all his appeals 
for strict demonstration to proceed from universal premises, he quite 
clearly indicates his meaning of universality. It is a kind of "relative" 
universality operating in a given frame of reference. When the geome-
trician applies the principle that "equals from equals give equals" to the 
concept of a line, he does indeed apply it to all lines. In this sense, 
the universality is relative to the concept C?f "line" within the framework 
of geometry. The principle, as Aristotle states, does not apply universally 
to all things in the same way. He envisions no universal science in which 
The One Principle explains all. 3 7 
He does hope for absolute demonstration, as we saw above. But 
now, perhaps, even this notion of strict demonstration is a bit 
3 ?perhaps Aristotle's most severe criticism of Platonic Forms 
occurs in the second Analytics in which he denies any relevance that 
Forms may have in demonstration and dismisses them as so much 
"whistling in the dark." Post. Ana., 83 a 33-34. 
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"relativized." "Thus it is evident from these considerations that abso-
lute demonstration of any attribute is impossible except from its own 
principles." 38 Absolute demonstration, then, is conditioned upon the 
knowledge of certain principles. If the fact and the reason for the fact 
are to be known as true, then appropriate primary facts must be known. 
And--tempering the "absolute" even further--Aristotle admits that these 
appropriate and primary principles are not always so clear. Knowledge 
is hard to come by. 
It is difficult to be certain whether one knows or not; 
for it is difficult to be certain whether our knowledge 
is based upon the principles appropriate to each case 
(for it is this that constitutes true knowledge) or not. 
We suppose that we have scientific knowledge if we 
draw an inference from any true and primary premise, 
but it is not so; the inference must be homogeneous 
with the primary truths of the science. 39 
All of this is no claim that Aristotle's "appropriate principles II of 
demonstration are the "hypothetical approximations" of science methods 
today. Nor is it claimed that his generic and specific classifications are 
identical with the frame of reference system of modern physics. Undoubt-
' 
edly, Aristotle believed that the principles, even though varied, multiple 
and appropriate, were self-evident truths and objects of knowledge in 
their own right. 
The claim is made, however, that the same polarity that permeates 
his natural philosophy also prevails in his theory of demonstration. That, 
38post. Ana., 76 a 14-16. 
39Post. Ana., 76 a 26-31. 
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in addition to the rationalistic pole of absolute and necessary demon-
stration, there is a pole of hypothetical and postulational demonstration. 
This latter pole is exemplified 1) in the attempt of Aristotle (not a very 
successful one) to define such terms as 'hypothesis' and 'postulate'; 
2) in his recognition of the special sciences and their appropriate prin-
ciples; and 3) in his less stringent use of 'universality' insofar as it 
is conditioned by the particular sciences. 
THE INTUITION OF FIRST PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION -
ANALYTIC OR INDUCTIVE ? 
When Aristotle finally approaches the problem of how the first 
principles of demonstration are apprehended, he seems to take an am-
bivalent course running from an analysis of terms with little or no appeal 
to sense experience, to an inductive process that is firmly grounded in 
experience. Since he clearly denies that first principles are arrived at 
by demonstration, 4o and since sense perception per se cannot acquire 
the universality that characterizes the first principles, 41 the only habit 
(/ 
( £ ~ 1 s ) of understanding ( o 1av61 a ) that seems capable of 
reaching the first principles is intuition ( v ol}s ) . 42 While it seems clear 
enough then that intuition is the mode of understanding the archai of 
demonstration, it is not so evident how such intuition is effected. 
40post. Ana., 72 b 20; 100 b 9. Also Meta. IV, 1006 a 1-10. 
41Post. Ana., 87 b 28ff. 
4 2 Post. Ana . , 10 0 b l 0-11. 
- 179 -
Analytical Intuition 
Many followers of Aristotle have given an analytical type of 
interpretation of the intuition of principles. A great number of scholastic 
philosophers, 43 for example, while maintaining that "nihil est in intel-
lectu nisi quod prius fuerit in sensu," nevertheless affirm that knowledge 
of principles is purely ; a rational analysis of terms and concepts. Suarez, 
perhaps, best exemplifies this interpretation of the analytical intuition 
of first principles--especially the axiom of axioms, the principle of 
contradiction: 
... not all principles are equal; in the first place 
there is one or another of the most general and best 
known; viz. , anything either is or is not; it is im-
possible for the same thing to be and not be; for 
these to be known no experience is required but 
simply the apprehension, understanding or explan-
ation of the terms. 44 
Among modern scholastics, Garrigou-Lagrange restates "Aristotelian-
Thomistic" thinking and claims that the principle of contradiction arises 
43Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Book IV, 
Lecture 6; Mercier, Criteriologie · Generale, Paris 1923, pp. 305-316; 
Hoenen, De Origine Primorum Principiorum Scientiae Gregorian um, 
1933, pp. 153-184;. Boyer, Cursus Philosophicus, Vol. I, Paris, pp. 246-
260. 
44pranciscus Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, I 6, N 27. 
The translation is mine. The original Latin reads: 11 • • • principia enim 
non omnia aequalia sunt. Est namque imprimis unum vel alterum 
generalissimum et notissimum scilicet: Quodlibet est vel non est; 
Impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse; et ad haec cognoscenda 
nulla requiritur experientia, sed sola terminorum apprehensio, intel-
ligentia seu explicatio. 11 
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immediately from the concept of being which is known by the "first act 
of the intellect. " 
In the intelligible reality thus known, our intellect 
seizes at once its opposition to non-being, and an op-
position expressed by the principle of contradiction: 
Being is not non-being. . . . Thus our intellect knows 
intelligible reality and its opposition to nothing, before 
it knows explicitly the distinction between me and non-
me. . . . Next it comes to know the existence of this 
and that individual object, seized by the sense. In 
intellective knowledge the universal comes first; sense 
is restricted to the individual and particular ..•. Yet 
even in these primary laws we find a hierarchy. One 
of them, arising immediately from the idea of being, is 
the simple first principle, the principle of contradiction. 45 
Aristotle, himself, does seem to tend toward this rationalistic 
analysis of terms which eventually yields a knowledge of first principles, 
and in particular the principle of contradiction. In the Metaphysics IV, 
he attempts to safeguard the knowledge and validity of "the most certain 
of all principles, " even though it cannot be demonstrated. He begins his 
discussion by analyzing the terms 'being' and 'non-being' maintaining 
that a definite meaning is contained therein. 
Thus in the first place it is obv ,i6us that this at any 
rate is true: that the term "to be" or "not to be" has a 
definite meaning; so that not everything can be "so 
and not so. ,.45 
The appeal that Aristotle makes is based solely on an analysis of 
the meaning of terms. He then specifies his terminology by applying the 
terms to a particular term 1man.' The meaning of man must be thus and 
45R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality (St. Louis: Herder Book Co., 
1950}, p. 31. 
46Meta. IV, 1006 a 29-31. 
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so (i.e. , it must have a definite meaning) and it is impossible to attach 
more than one meaning to the term 'man,' for "not to have one meaning 
is to have no meaning ... 4 7 If it is agreed that "thus and so" is the 
meaning of 'man,' then "it is impossible that at the same time, the same 
thing should not be so ... for 'to be necessarily so' means this: that it 
is impossible not to be so ... 48 Aristotle continues this analytical type of 
intuition of the contradiction principle by analyzing the meanings of 
'substance' and 'accident' and 'essence. 1 If an infinite number of meanings 
could be read into 'substance' and/or 'essence,' then in effect all at-
tributes are accidents and nothing is really "substantial" or "essential. " 
Basically, he concludes, an understanding (intuition) of the principle of 
contradiction rests on one's understanding of something' s To T ( 1n, 
dva1. 49 
Actually, at bottom, an analysis of the meaning of 'infinity' reveals 
the plausibility of the axiom. For, in all cases, the ultimate analysis is 
the impossibility of proceeding ad infinitum, whether it be an infinity of 
meanings of 'being' and 'non-being,' ox ·an infinity of attributes predicated 
of "man." 
According to Aristotle's treatment in the Metaphysics of the contra-
diction principle, therefore, knowledge of the basic axiom of demonstration 
47Meta. IV, 1006 b 6-7. 
48Meta. IV, 1006 b 33-34. 
49Meta. IV, 1007 a 21-35. 
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is based solely on a theoretical analysis of terms and concepts. There 
is no substantial appeal made to sense experience. 5 O In fact Aristotle, 
at times, manifests a hostility toward sense perceptions when he ad-
monishes those who would read an infinite number of meanings into 'being' 
and 'non-being' because of a belief that truth is found in appearances and 
sense perceptions. 51 It would seem, then, that for Aristotle to know such 
a principle, the proper terms need only to be analyzed, or as Suarez states 
it-- "the apprehension, understanding, and explanation of the terms." 
That an analysis of terms reveals the self-evident axioms is also 
an interpretation given to Aristotle's treatment of axioms in the Posterior 
Analytics, I 2. Aristotle simply states: "That which must be grasped if 
any knowledge is to be acquired, I call an axiom; for there are certain 
things of this nature and we are accustomed to apply this name especially 
to them ... 52 While this seems general enough to be rather innocuous, it 
should be noted that several lines above this passage Aristotle defines a 
proposition as either the affirmative or negative part of a contradiction. 
He states further that if demonstration is to be had then one or the other 
' 
part of the contradiction must be assumed. This may not be necessarily 
so if the proposition is a "thesis" which may assume either part indif-
ferently for the sake of dialectics. But one or the other part of a 
50only once in the entire discussion does Aristotle refer to 
experience. He wonders why, if 'being' and 'non-being' have no definite _, 
meaning, a man will not walk into a well rather than around it. Meta. IV, 
1008 a 16. 
51Meta. IV, 1009 a 1-13. 
52post. Ana., 72 a 17-19. 
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contradiction must be assumed if there is to be true demonstration. 
Axioms bear the rank and dignity if one is to make the assumption. That 
is to say, axioms afford the necessary ground for the mental assertion 
that something is or is not the case and cannot be otherwise. Aristotle's 
explication of "axiom" as the sine ~ non of all demonstration falls 
back on nothing more than the meaning of contradiction through an anal-
ysis of 'being' and 'non-being.' 
Scholastic philosophers have generally interpreted Aristotle's 
axioms as those self-evident (~ ~ nota) propositions that are revealed 
in the mind by analysis. In his commentary on the Posterior Analytics I a 
(a commentary on the same passage from Aristotle quoted above), Aquinas 
writes: 
Some (principles) are truly called dignitates et propositiones 
maximae because of their certitude for making other things 
manifest. The truth of these dignitates is in all cases ~ 
se nota so that it is impossible to mentally conceive the 
contrary, even though one may speak it. 5 3 
What seems important in this interpretation by Aquinas is the re-
lating of the self-evidence of th~ dignitates (axioms) to the mental 
conception of them. The rank of these first principles (at least the prin-
ciple of contradiction) exalts them above sensory dependence. They carry 
in the mind their own warrant. Commenting again on the same passage in 
5 3Thomas Aquinas, Commentaria in Aristotelem, Expositio 
Posteriorum Analyticorum, Lectio Quinta Editio Leonina, Vol. I, p. 15 6. 
The translation is mine; the original text reads: "Alia vero dicuntur 
dignitates et propositiones maximae, propter eorum certitudinem ad 
manifestandum alia. Harum dignitarum veritas est ita omnibus per 
se nota, ut null us contrarium credere mente possit, etse ore proferat." 
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the second Analytics, Aquinas refers to the principle of contradiction and 
makes an explicit reference to the Metaphysics IV where the principle was 
"proved" by an analysis of 'being' and 'non-being. 1 
There is another (principle) which is called dignitas vel 
propositio which must necessarily be grasped in the mind 
and given assent to if anything is to be learned. It is 
evident that there are such principles as these, as it is 
proved in Metaphysics .IV from this principle: that af-
firmation and negation are not true at the same time; the 
contrary of this cannot be mentally conceived, even 
though it can be spoken. 54 
We have here an interpretation that definitely connects the axioms 
of the Posterior Analytics I 2 with those of the Metaphysics IV. Such an 
interpretation manifests a rationalistic tendency in Aristotle whereby the 
significance of sensory experience is diminished or disregarded altogether, 
and the exalted and noble first principles of demonstration are grasped by 
a mental analysis. 
Inductive Intuition 
While the texts cited above seem to provide sufficient warrant for 
a rationalistic grasping of first principles, Aristotle makes a very definite 
empirical commitment that results in the enigma of his polarity. 55 
5 4Ibid. , p. 15 8. The translation is mine; the original reads: 
"Alilid vero est, quod dicitur dignitas vel maxima propositio quam 
necesse est habere in mente et ei assentire quemlibet, qui doceri debet. 
Et manifestum est quod quaedam principia talia sunt, ut probatur in IV 
Metaphysicae de hoc principio: quod affirmatio et negatio non sunt 
simul vera, cuius contrarium null us mente credere potest etsi ore 
proferat. " 
55The term 'polarity' or 'bipolarity' has been used throughout this 
paper to indicate that neither the rationalistic nor the empirical tendency 
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First of all, demonstration would be impossible without the universal 
archai from which it proceeds. 56 However, since there can be no 
infinity of demonstrations, 5 7 the universal premises are not themselves 
demonstrated but rather are objects of an inductive process ( braywyn). 
"It is impossible to gain a view of universals except through induction 
...... 58 Furthermore, Aristotle insists that induction could not be 
possible without the experiences effected through sense perceptions. 
We cannot employ induction if we lack sense perception, 
because it is sense perception that apprehends par-
ticulars. It is impossible to gain scientific knowledge 
of them, since they can neither be apprehended from 
universals without induction, nor through induction 
apart from sense-perception. 5 9 
In short, 1) demonstration is impossible without universal premises; 
2) the grasping of such premises is impossible without induction; 3) in-
duction is impossible without sensory experience. Demonstration, therefore, 
basically rests on sensory experiences of particular events that somehow 
"lead on to" ( ) ' E:1raywyn ) universals. 
in Aristotle is found in its pure state .• · To interpret Aristotle as either wholly 
rationalistic (as some scholastics have done) or as wholly empirical (as 
some moderns have done, e.g. , Anton, Randall) necessitates a careful 
selection of certain texts and an exclusion of others. The bulk of the 
Aristotelian text, however, bears the bipolar tendency in which the ration-
alistic includes the empirical and the empirical contains the rationalistic. 
56post. Ana., 71 b 20-25; 81 b 1. 
57post. Ana., 72 b 19-24. 
58post. Ana., 81 b 2-3. 
59post. Ana. 81 b 5-9. 
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Later in the second Analytics, Aristotle gives a more specific 
account of how the principles are grasped by induction. Repeated sense 
perceptions form a memory pattern, the organization of which constitutes 
an "experience" ( i: µ n e: 1 p { a ): " ... because the memories, 
though numerically many, constitute a single experience. 11 60 Aristotle's 
notion of induction proceeds from the sensing of individuals, to the re-
peated memories of individuals, to the single experience. Demonstration 
may well be the "scientific" mode of deducing facts and their reasons, 
but all of this is impossible without the inductive grasping of the prin-
ciples of demonstration, i.e., the primary premises. "Clearly then it 
must be by induction that we acquire knowledge of the primary premises, 
because this is also the way in which general concepts are conveyed to 
us by sense perception. 11 61 And later in the Ethics, he writes: 
Now induction supplies a first principle or universal, 
deduction works from universals; therefore there are first 
principles from which deduction starts, which cannot be 
proved by deduction; therefore they are reached by in-
duction. 62 
Not only does Aristotle des ,cribe the process of arriving at a knowl-
edge of the first principles, he also names the faculty ( t ~ 1 s · ) that 
directs the process and realizes its completion. He asserts that of all 
60post. Ana., 100 a 5-6. Cf. also Meta. I, 980 b 30; 981 a 2. 
"It is from memory that men acquire experience, because the numerous 
memories of the same thing eventually produce the effect of a single 
experience. " 
6lpost. Ana., 100 b 3-4. 
62Nic. Eth., ll39b27-30. 
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the intellectual endeavors only scientific knowledg e ( t tr 1 a T ~ µ n ) 
and intuition ( vpus ) operate in the realm of certitude, but scientific 
knowledge is structured along demonstrative lines ( t£11f 6o e: 1 ~ 1 s) 
and cannot effect a knowledge of first principles. By a process of 
elimination, then, nous is said to be the power behind the acquisition 
of first principles. First principles are known through inductive intuition. 
In linking intuition with induction in his theory of knowing the principles, 
Aristotle lays heavy emphasis on the external senses, memory and 
experience as the necessary conditions of all knowledge, not only of the 
first principles. 
The very linking of the terms 'induction' and 'intuition' presents 
several difficulties. First of all, 'intuition' tends to signify an element 
of immediacy in knowledge. Such an "immediacy," of course, is precisely 
what Aristotle needs for the grasping of the immediate first principles. 
Once such knowledge is had, then demonstration can proceed through its 
mediating terms. Induction, on the other hand, conveys the notion of a 
process in which we are "led on'r from one step to the next. In other words, 
induction does not seem to be immediate; and one wonders how Aristotle 
can link the "immediacy" of intuition with the "steps" of induction. Yet 
Aristotle would insist that the knowledge of first principles is gained in 
this way. The answer may be that Aristotle refers to the immediacy of 
knowledge to distinguish from demonstrative knowledge which needs a 
middle term. Thus intuition of the principles is immediate in the sense of 
"non-demonstrative" and, therefore, not needing a middle term as cause 
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of the fact. Intuition, on the other hand, is not immediate in the sense 
of "needing no other in order to effect the knowledge." On the contrary, 
the intuitional apprehension of the principles necessarily depends upon 
"the sense perception which gives rise to memory and the repeated 
memories of the same thing which gives rise to experience.,. 53 The in-
tuitional insights can only be had after a process of repeated events; the 
process bears the Aristotelian rubric of "induction"; the repeated events, 
"experience. " 
Aristotle, of course, never clearly explains the nature of intuition 
and its relation to experience. Is nous the sum total of physical experi-
ences depending upon the enumeration of single instances? Is nous a 
spiritual function that imposes rational order on the sequence of experi-
ences? There does not seem to be sufficient warrant in the texts of 
Aristotle to give adequate answers to these questions. Indeed, the 
Aristotelian texts have done much to formulate these problems and others 
in the history of philosophy. What Aristotle's texts do imply is a double 
tendency: first, there is the impqrtance and necessity of sense experience 
for human knowledge; secondly, there is the tendency to establish a mode 
of understanding as overriding this experience. Concerning his claims to 
how one knows first principles, the inductive intuition approach puts 
greater stress on the role of experience, while the analytical intuition 
interpretation emphasizes more the superiority of intuitive reason. If the 
latter is at fault because it plays down the importance of sensory experi-
ence, the former does not explain the importance of experience. 
63Post. Ana. , 100 a 4-5. 
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PRINCIPLES AS ONTIC AND PRINCIPLES AS AXIOMATIC 
In the very beginning of this work, it was hinted that the term 
"principle" carried a dual meaning. The first is an objective meaning 
whereby "principle" signifies the cause of something prescinding from 
one's knowledge of such a cause, 64 The second meaning designates a 
subjective role in which principle as reason relates what-there-is to 
one's conceptual understanding. Principle as cause, therefore, empha-
sizes the ontic ground of what-there-is; principle as reason emphasizes 
the epistemic value of understanding what-there-is. 
Aristotle attempts to unite these meanings of "principle" under one 
study, First Philosophy, without destroying the distinction of meanings. 
He raises the problem of whether or not the discipline that investigates 
the first principles of being should also investigate the first principles 
(axioms) of demonstration. 65 His answer is an emphatic affirmative, 
maintaining that 
, •. the investigation of these axioms too pertains to 
one science, namely the science of the philosopher; 
for they (axioms) apply to all . existing things and not to 
a particular class separate and distinct from the rest. 
Moreover all thinkers employ them--because they are 
axioms of being qua being, . , • 66 
64In citing this "objective" meaning of 'principle,' we are not 
necessarily maintaining that things exist in themselves apart from any 
knowing subject. Rather, the "objective" meaning of 'principle' as 
"cause" signifies a shift of emphasis to the ontic ground without 
emphasizing the relational role of cognition. 
65Meta. III, 995 b 7-12. 
66Meta, N, 1005 a 21-24. 
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Both in his formulation of the problem and in his resolution, 
Aristotle gives strong indication that the principle of contradiction is not 
only a causa (an ontological principle of being), but a ratio as well (an 
epistemic principle of knowing). 
In formulating the problem, Aristotle tells what he means by axioms 
t 
giving first an epistemic meaning, " ... that everything must be either 
affirmed or denied. ,.57 He immediately gives the more ontological expres-
sion " ... and, it is impossible at one and the same time to be and not 
to be. "68 After the problem is solved by Aristotle and he is assured that 
it is the philosopher's task to study principles of being and principles of 
demonstration, he again states the axiom of axioms in its dual implication. 
First he gives the cognitional expression whereby it is impossible to 
predicate contrary attributes of the same subject at the same time; and, 
secondly, he states that it is impossible to imagine that the same thing 
"is" and "is not. ,.59 
Here the assumption is made that reality is intelligible. Whatever 
may follow in Aristotle's thought must assume as indemonstrable that 
things-that-are can be conceptually uttered with meaning. Being is 
basically mind-related. That an inseparable link exists between things-that-
are and things-that-are-uttered-conceptually is unquestionable, and the chain 
that links them together is the principle of contradiction. Being and being's 
67Meta. III, 996 b 29. 
68Meta. III, 996 b 30-31. 
69Meta. IV, 1006 b 17-34. 
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intelligibility are founded on the same principle. The distinction that can 
be made is based on one's point of view. Objectively considered {i.e., 
considering the object known), things are and cannot not be; subjectively 
{i.e., considering the subject who knows), one cannot §Y that the same 
thing "is" and "is not" at the same time. This principle that has a double 
character is so foundational and primary that it rests on no previous 
hypothesis. 70 
It was already noted above in a previous chapter that too rational-
istic an interpretation has been given to Aristotle's principles of contradiction 
and excluded middle. He, himself, while exalting these principles as the 
basic assumption of all that is and is meaningful, is aware of the dif-
ficulty in employing such principles. This is especially true in the face 
of future contingencies when it is not certain what must be the case. Some-
thing may or may not happen in the future. We have no absolute knowledge 
of impending events, but neither are such events completely devoid of 
meaning. We are able to project some meaning into contingencies by 
postulating alternatives which ultimately ?raw meaning from the contra-
diction axiom. For example, there may or may not be a sea battle tomorrow; 
but at least this much is certain: either there will be a battle or there will 
not. Both alternatives cannot be accepted; both alternatives cannot be 
rejected. And without this assumption, all speculation and all "reality" 
is meaningless. 71 
70Meta. N, 1005 b 16. 
71 De Interpretatione, 19 a 3 2. 
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This dual meaning of "principle" coincides with the bipolarity in 
Aristotle's philosophy. Principles as reasons tend toward a rationalistic 
expression of what-there-is; while principles as ontic causes offer a 
more flexible and less rigid realization of contingent events. 
The meaning of Aristotelian "Science" is also affected by the 
ambivalence of archai. And too often a strict meaning of "science as 
that which demonstrates" is associated with Aristotelian episteme. 
Aristotle's use of the term is much broader than this and a more complete 
understanding of it will help to explicate further his theory of archai and 
also his meaning of wisdom and/or philosophy. 
THE MEANINGS OF "SCIENCE" 
It was said above that Aristotle feels that he has solved the problem 
of whether or not one science (First Philosophy) should study both rationes 
essendi and rationes demonstrandi. The problem is solved by assuming a 
rational character in being based primarily on the principle of contradiction. 
However, the basic problem that is engendered may be so urgent that 
perhaps one's very meaning of philosophy awaits the answer. The problem 
takes on many forms and subsidiary expressions: What is the nature of 
this "science" of First Philosophy that seeks such universal certitude? 
Is a science demonstrative, working from given premises to a conclusion? 
Are the first principles that the philosopher seeks premises or conclusions? 
If they are premises, then are they not hypotheses? Yet Aristotle has 
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maintained that the most certain principle is ). C I ovx u1ro6e:cns 72 
If they are conclusions, then is something prior to them? Basically, 
the problem involves the meaning of Aristotelian science; more specif-
ically, it involves the meaning of the term ) I e:1r 1.crTnJJn 
Throughout the Metaphysics, Aristotle refers to the ) I e:1r 1.crTnJJn 
under consideration. Book IV• begins with " t 1r 1. a T n µ n T 1. s ?i 8 e: wp e:'i 
TO 'ch, ( )I ~ ov ... ... 73 
A difficulty appears when the role of demonstration arises in connection 
with ) / e:1r1.crTnJJn • Aristotle himself recognizes this problem in the 
Posterior Analytics I 3 in which ~e argues for the scientific knowledge 
t'lrl.OTTlJJn ) of first principles even though those principles are 
not demonstrable &1rooe:(KT1.l<n ) . Failure to distinguish 
J I 
e:1r1.crTnJJn from ch6oe:1.~1.s places Aristotle in the difficult 
situation of having to demonstrate the indemonstrable. Owens see-s the 
difficulty: 
But at this stage (the establishing of indemonstrable 
principles) the dialectical approach brings to light a 
rather embarrassing situation. ,The first principles of 
wisdom, the separate Entities are not immediately 
evident. If they are the first principles of wisdom, 
how can they be established by Aristotelian dialectic? 
They have to be demonstrated. The things that are 
primarily knowable in themselves do not seem to be 
primarily knowable in regard to human cognition. How 
then can they be discovered by the dialectical 
scrutiny? 7 4 
72Meta. IV, 1005 b 16. 
73Meta. IV, 1003 a 20. 
740wens, op. cit., p. 180. 
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In a brief commentary on Aristotelian science, J. H. Randall at 
times seems to distinguish science from demonstration and at other times 
identifies the terms. 
The Posterior Analytics undertakes to analyze what science 
is, and how to use language, logos, as an instrument, 
organon, to formulate and express it. In the Posterior 
Analytics Aristotle thus answers the question raised in 
the Theaetetus: What is episteme, science? Aristotle's 
answer runs: We "just know," we have genuine "science" 
episteme, when we can state in precise language not only 
that things are so, hoti, but also why they are as they 
are, dioti, and why they have to be that way. 7 5 
So far Randall has identified ) / e:,r 1 oT nµn as knowledge of causes 
without any particular association of that knowledge with causal relation 
to previous knowledge. He then continues identifying ) / e:,r 1 oT nµn 
entirely with demonstration in which the knowledge is scientific because 
it is deduced from "more fundamental truths." 
We possess science when we can prove and demonstrate 
statements about them, by relating those statements to 
other statements of which they are the necessary consequences. 
"Science" is thus for Aristotle a knowledge of the why' s, 
the diotis, the "reasons for" true statements. It is a know-
ledge of the dependence of true statements on more 
fundamental truths, on "first ,things" ta prota, or "causes," 
aitia. Science, that is, is like geometry, the model 
Aristotle clearly has in mind, as the one fully developed 
and formalized science the Greeks had managed to achieve, 
in which theorems are demonstrated from initial axioms 
and definitions .... Science is thus demonstration, 
apodeixis. As in geometry, it demonstrates the reasons 
why, ta dioti, things are as they are observed to be, 
and why they must be so, and it demonstrates these 
reasons why from "first things," ta prota. 76 
75J. H. Randall, Aristotle (New York: Columbia Univ., 1960), 
pp. 33-34. 
76Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
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According to Randall's meaning of ' / E'll'l.OTT)µT) , it is not 
distinct from &n60E1.f;1.s ; and one would have to conclude that in the 
Metaphysics where Aristotle speaks of a science ( tn1.aT~µn} 
of first principles and causes, he is either misusing the term II fn10T~µn" 
(if first philosophy is not demonstrative) or he intends first philosophy to 
be productive of knowledge deduced from the &p xa 1. (which it never seems 
to be). 
In Ross' excellent Greek edition and commentary on the Meta-
physics, he seems to recognize a distinction between science and 
demonstration: 
In the first place, though he (Aristotle} calls metaphysics 
a science, he does not suppose that it is demonstrative 
through and through. No science is that. Every science 
starts with bp1.aµo1. and 6n66Ea1.s , unproved 
definitions of all its terms and unproved assumptions that 
there exist objects corresponding to the chief of those 
terms. These unproved propositions are its &p xa 1. 77 
Even here Ross' meaning of science is not quite clear. What does 
he (Ross) mean by stating that metaphysics as a science is not 
"demonstrative through and through"? ,And that like all other sciences, 
metaphysics must assume its ) ' apxa1. ? Does this mean that given the 
first principles in the Metaphysics, Aristotle is then going to demonstrate 
being qua being? And that insofar as being qua being is demonstrated 
from the &p xa 1. --to that extent metaphysics is a science? And insofar as 
the &p xa 1 are indemonstrable, then metaphysics is not a "through and 
77Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1924) t P• 251. 
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through II science? If this is what Aristotle means, it is not what he seems 
to say. First of all, metaphysics is a science that does not rest on &'ll'b6e:01s. 
As it was quoted above: "For the principle which the student of any form 
of Being must grasp is no hypothesis ( i:oui:o oDx 01T66e:01s ). 78 
It is true as Ross states that the tLpxa1. are unproved (and one might add 
unprovable} assumptions, but they ( &p xa1. ) are not hypothesis in the 
sense of leading to further conclusions. First Philosophy is simply the 
exposing of the irreducible principles of being as such. It can be called 
, / 
e:11'101:nµn by Aristotle since he uses the term in a generic sense 
indicating causal knowledge without any specific reference to conclusions 
deduced from those L / ) ' a;\T\a Ka\ apxa1 . When he makes specific 
reference to demonstrative knowledge, he usually couples the words 
II alll'OOe:\KT\Kn t'IT \ 01:nµn . ,,79 Ross indicates the frustration one 
will experience upon waiting for Aristotle to deduce conclusions in his 
metaphysical II science. 11 
So far Metaphysics is doing only the preliminary work of 
a science, the formulation and in some cases the com-
mendation of definitions a,nd hypotheses. Does it ever 
proceed to the main work of a science, the drawing of 
conclusions from these? It seems that the answer must 
be in the negative. The procedure throughout the Meta-
physics remains aporematic. A moments comparison of 
its procedure with that of geometry, for instance, will 
show the difference. Aristotle's frequent description of 
metaphysics as the science of principles itself suggests 
that it is not meant to get beyond principles to conclusions. 80 
78Meta. IV, 1005 b 15-16. 
79cf. Post. Ana., 71 b 20; 72 b 19; 76 a 36; 76 b 11-12. 
8 0 Ros s , op . cit. , p . 2 5 2 . 
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The more important point that Ross does not raise is this: If 
metaphysics is not intended to deduce conclusions from the &pxa't 
(which--the feeling here is--it is not), then can Aristotle legitimately 
call it a science (which he does)? Concerning the latter point, i.e. , 
Aristotle's use of ) / e:1r10-rnµn in reference to metaphysics, the 
textual use of the term appears t o prescind from any question of demon-
strating conclusions from the & P x a 1. Rather ' / e:1r10-rnµn is simply 
a knowledge of principles. In the Metaphysics, what are investigated 
are the first principles and the highest causes so that the knowledge 
( ) / e:1r10-rnµn ) is the knowledge of a philosopher--i. e., it is wisdom 
ao4>(a ). 
"Thus it is clear that Wisdom ( 004>(a) is knowledge { l1r10-rnµn 
of certain principles ( T\VCXS &pxas) and causes ( at.(as ),"81 
And again in the next chapter: 
"Since we are investigating this kind of knowledge ( l1r10.~µnv), 
we must consider what these causes ( a { -r { as ) and principles ( 6px~s) 
( , / are whose knowledge e:1r10-rnµn is ;Ni s dom ( a o 4> { a ) . " 8 2 
From these passages it seems fairly clear that Aristotle is using 
the term " , / e:1r10-rnµn " in some sort of alignment with wisdom. In 
doing so he pres ,cinds from any connection " , / e:1r10-rnµn "may have 
with " ln 6 o e: 1 ~ 1 s . " In the Posterior Analytics, after Aristotle claims 
the importance of knowing and proceeding from indemonstrable first 
81Meta. I, 982 a 1-2. 
82Meta. I, 982 a 3-5. 
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principles, he proceeds to state two views contrary to his own; viz., that 
there is no knowledge since all knowledge must be demonstrative and the 
&pxa1. are not demonstrable; and, secondly, that there is knowledge 
since all facts are demonstrable including the flp xa) . In stating his 
own view Aristotle maintains that there is knowledge and yet the ' .... apxat 
are not demonstrable. 
( } / "We, however, hold that not all knowledge e: 1r la T n µ n) 
is demonstrative ( c':rn O OE:\ KT\ Kn \I ) . 1183 This type of non-demonstrative 
l1r lOT11lln grasps the first principles from which demonstration pro-
Ce eds and indeed this type Of €;'Ir\ C1 T 11 µ n has its ~ principle, i.e., 
a psychological principle, v o us He continues: 
The knowledge of immediate premisses is not by demon-
stration. It is evident that this must be so; for if it is 
necessary to know the prior premisses from which the 
demonstration proceeds, and if the regress ends with the 
immediate premisses, the latter must be indemonstrable. 
Such is our contention on this point. Indeed we hold 
not only that E'lrlOTTllln is possible, but that there 
is a definite first principle of knowledge ( &p x riv l 1r la T n µ n s) 
by which we recognize ultimate truths. 84 
All well and good! Not every t1r \ OTl') ll n is demonstrable; 
' 1 I there 1s an e:1r toTnµn of highest principles that constitutes wisdom. 
But can this be reconciled with the claim in the second Analytics that 
there can be no :, I e:1rt0Tnµn of first principles? 
Now of the intellectual faculties that we use in the 
pursuit of truth some (e.g. scientific knowledge E 'Ir\ (1 T n µ n 
and intuition vous ) are always true, whereas others 
83post. Ana., 72 b 19-20. 
84post. Ana., 72 b 21-25. 
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(e.g. , opinion and calculation) admit falsity; and no 
Other kind Of know ledge ( £ 'Ir 1. 0 T }1 µ n ) except 
intuition ( v o us ) is more accurate than scientific 
knowledge ( l'lrl.OTT1µn ).85 Also first principles 
are more knowable than demonstrations, and all 
scientific knowledge involves reason. It follows that 
there can be no scientific knowledge ( l 'Ir 1. a T n µ n ) 
of the first principles ( -rwv &pxwv ) and since 
nothing can be more infallible than scientific knowl-
edge except intuition, it must be intuition that 
apprehends the first principles. 86 
There appears, of course, to be a contradiction, which would be 
a rare paradox indeed that Aristotle in his exposition of the principle of 
contradiction should contradict himself. In the Metaphysics Aristotle 
argues that there is an l 'Ir 1. a T n µ n 
Analytics he claims that there is no 
In the Ethics he likewise states that 
' ' 
of first principles; in the Posterior 
' / e:'lr1.o-rnµn 
' / e:'lr1.o-rnµn 
of first principles. 
cannot provide the 
knowledge needed to grasp the apxa1.: 
Scientific knowledge ( ln1.0-rnµn ) is a mode of 
conception dealing with universals and things that are 
of necessity; and demonstrated truths ( &pxa1. -rwv 
&'lroOe:1.KTWV ) and all scientific knowledge ( 'lraons 
ln1.o-rnµns )--since this involves reasoning--are 
derived from first principles. Consequently the first 
principles from which scientific truths are derived can-
not themselves be reached by scie;ce. 87 
85 Again e 'Ir 1. a n1 µ n is used as distinct from the implication 
of demonstration. This distinction is even clearer in the passage im-
mediately following the above quote in which he states: "This (i.e., 
that voOs grasps apxa) ) is evident not only from the foregoing con-
siderations but also because the starting point ( &p x n ) of demonstration 
( a'lrooe:(E;e:ws ) is not demonstration ( a'lrooe:1.E;1.s ), and so 
the starting point of scientific knowledge ( ~ 11' 1. a T n µ n ) is not itself 
scientific knowledge t 'Ir 1. a T n µ n • " 
Post. Ana., 100 b 12-14. 
86Post. Ana., 100 b 5-11. 
87Nic. Eth., 1140 b 31-35. 
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This apparent difficulty can be avoided if one realizes in the 
Aristotelian texts two meanings of ' / E'll'taTnµn . First of all, there is 
a strict and proper use whereby conclusions are deductively demonstrated 
from first principles. In this meaning of ' / E'll'taTnµn , demonstration 
, / 
0'11'00£\f;\S ) is its principal quality ( ~E; 1 s ) . Perhaps the sub-
script "alpha" will best convey this meaning of ' / E'll'taTnµn and its chief 
quality of &.,..t cS £ 1 E; 1 s J.,..1aT11µn , then, is knowledge in the 
. a 
strict sense, i.e., deductive knowledge demonstrating from first principles. 
However, ) / E'll'taTnµn also has a more analogous meaning. This type 
·, 
of knowledge is no less certain than , / E'll'taTnµn 
a 
since it too grasps 
the necessary and eternal; but its method is inductive whereby it grasps 
basic concepts and principles. Since voos is the principle of this 
inductive knowledge of first principles, we subscript "nu" to . , E'll'taTnµn 
so that l i 1C1TT1µn 
v 
designates knowledge that is not strictly 
scientific but analogously so, inasmuch as the principles of demonstration 
must be known with intuitive certitude before demonstration itself can be 
accomplished. The distinction can be expressed schematically: 
i'll'\C1Tl1µn 
a 
> I 
£'11'taTnµn 
v 
l . science in the strict sense 
2. deductive 
3. employing & .,.. 6cS £ 1 E; 1 s 
from first principles 
1. analogous meaning of "science" 
2. inductive 
3. employing vous as the ultimate 
principle of grasping first principles 
I 
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The passage that best contains all of the above distinctions is 
Aristotle I s attempt to define ) I e:1r 1 crTnµn in the sixth Book of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. 
The nature of l 1r 1 O' T T1 µ n --employing the term in its 
exact sense and disregarding its analogous uses--may 
be made clear as follows. We all conceive that a thing 
which we know scientifically cannot vary; when a thing 
that can vary is beyond the •range of our observation, we 
do not know whether it exists or not. An object of 
t1Tt<1Tnµn , therefore, exists of necessity. It is 
therefore eternal, for everything existing of absolute neces-
sity is eternal; and what is eternal does not come into 
existence or perish. Again it is held that all i 1r 1 cr T 11 µ n 
can be communicated by teaching, and that what is 
scientifically known must be learned. But all teaching 
starts from facts previously known, as we state in the 
Analytics, since it proceeds either by way of induction, 
or else by way of deduction. Now induction supplies a 
. first principle or universal, deduction works from univer-
sals; therefore, there are first principles from which 
deduction starts which cannot be proved by deduction; 
therefore, they are reached by induction. l 1r 1 cr T Tlµ n 
therefore, is the quality whereby we demonstrate, 88 with 
the further qualifications included in our definition of it in 
the Analytics, namely, that a man knows a thing scientifi-
cally when he possesses a conviction arrived at in a certain 
way, and when first principles on which that conviction 
rests are known to him with certainty--for unless he is more 
certain of his first principles than of the conclusion drawn 
from them, he will only possess the )<nowledge in question 
accidentally. Let this stand as our definition of 
t1r1crTnµn ,89 
With ' / e:1r1crTnµn including both possibilities of deductive 
demonstration and inductive apprehension of principles, Aristotle can now 
call First Philosophy the investigation of an 1 I e:1r1<1Tnµn that seeks 
out the 6pxa1 and whose knowledge is wisdom. For wisdom is a kind 
88This precise sentence II l1r1<1Tnµn 
is the expression of t1r1crTnµn 
a 
89Nic. Eth. , 1139 b 18-35. 
2. (I 
e:O'TlV e:~15 ci1rooe:{KT1Kn u 
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of t 11' \ a T n 'I.In • In fact it ( a O 4' ( a ) is a combination of t 11' \ a T 11 l.ln 
(i.e. , knowledge acquired by intuiting first principles) and ) / E:11'\0TT)lJT) 
(i.e., knowledge acquired by demonstrating from first principles). 
The wise man therefore must not only know the conclusions 
that follow from his first principles, but also have a 
true conception of those principles themselves. Hence 
Wisdo~ m~st be a combinat~on of }ntelli8ence ( vous 
and Scientific Knowledge ( , e: 1r 1 at n 'I.In). 9 
And again in the Ethics, he writes: 
a 
"These considerations therefore show that Wisdom is both Scien-
tific Knowledge ( J 1r 1 at n 'I.In ) and Intuitive Intelligence ( v p Gs ) 
as regards the things of the most exalted nature . .,91 
Wisdom is a definite sort of knowledge--an ' / E:11'\0TTllJl'l 
simultaneously knows its principles through an intuiting vous-
that 
principle ( ' ; E:11'\0TTllJl'l ) and knows its certain conclusion by demon-
\) 
stration from those principles ( ~ 1r 1 at n 'I.In ) • 
a 
Not only do first principles provide a point of common ground for 
intuition and demonstration, but also their all-pervasive priority renders 
consistent the solution to the problem Arist~tle had raised in the Meta-
\) 
physics, viz., whether the same ) / E:11'\0TT)lJT) that studies principles of 
being should also study principles of demonstration. The primary principles 
have a dual purpose. Being and being's demonstrability are both rooted in 
the same source. Hence, if one accepts Aristotle I s f 1r 1 at n 'I.In 
\) 
90Nic. Eth., 1141 a 17-19. According to our distinction, this 
meaning of t 1r 1 at 11 l.l n would have the alpha subscript. 
91Nic. Eth., 1141 b 2-3. 
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of being qua being (metaphysics), one also accepts his ' / e:1r 1 aTnµ n 
a 
of being qua demonstrable (methodology). And the important point here 
is this: one will accept the Aristotelian "sciences" of first philosophy 
and demonstration if one accepts his notion of first principles. Nothing 
else holds such an esteemed position in his entire philosophy than what 
he considers to be the basic . and ultimate and prime reasons why some-
thing is the way it is and could not be otherwise without involving another 
kind of principle. To what extent have the "principles" of Aristotle been 
accepted? From an ontological point of view, do the principles provide 
the structural priority that Aristotle claims? How self-evident, eternal 
and invariable are the primary principles? Or are these latter notions 
simply a restatement of Platonic Ideals freed from the myth and poetics of 
Aristotle I s great teacher? 9 2 From the point of view of methodology and/ or 
demonstration, how much do the "new sciences" born of the Copernican 
revolution owe to the ) / e:1r 1 a T nµ n of Aristotle nurtured as it is on first 
principles? 93 If the primary principles do not give the knowledge or 
wisdom that will satisfy man, must they be replaced by working approxi-
mations which in turn give way to further hypotheses? Is philosophy's 
task autonomous--establishing conclusions from principles independent 
of further empirical findings? Or is philosophy's prime principle that 
whereby the entire range of scientific endeavors is ordered and reshaped 
according to new findings? 
92cf. F. Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik und 
Rhetorik, Berlin, 1929. 
93cf. E. McMullin, "Medieval and Modern Science: Continuity 
and Discontinuity," International Philosophical Quarterly, Feb. 1965, pp. 103-129. 
- 204 -
An examination of Aristotelian texts reveals no single answer 
to these questions. Aristotle's realm of Reason and its principles of 
demonstration follow more or less the same pattern as his realms of 
Nature. An analogous use of basic, irreducible principles exhibits a 
bipolar tension. At one pole there is stress on the a priori, the neces-
sary, the Absolute. Ultimately, nous is the underlying principle of 
principles at this pole, whether it is the intuition of axioms in the second 
Analytics or the Pure Act of thinking in the Metaphysics. Concerning 
Aristotle's principles of demonstration, this rationalistic pole takes the 
form of strict reasoning, i.e. , absolute connection between self-evident, 
universal premises that yields a certain and indubitable conclusion. 
At the other pole, there is the recognition of contingency, the 
relative, the individual being or event that may or may not be. Basically, 
experience is the underlying guide. In demonstration, this pole of 
thought tempers the mode of reasoning. Postulates and hypotheses are 
offered, necessity is conditioned by various assumptions; and probability, 
or at least the II probable 11 ( ,,. E\KOS 
Aristotelian scheme of demonstration. 
)94 finds its way into the 
This bipolar play in Aristotle's thought prevents any extreme 
principle ( v o us or l µ 1r E 1 p ( a ) from assuming exclusive rights 
as Cause (on tic) or Reason (epistemic) of all things. Aristotle, therefore, 
94ror a treatment of probability and/or the probable in Aristotle 
confer E. H. Madden, "Aristotle I s Treatment of Probability and Signs, " 
Philosophy of Science, April 1957, pp. 167-172. 
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is neither Rationalist nor Empiricist (Naturalist). Yet, considered 
together, he is both Rationalist and Empiricist, for throughout his works 
reason is at work discovering the "principles" of experience and nature. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources 
Aristotle. Aristotle's Metaphysics. 2 vol. A revised text with Intro-
duction and Commentary by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon 
Pre S S I l 9 2 4 • 
----
• Aristotle's Physics. A revised text with Introduction and 
Commentary by W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936. 
____ • Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics. A revised text with 
Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1949. 
----
• The Basic Works of Aristotle. Edited with an Introduction by 
Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 1941. 
----
• Generation of Animals. With an English translation by A. L. 
Peck. London: W. Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1943. 
----
• Historia Animalium. With an English translation by A. L. Peck. 
London: W. Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1965. 
____ • The Metaphysics. 2 vol. With an English translation by Hugh 
Tredennick. London: W. Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1933. 
____ . Meteorologica. With a,n· English translation by H. D. P. Lee. 
----
London: W. Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1951. 
. The Nicomachean Ethics. With an English translation by 
H. Rackham. London: W. Heinemann; New York: G. P. 
Putnam, 1926. 
____ . On Coming-To-Be and Passing-Aw~. With an English trans-
lation by E. S. Forster. London: W. Heinemann; Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1955. 
- 206 -
- 207 -
• On The Heavens. With an English translation by W. K. C. 
----
Guthrie. London: W. Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1939. 
____ • On Interpretation. With an English translation by Harold P. Cook. 
----
----
London: W. Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1938. 
• On the Soul. With an English translation by W. S. Hett. London: 
w. Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939. 
• Parts of Animals. With an English translation by A. L. Peck. 
London: W. Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. 
Pre s s , 19 2 7 • 
____ • The Physics. 2 vol. With an English translation by Philip H. 
----
Wick steed and Francis M. Cornford. London: W. Heinemann; 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1929. 
• Posterior Analytics. With an English translation by Hugh 
Tredennick. London: W. Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1960. 
Secondary Sources 
Anton, John P. Aristotle's Theory of Contrariety. London: Routledge and 
Keg an Paul, 195 7. 
Aquinati, Thomae. Expositio Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelis. Leonis 
XIII edita Vaticanus. Propaganda Fide, 1884. 
Boas, G. Some Assumptions of Aristotle. Philadelphia: The American 
Philosophical Society, 1959. 
Bochner, S. "Aristotle's Physics and Today's Physics," International 
Philosophical Quarterly, May 1964, pp. 217-244. 
Buchanan, E. Aristotle's Theory of Being. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University 
Microfilm, 195 9. 
Cherniss, Harold. Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935. 
- 208 -
____ . Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1944. 
Copi, I. M. "Essence and Accident," The Journal of Philosophy, 1954, 
pp. 706-719. 
Elders, Leo. Aristotle's Cosmology: A Commentary on the De Coe lo. 
The Netherlands: Van Gorcur,n, 1965. 
Gohlke, P. Die Entstehung der Aristotelischen Prinzipienlehre. Tubigen: 
Muhr, 1954. 
Greene, M. "Aristotle's Circular Movement as a Logos Doctrine," Review 
of Metaphysics, Sept. 1965, pp. 115-132. 
Haring, E. S. "Aristotle's Physical Philosophy," Review of Metaphysics, 
Dec. 1961, pp. 271-277. 
Heath, Sir Thomas. Mathematics in Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1949. 
Jaeger, W. Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development. 
Translation by R. Robinson . . London: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2nd ed., 1948. 
Lee, H. D. P. "Geometrical Method and Aristotle's Account of the First 
Principles," Classical Quarterly, 1935, pp. 113-124. 
Lloyd, G. E. R. Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in 
Early Greek Thought. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1966. 
Lovejoy, A. O. The Great Chain of Being. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1936. 
Madden, E. H. "Aristotle's Treatment of Probability and Signs," 
Philosophy of Science, April 1957, pp. 167-172. 
Mc Mullin, E. The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy. 
Notre Dame, Indiana: Univ. Press, 1963. 
"Medieval and Modern Science - Continuity and Discontinuity," 
International Philosophical Quarterly, Feb. 1965. 
- 209 -
Owens, J. The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1951. 
"The Aristotelian Conception of the Sciences," International 
Philosophical Quarterly, May 1964, pp. 200-216. 
Randall, J. H. Aristotle. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1960. 
Ross, W. D. Aristotle. London: Methuen, 1923. 
Simon, Y. R. "Aristotelian Demonstration," Modern Schoolman, March 
1948 t pp, 183-190, 
Solmsen, F. Aristotle's System of the Physical World. Ithaca: Cornell 
Univ. Press, 1960. 
Vogel, C. J. Aristote et les Probl'emes de Methode. Louvain, 1961. 
Woodbridge, F. J. E. Aristotle's Vision of Nature. Edited by J. H. Randall. 
New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1965. 
Zeigelmeier, E. H. "The Discovery of First Principles According to 
Aristotle," Modern Schoolman, 1945, pp. 132-138. 
VITA 
I, Joseph J. Romano, was born on November 30, 1934 in 
Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, the son of Anthony Romano and 
Marguerite Forte Romano. I received my elementary and secondary 
education in the public school system of Conshohocken. In 1958 I 
earned a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Philosophy from St. Charles 
Borromeo Theological Institute which offered, in addition to the 
Philosophy program, a wide background in classic al studies. At 
St. Charles I was awarded the gold medal for academic excellence 
in Ancient History. In 1962 I received the Master of Arts Degree in 
Philosophy from Villanova University and delivered the graduate 
student address at commencement. I entered Bryn Mawr College in 
Septembe r 1963 and concentrated upon the historical approaches to 
Philosophy. I attended seminars under the direction of 
Miss Isabel S. Stearns, Mr. George L. Kline and Mr. Jose Ferrater Mora, 
each one of whom I thank for sharing with me their wealth of philosophical 
knowledge. My courses were arranged under the direction of 
Mr. Milton C. Nahm to whom I am indebted for his encouragement 
and personal interest in my career. In September 1965 I received a 
tuition scholarship from Bryrl Mawr College, and the following year 
successfully completed the preliminary examinations in the areas of 
Greek Philosophy, Seventeenth Century Rationalism, The Theoretical 
and Practical Philosophy of Kant, and Phenomenology. My work on 
the dissertation was carried out under the direction of 
Professor Ferrater Mora to whom I am most grateful for his invaluable 
suggestions and patient guidance o 
I am married to the former Jeanne M. Hart of Valley Forge, 
Pennsylvania. We have a daughter, Elizabeth, who is four-years-old. 
No small amount of thanks is due to my wife who typed both the first 
draft and the final copy of my dissertation. Currently I am teaching 
Philosophy at Cabrini College, Radnor, · Pennsylvania. 
